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Although South African law adopted the doctrine of common purpose from 19
th
 
century English law, the scope of the doctrine has been considerably extended. 
Whereas English law required presence at the time of the crime, in pursuance of a 
conspiracy to commit the crime in concert, South African law has dispensed with the 
need for all these requirements to be met. Thus, where there is a prior conspiracy, 
South African law does not require presence at the time of the crime, or an actual 
contribution towards its execution. Where there is presence at the time of the crime, it 
is unnecessary to prove a prior conspiracy, or an actual contribution towards the 
execution of the crime. All that is required is unilateral conduct showing solidarity 
with the conduct of the actual perpetrator. South African law has also dispensed with 
the need to establish the scope of a common purpose as a matter of objective fact. It is 
only necessary to prove association in a criminal enterprise of some kind, coupled with 
the necessary mens rea for the crime.  
 
This means that liability for a serious crime like murder can arise from a relatively 
trivial act of association, which in no way contributed to the death of the deceased, or 
encouraged or facilitated the commission of the crime. This is an unacceptable 
departure from the principles of normative criminal justice, which require liability and 
punishment to be commensurate with personal culpability. 
 
Although the normative basis for the doctrine was originally thought to lie in the 
principles of mandate, mandate cannot offer a tenable justification for the doctrine in 
its present extended form. It is argued that there is in fact no normative basis for the 
doctrine in this form. The only justifications that remain are instrumental in nature. 
The lack of a normative basis for the doctrine is inimical to a rational, systematic and 
principled approach to the law, whilst disregard for the principles of culpability, fair 
labelling and proportionality in punishment is unacceptable in a constitutional 
dispensation concerned with protecting fundamental human rights. At the same time, 
instrumental justifications for the doctrine are unconvincing. It is accordingly 
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South African criminal law, like that of other Western legal systems, is founded on the 
principle of personal responsibility – the idea that each individual is responsible for his 
own wrongdoing,
1
 and can therefore be held to account for it and punished 
accordingly.
2
 This idea originated in Canon law, as a corollary of the Judaeo-Christian 
doctrine of free will and its philosophical equivalent, the theory of self-determinism, 
which holds that human beings are able to govern their conduct according to their will. 
The medieval theologian-philosopher, St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), was an arch-
proponent of these ideas, which he developed in his leading works, The Treatise on 
Human Nature: Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles.
3
 An important 
implication of the principle of personal responsibility is the idea that, since each 
individual is responsible for his own wrongdoing, he is not as a general rule responsible 
for the wrongdoing of others.
4
 As Unterhalter explains: 
 
[The principle of personal responsibility] is a necessary entailment of the criminal law’s 
profound commitment to the separateness of persons. Blame attaches to individuals in virtue 
of their own actions because each person is sovereign over his actions and thus responsible 
for them. The law is rightly reluctant to hold one person responsible for the actions of 
another, for ordinarily another’s actions fall outside the domain over which the individual is 





                                                 
1
 Unless the context indicates otherwise, ‘his’ also denotes ‘her’ and ‘he’ also denotes ‘she’. 
2
 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) 49-50 and further authorities cited therein. 
3
 T Aquinas The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologica, Pars 1 reprinted ed (2002); Summa 
Contra Gentiles reprinted ed (1975). See also Kemp G et al Criminal Law in South Africa (2012) 14-15. 
4
 Thus, for example, a parent is not responsible in law for the crimes of his child and an employer is not 
as a rule responsible for the crimes of his employee, although there are instances where the legislature has 
imposed such liability, either expressly or by necessary implication. One example is section 24(1) of the 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
5
 D Unterhalter ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose: What Makes One Person Liable for the Acts of 
Another?’ (1988) 105 SALJ 671, 674. 





This principle was contrary to early Germanic law, which viewed criminal 
responsibility as a matter that concerned not only the offender and the victim, but also 
their extended families on both sides. The adoption of the principle of personal 
responsibility therefore represented an important milestone in the development of 
Western criminal jurisprudence and it remains an important cornerstone of modern 
South African criminal law. 
 
At the same time, however, South African criminal law recognises a significant 
exception to the principle of personal responsibility, in the form of the doctrine of 
common purpose:
6
 Where two or more participants associate together with a common 
purpose to commit a crime, each becomes liable for any crimes committed by his fellow 
participant(s) that fall within the scope of that common purpose. It is not necessary for 
the state to prove that each participant contributed towards the commission of the crime 
in a physical or even psychological sense. As a matter of law, the conduct of each 
participant is imputed to all the others. The participants are then regarded as co-
perpetrators and are accordingly liable for the crime itself, rather than for the separate 
and lesser offence of being accomplices to that crime. This represents a significant 
departure from the principle of personal responsibility. 
 
Although the doctrine of common purpose originated in and was adopted from English 
law, English law nevertheless based the liability of secondary participants on their 
proximity to the commission of the crime, in both a physical and a legal sense;
7
 for 
example ‘aiding and abetting’ the actual perpetrator, or procuring the commission of the 
crime, or providing advice or encouragement towards the commission of the crime 
before the event (counselling). English law therefore required a connection (although 
not necessarily a causal one) between the conduct of a secondary participant and the 
commission of the crime, which is no longer required in South African law.  
                                                 
6
 The term ‘doctrine’ has fallen out of favour in recent years, most modern authorities preferring to 
downplay its significance by speaking of the common purpose ‘rule’, or even by referring to common 
purpose as though it were simply a matter of fact (see, for example, R v Chenjere 1960 (1) SA 473 (FC) 
476D: ‘[T]he courts are not acting on a doctrine’; S v Maxaba 1981 (1) SA 1148 (A) 1149H: ’[T]here is 
nothing magical about the doctrine of common purpose’. See further P Parker ‘South Africa and the 
Common Purpose Rule in Crowd Murders’ (1996) 40 J of African Law 78, 86-7). As will be shown, 
however, common purpose is a basis for imputing liability where none would otherwise exist. As such, it 
constitutes a legal fiction and it is submitted that the term ‘doctrine’ is not only accurate but appropriate. 
7
 S v Nzo 1990 (1) SA 1 (A) 16I (per Steyn JA, minority judgment). 





In South African law, the unlawful conduct of a participant whose liability is founded 
on common purpose consists of his act of associating with the actual perpetrator, with a 
shared intention to commit the crime in question.
8
 It is not necessary to show that his 
conduct contributed towards the commission of the crime in a physical or even 
psychological sense. Consequently, liability for a serious crime like murder can arise 
from a relatively trivial act of association, which in no way contributed to the death of 
the deceased, or encouraged or facilitated the commission of the crime. This is regarded 
by some critics as an unacceptable departure from the principles of culpability, fair 
labelling and proportionality in punishment and, hence, as an unwarranted lowering of 
the threshold for liability.  
 
Although the Constitutional Court considered and rejected a number of constitutional 
objections to the doctrine of common purpose in S v Thebus,
9
 it did not consider the 
implications of the principles of culpability, fair labelling and proportionality in 
punishment. Furthermore, much of its reasoning on the issues that it did consider is 
questionable and the validity of its conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the 
doctrine are consequently open to doubt. Accordingly, there still remains considerable 
scope for enquiry regarding the constitutionality of the doctrine in its current form.  
 
The pressing need for such an enquiry was highlighted recently by the public response 
to the National Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA’s) short-lived decision to institute murder 
charges against 270 Lonmin mineworkers, thirty-four of whose colleagues had been 
shot and killed by the police during the course of an illegal strike at Lonmin’s Marikana 
mine, in August 2012. Although the NPA had adequate legal grounds for its decision, in 
terms of current South African law,
10
 it was greeted with outrage and disbelief by the 
                                                 
8
 Burchell EM & Hunt PMA South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Volume 1, General Principles 
of Criminal Law (1970) 364: ‘Association in a common illegal purpose constitutes the participation - the 
actus reus. It is not necessary to show that each party did a specific act towards the attainment of the joint 
object. Association in the common design makes the act of the principal offender the act of all.’ This 
passage was cited with approval by Botha JA in S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) 899E-F. 
9
 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
10
 See, for example, the defence of the NPA’s decision by Grant (James Grant ‘Marikana: Common 
purpose not outdated or defunct’ Mail & Guardian 31 August 2012 (available at  http://mg.co.za/article/ 
2012-08-31-marikana-common-purpose-not-outdated-or-defunct, accessed on 26 November 2013).  





general public, members of the intelligentsia and even the international community.
11
 
Although this public furore eventually resulted in the withdrawal of the charges, it 
clearly illustrates the extent to which the doctrine of common purpose has fallen out of 
step with common conceptions of crime and criminality. 
 
 
2. OBJECTIVES OF DISSERTATION 
 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to analyse and evaluate the doctrine of common 
purpose in South African law, in relation to its compatibility with the principles of 
personal responsibility, culpability, fair labelling and proportionality in punishment, 
which are commonly accepted principles of normative criminal justice in liberal 





It begins by identifying the classical models of complicity and describing and 
classifying the approaches adopted in Roman-Dutch, English and early South African 
law. It documents the adoption of the doctrine of common purpose into South African 
law and critically analyses its development and the extension of its scope by the South 
African courts, up to to the present day, in four principal areas; namely, the nature and 
effect of the doctrine; the methods of forming a common purpose; the relevance of the 
time of its formation; and the determination of the scope of a common purpose, 
including liability for collateral crimes. Accomplice liability, as a further (and possible 




Thereafter, the possible normative and instrumental justifications for the existence and 
retention of the doctrine of common purpose are discussed and evaluated. It is argued 
that, whilst there may have been clear and defensible normative justifications for the 
doctrine in its original form, there is no normative justification for the considerably 
                                                 
11
 See, for example, L Bridges ‘The case against joint enterprise’ (2013) 54(4) Race & Class 33, 33-34 
and further sources cited therein. See also the range of responses to Grant’s article on that webpage (note 
10 above). 
12
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (‘the 1996 Constitution’). 
13
 Liability as an accessory after the fact is not concerned with complicity in the crime itself and will 
therefore not be addressed in any detail. 





extended form of the doctrine, as it currently exists in South African law. It is also 
argued that the instrumental justifications that have been advanced for the doctrine have 
been exaggerated and lack empirical foundation.  
 
The constitutionally of the doctrine of common purpose is then addressed in depth. This 
is done in two stages: First, the Constitutional Court’s judgment and rulings on the 
constitutional issues raised in S v Thebus are analysed and criticised.
14
 It is argued that, 
contrary to the Constitutional Court’s findings, the doctrine of common purpose does in 
fact represent a violation of the constitutionally protected right to freedom and security 
of the person, as well as the right to be presumed innocent.
15
 Thereafter, the question of 
whether the doctrine of common purpose violates the constitutionally protected right to 
dignity (which was not adequately ventilated in S v Thebus) is examined afresh.
16
 In so 
doing, the content of the right to dignity, the principles of culpability, fair labelling and 
proportionality in punishment, and the interconnection between the right to dignity and 
these principles are examined and elucidated, to justify the conclusion that the doctrine 
of common purpose, in its present form, does in fact violate the right to dignity.  
 
Lastly, after summarising the conclusions to be draw from the above, practical 
proposals are submitted for the reform of the doctrine, so as to render the South African 
law of complicity constitutionally compliant. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methodology adopted throughout the dissertation is analytical and library- 
based. It has involved the location and analysis of texts, commentaries, cases and other 
written materials documenting the origins and development of the South African law of 
complicity and, in particular, the doctrine of common purpose. Although a full 
comparative analysis of the law of complicity in other comparable jurisdictions has not 
been undertaken, reference is made to other jurisdictions for purposes of comparison as 
and when appropriate. 
                                                 
14
 S v Thebus (note 9 above). 
15
 These rights are protected by s12(1)(a) and s35(3)(h), respectively, of the 1996 Constitution. 
16




AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF COMPLICITY IN ROMAN-DUTCH, 





This chapter will focus on the origins of the doctrine of common purpose in English law 
and its adoption into South African law. It will begin by discussing briefly the classical 
models for dealing with participation in crime, the approaches adopted in Roman-Dutch 
and English law, respectively, and then consider how these different approaches 
influenced the development of South African law. 
 
 
2. THE CLASSICAL MODELS OF COMPLICITY 
 
Criminal law scholarship traditionally distinguishes between two classical models for 
dealing with questions of complicity; namely, the monistic model and the 
dualistic/pluralistic model.
1
 In a criminal justice system based on a monistic model, 
‘each individual contributing to an offence is liable as a perpetrator and is responsible as 
such – regardless of the significance of the contribution’.
2
 The significance of the 
contribution may be relevant to the question of sentence, but not to the question of 
liability. In a system based on a dualistic/pluralistic model, a distinction is drawn 
between at least two types of participant; namely, ‘main offenders or perpetrators or 





Although it is thought that the dualistic/pluralistic model is closer to social reality, 
where distinctions are commonly drawn between primary and secondary offenders,
4
 the 
                                                 
1
 J Vogel ‘How to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic Contexts: Twelve Models’ 
(2002) Cahiers de défense sociale 151, 152. As the title of his article indicates, Vogel argues that there 
are in fact more than two possible models, however it is unnecessary for present purposes to canvass his 






 Vogel (note 1 above) 153. 






challenge facing legal systems that adopt this model is to decide what legal criteria 
should be employed for distinguishing between primary and secondary participants.
5
 
Questions of this nature do not arise with the monistic model, which has the virtue of 
simplicity,
6
 but a legal system that adopts this model undoubtedly faces its own 
challenges, such as how to reconcile the equal liability of all participants, regardless of 
contribution, with the principles of fairness and justice (including the principles of 
culpability and fair labelling) and where to draw the outer limits of liability. Of course, 
a particular legal system need not necessarily opt for a single approach. It might adopt a 
hybrid approach, in which both monistic and dualistic features are combined. An 
example of such an approach may be found in 19
th
 century English law.  
 
In the discussion that follows, it will be shown how, in South African law, the dualistic 
features of the English law approach were superimposed onto the monistic Roman-
Dutch law approach. It will also be shown, however, that despite the initial adoption of 
these dualistic features, South African law has generally preferred a monistic approach. 
Consequently, where dualistic features have been adopted, they have been short-lived 
and, where retained, there has been a tendency to minimise their role and influence. 
 
 
3. COMPLICITY IN ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
 
Roman-Dutch law tended to approach the question of crimes committed in concert by 
applying the concept of mandate (or, perhaps more properly, quasi-mandate),
7
 the legal 
effect of which is summed up in the maxim ‘qui facit per alium facit per se’ (literally 
translated as ‘he who acts through another, acts through himself’).
8
 On this basis, both 
the mandator and the mandatary would be equally liable for a crime executed by the 




 Simplicity could be a definite advantage in those jurisdictions where trial is by a jury of laypersons, who 
might have difficulty understanding complex, technical distinctions between different categories of 
participant. 
7
 Rabie explains that mandate implies a lawful juristic act, commissioned for a lawful purpose. Where the 
act was unlawful or immoral, or commissioned for an unlawful or immoral purpose, the law of mandate 
has no application – MA Rabie ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose in Criminal Law’ (1971) 88 SALJ 
227, 237, citing A Mattheus De Criminibus 1.3.26.7. For this reason, it is probably more accurate to 
speak of ‘quasi-mandate’ in such cases. 
8
 Author’s translation. This maxim forms the foundation of the law of agency. 








 The result was that, with the exception of accessories after the fact,
10
 
Roman-Dutch law did not distinguish between different categories of criminal 
participant. All participants in a crime were regarded as co-principals and all were 
equally liable for the crime itself.
11
 The Roman-Dutch law model of complicity was 
therefore monistic in nature. 
 
Rabie points out that, at the same time, the Roman-Dutch authorities also recognised a 
principle closely resembling the doctrine of common purpose in cases of prior 
conspiracy to commit murder, although possibly not in other types of case.
12
 He 
mentions, however, that although not clearly stated, the majority of the Roman-Dutch 
authorities did not appear to consider that this principle dispensed with the need to 
prove causation, in the sense that it was still necessary to show that the death was a 




Although the principles outlined above formed part of South African criminal law and 
still apply today (at least in theory), they are of relatively little significance, since, as 
will be shown, they were soon eclipsed by the adoption of the English law doctrine of 







                                                 
9
 A Domanski ‘Criminal liability based on mandate and order in the De Criminibus of Matthaeus’ (1997) 
10 SACJ 287 at 289-90 and further authorities cited therein.  
10
 In R v Peerkhan and Lalloo 1908 TS 798, 802-3, Wessels J mentions that, according to Matthaeus De 
Criminibus 1.2, even an accessory after the fact was regarded as a socius criminis, however Burchell & 
Hunt point out that, elsewhere, Mattheus himself and various other Roman-Dutch authors did draw a 
distinction between a socius criminis and an accessory after the fact, at least for purposes of punishment 
(EM Burchell and PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Volume 1, General Principles 
of Criminal Law (1970) 368 and further authorities cited therein). 
11
 It should perhaps be noted that Professor JC De Wet, co-author of one the leading Afrikaans textbooks 
on criminal law, disagrees with this view. In his view, Roman-Dutch law did recognise and distinguish 
between different forms of participation, at least for purposes of sentence (see JC de Wet & HL 
Swanepoel Strafreg 3ed (1975) 171-178 and further authorities cited therein). 
12
 Rabie (note 7 above) 235-6. 
13
 Ibid. 






4. COMPLICITY IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
English law had a hybrid approach towards complicity. Until the mid-19
th
 century, 
English law had a complex and sophisticated set of rules and distinctions for crimes 
committed in concert. In the first instance, a distinction was drawn between different 
types of crime; in particular, between felonies and misdemeanours.
14
 Complicity in the 
case of misdemeanours was monistic in nature, with no distinction drawn between 
primary and secondary parties. In the case of felonies, however, a dualistic approach 
was adopted, with a distinction being drawn between primary participants (principals) 
and secondary participants (accessories).
15




A principal was a person who was present at the time of the commission of a felony and 
who participated in its commission. Principals were further subdivided into principals 
in the first degree and principals in the second degree. A principal in the first degree 
was the person who actually executed the crime, whether acting alone or in concert with 
others.
16
 It also included a person who did not commit the crime himself, but who 
orchestrated its commission through an innocent agent.
17
 A principal in the second 
degree was a person other than a principal in the first degree, who was present at the 
time of the commission of the crime,
18
 and who aided and abetted (assisted, incited 
                                                 
14
 At common law, a felony was a crime ‘which occasioned ... the forfeiture of lands and goods’. They 
were usually also capital crimes. Felonies were therefore generally the more serious common law crimes 
(excluding the various forms of treason, which were in a category of their own), such as murder, rape and 
robbery, together with other felonies created by statute. All crimes other than treasons and felonies were 
misdemeanours, and attracted a lesser punishment. English law eventually abolished the distinction 
between felonies and misdemeanours by means of s1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. South African law 
has never distinguished between treasons, felonies and misdemeanours (Burchell & Hunt, note 10 above, 
83 and further authorities cited therein). 
15
 These distinctions did not apply in the case of misdemeanours. In the case of a misdemeanour, a person 
who played the role of an accessory before the fact was simply regarded as a co-principal, whilst no 
liability attached to a person who played the role of accessory after the fact (G Williams Criminal Law 
The General Part 2ed (1961) 346; JC Smith & B Hogan Criminal Law (1965) 68). Early editions of these 
texts have been consulted in order to ascertain, as nearly as possible, the state of the English law of 
complicity prior to recent developments. 
16
 There could be more than one principal in the first degree. For example, where A and B both attacked 
C, who died from the combined effect of their blows, both A and B would be principals in the first degree 
to murder (Smith & Hogan (note 15 above) 69). 
17
 Williams (note 15 above) 349. 
18
 The concept of ‘presence’ was given a fairly broad interpretation. It did not necessarily mean presence 
at the actual place where the crime was being committed, but would also include a person who was 






and/or encouraged) the commission of the crime; or who was present in pursuance of a 





The abettor’s liability as a co-principal was based on imputed conduct; the fiction that, 
by aiding and abetting the actual perpetrator, he identified himself with the latter’s 
crime to the extent that it was regarded by law as his own. As explained by Sir Matthew 
Hale, writing in 1736: 
 
[A]ll, that are present, aiding and assisting, are equally principal with him, that gave the 
stroke whereof the party died ... for tho one gave the stroke, yet in interpretation of law it is 
the stroke of every person, that was present, aiding and assisting, and tho they are called 








 centuries. Abettors were originally 
regarded as a third class of accessory – accessories at the fact – and enjoyed the same 
privileges as other accessories.
21
 At some time after the reign of Edward III (1327 – 
1377), however, a legal fiction emerged that a person who was present and who aided 
and abetted the commission of a murder, was himself regarded as having killed, as 
much as if he himself had given the deadly blow. Although this fiction was not 
immediately accepted as settled law, it had come to be regarded as such by the time of 
Mary I (1553 – 1558).
22
 The original rationale for the fiction is not entirely clear. The 
                                                                                                                                               
stationed some distance away, but near enough to be of assistance, for example by giving warning, or 
helping the perpetrators escape after the event. Equally, the concept of presence ‘at the time’ of the crime 
was given a fairly broad meaning. It was not necessary for an abettor to have been present throughout the 
commission of the crime, as long as he was present during part of its commission, or even so soon 
afterwards that his contribution could be regarded as part of the same train of events. Thus an abettor 
would include a person who, by arrangement, arrived at the scene of a housebreaking only after entry had 
been effected, but in time to help carry away the stolen goods (Williams, note 15 above, 354-6, 409; 
Smith & Hogan, note 15 above, 70; and further authorities cited therein). 
19
 Williams (note 15 above) 353; Smith and Hogan (note 15 above) 70; and see also below on common 
purpose in English law. Mere voluntary presence at the scene of a crime, in the absence of a prior 
conspiracy, and without actively aiding and abetting the commission of the crime, was not sufficient for 
liability (ibid). 
20
 Sir M Hale The History of the Pleas of the Crown 1 (1736) 437. Writing in 1762, Foster explained the 
principle in similar terms: ‘For in combinations of this kind the mortal stroke, though given by one of the 
party, is considered in the eye of the law, and of sound reason too, as given by every individual present 
and abetting. The person actually giving the stroke is no more than the hand or instrument, by which the 
others strike.’ (M Foster and M Dodson Crown Law 3ed (1792) 351). 
21
 Foster & Dodson (note 20 above) 347-348. For a brief account of these privileges, see 4.2 below. 
22
 Ibid. 






English judge, Sir Michael Foster, who provides the most extensive account of its 
adoption, was of the view that it was adopted purely in order to deny abettors the 
privileges available to accessories, notably that of being (effectively) immune from trial 
and punishment until such time as the actual perpetrator had been brought to justice: 
 
At the time when [Bracton and Fleta] wrote, and indeed for a long time afterwards, the law 
was taken to be, that persons present aiding and abetting were to be considered in the rank 
of accessaries, not liable to answer till the principal was convicted or outlawed: but the 
mischiefs of this rule were very great and many. The persons who were then esteemed the 
only principals might die before conviction: their accomplices might dispatch them, in 
order to procure their own indemnity; and it is no improbable supposition, that persons 
whose hands have been once dipped in blood should do so. The principals might be persons 
wholly unknown, or they might not be distinguishable from the rest of the party in-the-
confusion, which, usually attends the perpetration of enormous offences, where numbers 
are concerned. In all these cases, and others which might be mentioned, by too strict an 
adherence to this rule the hands of justice would be forever tied up with regard to the 
accomplices: and whenever the principals could lie concealed or flee, the course of justice 
against the accomplices was very much retarded.  
 
If I may be allowed to make a conjecture, I would say, that to obviate these mischiefs, and 
with that view alone, the judges by degrees came into the rule of law, as it now stands, That 
all present and abetting are principals ... What strengthens my conjecture is, that it appears 
by the cases cited in the margin, wherein the point came under consideration, that the 
persons who gave the mortal wounds, for they are all cases of murder, were fled from 
justice; and that none beside the persons present and abetting were amesnable: and 
probably in the other cases the fact might be so, though the reporters are silent as to that 
circumstance; and I the rather think so, because I do not at present recollect any case, 
wherein, as the law then stood, the distinction between principals and accessaries could be 
any way material, unless it were to determine, whether the prisoner should take his trial 
immediately, or must wait for the conviction of another person, who possibly might not 




In light of Foster’s explanation, it appears more than likely that, initially at least, the 
fiction rested on nothing more than expediency. Later, however, during the Victorian 
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era, when it might have been considered necessary to find some more legitimate (and 







An accessory was a person who played a supportive role in the commission of a felony, 
but who was not present at the time of its commission. Accessories, in turn, were 
divided into accessories before and after the fact. An accessory before the fact was a 
person who counselled or procured the commission of the crime (in other words, an 
instigator), or who conspired towards its commission, or who knowingly gave 
assistance to the principal(s) before the crime, but who was not present when it was 
committed.
25
 An accessory after the fact was a person who was not present when the 
crime was committed and did not contribute towards the commission of the crime itself, 





It will be noted from the above that English law attached considerable importance to the 
question of presence at the time of the crime (proximity to the commission of the crime 
in both physical and temporal terms).
27
 The role of prior conspiracy in determining the 
extent of liability was accorded less importance. Thus a conspirator would be a co-
principal only if he was also present at the time of the crime. A conspirator who was 
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The distinction between principals and accessories in felonies was originally important 
from a procedural perspective. Although principals in the second degree and accessories 
before the fact to a felony were both liable to the same punishment as a principal in the 
first degree,
29
 a principal could not claim benefit of clergy in the case of certain felonies 
like murder, robbery, rape and burglary, this benefit having been ousted by statute 
during the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I,
30
 but left available to accessories.
31
 
More importantly, the liability of an accessory was inherently derivative in nature and 
was thus dependent upon the liability of the principal. Accordingly, at common law, an 
accessory to a felony could not be convicted before the principal had been convicted.
32
 
If the principal could not be apprehended and convicted, or escaped liability due to a 




These undoubtedly inconvenient distinctions lost much of their significance, however, 
as a result of various legislative amendments over the years, culminating in the 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861,
34
 which allowed for an accessory before the fact to 
any crime to be indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced as a principal.35 The distinction 
between the first three categories and the last (that of accessories after the fact) 
remained. An accessory after the fact was liable to a lesser punishment than a principal 
and consequently could not be indicted, tried and convicted as a principal, but had to be 
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 This did not mean that they would necessarily receive the same punishment. A party who merely 
played a peripheral or incidental role in the commission of the crime would generally receive a lighter 
sentence than the principal actor, whilst a person who masterminded the crime, even if only an accessory 
before the fact, might well receive a heavier sentence than the person who actually executed the crime 
(Williams, note 15 above, 404). During the years when the Homicide Act 1957 was in force, the death 
penalty could only be imposed on the party who himself had killed or used force against the deceased (S5 
Homicide Act 1957). 
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between life and death for the offender (ibid). 
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Williams states categorically that duress is ‘no defence to a charge of murder’, although he argues that it 
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34
 Smith & Hogan (note 15 above) 78. 
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commission of any indictable offence whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any 
act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.’ 






indicted, tried and convicted as an accessory after the fact.
36
 Thus, although English law 
retained the dualistic distinction between primary and secondary participants, it came to 
be a distinction with very little difference. 
 
4.3 The doctrine of common purpose 
 
In determining the liability of principals in the second degree, English law could rely on 
the doctrine of common purpose. An early account of common purpose is provided by 




Several persons set out together, or in small parties, upon one common design, be it murder 
or other felony, or for any other purpose unlawful in itself, and each taketh the part assigned 
to him; some to commit the fact, others to watch at proper distances and stations to prevent 
surprise, or to favour, if need be, the escape of those who are more immediately engaged. 
They are all, provided the fact be committed, in the eye of the law, present at it;
37
 for it was 
made a common cause with them, each man operated in his station at one and the same 
instant towards the same common end; and the part each man took tended to give 





It is evident from the above passage that, in its early form and as explained by Foster, 
common purpose had two implications: Firstly, involvement in a common purpose 
established ‘presence at the time of the crime’, in a constructive sense;
39
 and, secondly, 
it stood as proof of mutual assistance and encouragement (aiding and abetting).
40
 In 
other words, evidence of involvement in a common purpose helped to establish that the 
accused was a party to the crime, rather than an innocent bystander; and, furthermore, 
that he was a co-principal, rather than an accessory before or after the fact. Common 
purpose was not, however, ‘a doctrinally separate basis of liability’ at the time when 
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 Williams (note 15 above) 414. As a general rule, the maximum sentence was two years’ imprisonment, 
although an accessory after the fact to murder could be sentenced to life imprisonment (Smith and Hogan 
(note 15 above) 86 and further authorities cited therein). 
37
 In the next paragraph, Foster goes on to refer to this as ‘constructive presence’ (Foster, note 20 above, 
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38
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40
 R Toulson ‘Sir Michael Foster, Professor Williams and complicity in murder’ in DJ Baker & J Horder 
(eds) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, The Legacy of Glanville Williams (2013) 230, 230. 








 Nevertheless, it had clearly acquired this status by the early part of 
the 19
th
 century. Thus, for instance, in the 1838 case of Macklin, Murphy, & Others, the 
court held:  
 
[I]t is a principle of law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent, 




The doctrine of common purpose was subsequently applied as a basis for liability in a 
number of other murder cases, such as R v Downing and Powys, R v Harrington and R v 
Price and Others.
43
 It was not limited to murder cases however,
44
 but was applied to 




 and possession of housebreaking 
implements.
47





The legal effect of the doctrine is well illustrated in R v Price and Others.
49
 This case 
concerned six men on trial for the murder of a man whom they had allegedly attacked 
and who had been stabbed and killed by one of them. The court (per Byles J) instructed 
the jury that if the identity of the actual perpetrator could be established, he would be 
liable for murder, whilst the other five accused would also be guilty of murder if they 
had participated in the attack on the deceased with a common purpose to kill him, or 
failing that, with a common purpose to stab him, ‘because then the hand that used the 
knife was the hand of all of them’.
50
 Even if they lacked such a common purpose, the 
other five accused would still be guilty of murder if they had been present when the 
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deceased was killed and had shown their approval by assisting in the crime (aiding and 
abetting). If none of these things could be proved against them, they could not be found 
guilty. The only person who would be guilty would be the actual perpetrator and, if his 




It can be seen, therefore, that by the early years of the 19
th
 century the doctrine of 
common purpose was being used to extend the ambit of liability as a principal in the 
second degree: No longer was presence in pursuit of a common purpose merely 
evidence of aiding and abetting (as described by Foster in the passage cited above); by 
the time of R v Price it had become a substitute for aiding and abetting – that is, an 
alternative basis of liability, which made it unnecessary for the prosecution to prove 
conduct amounting to actual aiding and abetting.
52
 It is worth noting, however, that the 
doctrine was nevertheless limited to persons who, by conspiracy, had actually embarked 
together on the commission of a crime and who were present at the time of its 
commission, albeit in an extended or ‘constructive’ sense. A person who merely 
conspired towards the commission of the crime before the event, but who was not 
present at the time and played no part in its commission, was not a principal in the 
second degree, but remained an accessory before the fact. As mentioned previously, 
though, this once-important distinction lost its significance after 1861, with the 
enactment of the Accessories and Abettors Act of that year. 
 
4.4 Modern English law 
 
In modern English law, a secondary party may be liable for a crime committed by 
another on the basis of his own conduct (aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring),
53
 
or through membership of a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (the current term for common 




 Thus, for example, Williams says: ‘A person is guilty of aiding and abetting if he is either (a) a 
conspirator who is present at the time of the crime, whether or not he in fact assists, or (b) anyone who 
knowingly assists or encourages at the time of the crime, whether a conspirator or not and whether 
present or not.’ (Williams, note 15 above, 353). 
53
 These forms of participation are still dealt with in terms of s8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 
1861, in terms of which aiders, abettors, counsellors and procurers may be indicted, tried and punished as 
principal offenders. They are, however still regarded as secondary parties (accomplices), in that their 
actus reus and mens rea differ from that of the principal offender (Simester & Sullivan, note 24 above, 
196). 






purpose) that led to the commission of the crime.
54
 As regards the first method, ‘aiding’ 
denotes actual assistance, in some practical form. This means that the assistance must in 
fact have been given. A mere attempt, or willingness to assist will not suffice (although 
an unfulfilled promise of assistance could amount to abetting),
55
 but the assistance need 
not have been substantial or necessary, nor it is necessary for the principal to have been 
aware of it.
56
 ‘Abetting’ requires actual encouragement, whilst ‘counselling’ requires 
urging, or the provision of advice. In both cases, the encouragement, urging, or advice 
must have been effectively communicated to the principal. Mere presence at the 
commission of a crime, which does not constitute encouragement, is insufficient for 
abetting, as are words and gestures of encouragement that cannot be shown to have 
come to the principal’s notice.
57
 The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to counselling.
58
 It 
is not necessary, however, for the encouragement, urging, or advice to have had any 
effect on the principal’s decision to commit the crime.
59
 In the case of ‘procuring’, the 
secondary party must deliberately have caused the principal to commit the crime.
60
 
Proof of a causal nexus between the conduct of the secondary party and the commission 
of the crime by the principal is therefore required. Although a causal nexus is not 
required in the case of aiding, abetting and counselling, the secondary party’s conduct 
must nevertheless amount to participation in the crime. There must therefore be a 
connection of some sort between the secondary party’s conduct and the commission of 
the crime.
61




The second form of secondary party liability, joint enterprise liability, is based on 
imputed conduct. This form of liability is reserved primarily for collateral crimes, 
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 Simester & Sullivan (note 24 above) 201-202 and further authorities cited therein. 
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 JC Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law 6ed (1988) 135. See also Simester & Sullivan (note 24 above) 
199- 203. And see the further discussion in this regard in chapter 3, section 2.3.2.1. 
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 Simester & Sullivan (note 24 above) 203. 
62
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committed in pursuance of a prior conspiracy, in which the various participants act in 
concert.
63
 It requires proof of the following:  
 
1. Two or more parties (X and Y), by express or tacit agreement, embark together on 
the commission of a particular crime (crime A);  
 
2. X foresees the possibility that, in the course of their joint enterprise to commit crime 




3. Y does commit crime B;  
 
4. Crime B occurs as an incident of their joint enterprise to commit crime A and does 





On satisfaction of these requirements, X will be liable for crime B. His liability for 
crime A will however still depend on his own conduct (aiding and abetting, as discussed 
above).
66
  This form of liability is therefore a refined version of the original doctrine of 
common purpose,
67
 as it existed in English law during the mid-19
th
 century.  
 
 
5. COMPLICITY IN OTHER COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 
 
Although an extensive comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it 
may be useful, before proceeding to South African law, to mention briefly how the law 
relating to complicity has developed in some of the other common law jurisdictions 
based on, or influenced by English law. 
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 The most significant refinement is the substitution of subjective foresight for the ‘probable 
consequences’ test used in the original version. 






Both Canadian and Australian law approach secondary participation in terms very 
similar to those of English common law. The Canadian Criminal Code provides for the 
liability of secondary parties based on aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring, in 
much the same way as modern English law (there are slight differences in the 
requirements for liability, but they are not important for present purposes and need not 
be canvassed here).
68
 Australian law distinguishes between principals in the second 
degree (aiders and abettors present at the fact) and accessories before the fact (aiders, 
abettors, counsellors and procurers not present at the fact), but the distinction is of no 
great significance.
69
 Both jurisdictions also recognise liability for collateral crimes 
committed in the course of a joint criminal enterprise, in much the same way as English 
law. In each jurisdiction, as in English law, there must be both prior conspiracy 




The fault element for liability is the same in Australian law as in English law (subjective 
foresight of a real possibility),
71
 but Canadian law differs. Unlike English law, the 
Canadian Criminal Code does not require subjective foresight of the commission of the 
collateral crime. Negligence will suffice,
72
 although the Canadian Supreme Court has 
ruled that subjective foresight will nevertheless be required in the case of certain crimes 
for which a subjective fault requirement is a ‘fundamental principle of justice’, as 
contemplated in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
73
 It has been 
held that murder and attempted murder are such crimes, in view of the high social 
stigma and severe penalties they carry.
74
 Conversely, in Canada it is insufficient if the 
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parties knew, or ought reasonably to have known that the collateral crime was a possible 
consequence of carrying out the common purpose. It must have been foreseen, or be 




Scottish common law does employ a doctrine very similar to the South African doctrine 
of common purpose, in the form of ‘art and part’ liability. Apart from accessorial 
liability through aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring, a person will also be liable 
‘art and part’ for an offence committed by another, if (1) he conspired beforehand to 
commit the offence and took some part in its preparation or commission; or if (2) in the 
absence of prior conspiracy, he knowingly participated in its commission. Art and part 
liability furthermore extends to collateral crimes committed by the other participant(s) 
in the course of committing the principal crime, if the commission of the collateral 






6. COMPLICITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
As previously shown, the English law distinctions between principals in the first and 
second degrees and between principals and accessories before the fact had no 
counterparts in the Roman-Dutch law upon which South African law was founded.
77
 
Thus, in 1908, in R v Peerkhan and Lalloo,
78
 the Transvaal Supreme Court held (per 
Innes CJ): 
 
In the case of common law offences any person who knowingly aids and assists in the 
perpetration of a crime is punishable as if he committed it. The English law calls such an one 
a principal in the second degree; and there is much curious learning as to when a man is a 
principal in the second, and when in the first degree. Our law knows no such distinction 
between principals in the first and second degrees or between principals in the second degree 
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and accessories. It calls a person who aids, abets, counsels or assists in a crime a socius 
criminis – an accomplice or partner in the crime. And being so, he is under Roman-Dutch 





Consequently, for many years South African law recognised and distinguished between 
only two categories of participant – principals (or perpetrators, as they were later 
known) and accessories after the fact.
80
 Any secondary participant other than an 
accessory after the fact was simply a ‘socius criminis’ and was regarded as a co-
principal/co-perpetrator. Pursuant to the decision of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court (‘AD’) in the 1980 case of S v Williams,
81
 however, South African law 
has distinguished between secondary participants according to whether they are co-
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 Accordingly, South African law currently recognises and 
distinguishes between three categories of participant, namely perpetrators, accomplices 
and accessories after the fact. Accessories after the fact are not regarded as parties to 
the crime and do not require detailed discussion for present purposes.
83
 The discussion 
that follows will therefore concentrate on the legal position of perpetrators and 
accomplices. 
 
There are three ways in which a person may become a perpetrator (or co-perpetrator) in 
South African law: Firstly, if he personally satisfies all three elements of criminal 
liability (actus reus, criminal capacity and mens rea); secondly, if he does not commit 
the actus reus himself, but orchestrates its commission by some unwitting or otherwise 
innocent agent; and, thirdly, if he does not commit the actus reus himself, but forms a 
common purpose to commit the crime together with a person who executes the actus 
reus in pursuance of that common purpose.
84
 It is unnecessary for present purposes to 
discuss the first two types of perpetrator in detail, but liability based on common 
purpose will be discussed further.  
 
Both Rabie and Parker have provided informative accounts of the adoption and 
development of the doctrine of common purpose in South African law.
85
 For the sake of 
completeness, however, and to set the scene for the critical analysis of the doctrine that 
follows in later chapters, it would be appropriate to provide a brief account here.  
 
As explained above, Roman-Dutch law generally regarded the liability of secondary 
participants as arising from quasi-mandate. It would seem from the Transvaal Supreme 
Court’s use of the term ‘socius criminis’ (literally translated as ‘partner in crime’) in R v 
Peerkhan and Lalloo,
86
 that it regarded the fictitious mandate as arising, not from 
authorisation, such as would occur in the case of principal and agent, but rather from 
operation of law, the analogy being the implied mandate that is deemed to come into 
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existence between partners (‘socii’) in a business venture. The existence of such a 
partnership was to be inferred, the court suggests, from the assistance afforded by the 
one to the other in the commission of the crime. The notion of fictional partnership and 
consequent implied reciprocal mandate was not very far removed from the English law 
concept of imputed conduct based on common purpose,
87
 as expressed in cases such as 
Macklin, Murphy and Others and R v Price,
88
 however, and one might speculate that 
this fiction could well have resulted in our law developing in much the same direction 
as it did, even if the doctrine of common purpose had not been imported into South 
African law.  
 
Such speculation is idle, however, since the doctrine of common purpose was imported 
into South African law, either directly from English law, or (as is commonly thought) 
via the influence of the Native Territories’ Penal Code of 1886,
89
 section 78 of which 
provided as follows: 
 
If several persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist 
each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in 
the prosecution of such common purpose, the commission of which offence was, or ought to 
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The doctrine of common purpose, as encapsulated in section 78 of the Native 
Territories’ Penal Code, was subsequently applied in the area of the (former) Transkei, 
in the 1920 case of R v Taylor.
91
 The doctrine did not remain confined to the Transkei, 
however. In 1917, it was used as the basis of a delictual claim in the Orange Free State 
Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, in the case of McKenzie v Van der Merwe.
92
 
McKenzie, a farmer, claimed compensation for stock stolen and fences damaged in 
1914 by a group of Boer rebels, whose commanding officer had been the defendant, 
Van der Merwe. McKenzie’s argument was that, because Van der Merwe had shared a 
common purpose with his rebel troops to engage in an illegal rebellion, each of them 
was liable for the delicts of the others, committed in furtherance of that objective. The 
trial court, by a majority of two to one, declined to award damages on this basis and 
McKenzie appealed to the AD. The AD however similarly declined to uphold 
McKenzie’s claim, holding that there was no basis for such a claim, either in Roman-
Dutch law, or in English law. In delivering the majority judgement, Solomon JA held as 
follows: 
 
The contention is that everyone who takes part in a rebellion must be taken to constitute 
every other rebel as his agent to do all that is reasonably necessary in order to carry out their 
common purpose... No direct authority in our law has been produced for a doctrine which 
produces such startling results, and it was virtually admitted that it could only be based on 
the ground of agency. That no such agency is expressly constituted by a rebel when he enters 
into a rebellion is undoubted, and I fail to see how it can be inferred from the mere fact of his 




Despite the AD’s reluctance to award damages on the basis of common purpose in 
McKenzie, the doctrine was invoked again a few years later, with more success, in the 
                                                                                                                                               
Code is the section that dealt with definitions and that nowhere is s5(e) explicitly linked to the provisions 
of section 78, however two were evidently meant to be read in conjunction. 
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Hutton J held (323): ‘... [I]t must of course be borne in mind that it is not necessary for the Crown to 
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Transkeian Penal Code)’. 
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93
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criminal case of R v Garnsworthy.
94
 The accused, a group of striking mineworkers, had 
launched an armed attack on mine officials and others defending the Brakpan Mine, 
with the aim of bringing mining operations to a halt. One Lowden, a member of the 
defending force, had been killed in this attack and others had been killed in subsequent 
acts of violence, committed after the defending force had surrendered. Although there 
was no evidence that any of the accused had killed any of the deceased, all were 
convicted of Lowden’s murder on the basis of common purpose, but were acquitted of 
the subsequent murders on the grounds that these had fallen outside the scope of the 
common purpose to stop operations at the mine, that purpose having already been 
achieved when these additional murders were committed. In delivering the court’s 
judgment, Dove-Wilson JP held: 
 
Now the law upon this matter is quite clear.
95
 Where two or more persons combine in an 
undertaking for an illegal purpose, each of them is liable for anything done by the other or 
others of the combination, in the furtherance of their object, if what was done was what they 
knew or ought to have known, would be a probable result of their endeavouring to achieve 
their object. If on the other hand what is done is something which cannot be regarded as 
naturally and reasonably incidental to the attainment of the object of the illegal combination, 
then the law does not regard those who are not themselves personally responsible for the act 
as being liable; but if what is done is just what anybody engaging in this illegal combination 
would naturally, or ought naturally to know would be the obvious and probable result of 




After R v Garnsworthy, the doctrine of common purpose was applied and developed by 
the courts, particularly the AD, in a number of cases. Until 1945, it appears to have been 
used interchangeably with Roman-Dutch law. Thus, for example, in R v Ngcobo in 
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 R v Garnsworthy 1923 WLD 17. 
95
 This was undoubtedly an overstatement. As Rabie points out, there was no direct authority for the 
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purpose liability bears a strong resemblance to that contained in section 78 of the Native Territories Penal 
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1928, the AD applied Roman-Dutch law, citing R v Peerkhan and Lalloo.
97
 In R v 
Mbande in 1933, the AD upheld the third accused’s conviction for murder on the basis 
that he was a party to a common purpose to commit murder and had also ‘aided and 
abetted’ the commission of the murder by the second accused. In 1942, in R v 
Matsitwane, the AD again applied Roman-Dutch law, citing both R v Peerkhan and 




From 1945 onwards, however, the courts attempted to reconcile the English law and 
Roman-Dutch law approaches, by stating that the doctrine of common purpose was 
founded on the same principle of implied mandate that was also recognised in Roman-
Dutch law, if not as a matter of historical fact, then as the only acceptable legal 
rationale, as held earlier by Innes CJ in McKenzie v Van der Merwe:  
 
Now [the common purpose] rule has not been deduced from general principles, but rests 
upon certain old decisions. The terms in which it is expressed and the limitations to which it 
is subject would seem to indicate that the principle which underlies it is that of agency. 
However that may be, its place in our law must be that of an application of the doctrine of 
implied mandate. There is none other upon which it can be grounded; and its operation in our 




This idea was echoed by Tindall JA in his dissenting judgment in R v Duma, where he 
held, ‘If it is proved that the intention of persons acting in concert is to do an illegal act, 
then there is a common purpose and each is the agent of the other in the performance of 
that act’ (emphasis added).
100
 After R v Duma, there were numerous cases in which the 
courts took the view that the joint liability of parties to a common purpose rested on 
implied mandate.
101
 This view was in fact endorsed by no less a luminary than Professor 
Exton Burchell, writing in 1957,
102
 although he was later to retract it, with the 
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observation: ‘[T]here is no magic about the “doctrine” of common purpose, and ... there 




The notion that the imputation was based on implied mandate was maintained well into 
the 1960s,
104
 although it began to attract increasing criticism as the years passed. One 
unassailable criticism was that it is not possible for criminal liability to arise ex 
mandato, because a mandate to commit an unlawful act is itself unlawful and hence 
invalid.
105
 At best, therefore, one might speak of a situation analogous to mandate, or 
‘quasi-mandate’. Other critics were concerned with the fact that, if the analogy was 
carried through to its logical conclusion, there would be nothing to prevent conduct 
from being imputed retrospectively, by implied ratification;
106
 an approach that did in 




Apart from such technical objections, however, there were also criticisms aimed at 
logical inconsistencies in the application of the analogy, such as the fact that, in civil 
law, a mandator’s liability is limited by the scope of the mandate, which includes any 
express instructions as to how the mandate should be executed. In criminal law, 
however, whilst A and B may agree to commit a particular crime, and A may (for 
instance) expressly instruct B that no violence is to be used for the purpose, A will 
nevertheless be liable for B’s acts of violence if A foresaw the possibility that B might 
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commit such acts, despite his instructions to the contrary.
108
 Nor does it matter whether 
the violence used by B was necessary for, or incidental to the commission of the agreed 
crime, as long as it was foreseen by A.
109
 A’s liability is therefore not limited by the 
scope of the mandate, but only by the scope of his own foresight, which is 
disanalogous.
110
 Furthermore, in civil law the mandator is necessarily the dominant 
party in the relationship, in that the mandatary, in executing the mandate, is required to 
submit to the mandator’s control and to act entirely in the mandator’s interests, 
subordinating his own interests insofar as necessary.
111
 Where A is the instigator and 
driving force behind the planning and execution of a crime, whilst B merely falls in 
with A’s plans, it seems inapposite to speak of B as having impliedly mandated A to act 
on his (B’s) behalf. Yet the doctrine of common purpose imputes A’s conduct to B as 
readily as it imputes B’s conduct to A. Once again, this is disanalogous. As explained 
above, however, it seems likely that the original analogy in South African law was 
drawn, not from the law of agency, but from the law of partnership, where each partner 
(‘socius’) in a business venture is deemed to have granted every other partner an 
implied mandate to transact business for the account of all. In so doing, the common 
law does not distinguish between ‘senior’ and ‘junior’ partners – all partners are deemed 
to be of equal standing, with equal authority to bind the others. 
 
Whatever the merits of the above criticisms, however, it is abundantly clear that the 
mandate analogy is untenable in those cases where the participant in question accedes to 
the common purpose by active association (joining-in) and thus unilaterally.
112
 Mandate 
is necessarily based on consensus. By extending the doctrine of common purpose to 
such cases, therefore, the courts unavoidably placed themselves in a position where they 
could no longer appeal to the mandate rationale as a general justification for the fiction. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that despite Botha JA’s observation in S v Safatsa that the 
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‘much maligned notion of implied mandate’ is ‘not without merit’,
113
 he declined to 
express a definite view on the matter, or that the courts in subsequent years have not 
seen fit to endorse this notion. On the contrary, after Safatsa there was general silence 
on the rationale for the fiction, until the Constitutional Court was obliged to address the 




In S v Thebus, in upholding the constitutionality of the active association form of 
common- purpose liability, the Constitutional Court identified two rationales for the 
doctrine. It held that its principal object is to ‘criminalise collective criminal conduct 
and thus to satisfy the social “need to control crime committed in the course of joint 
enterprises”’.
115
 In support of this object, it added that ‘[t]he phenomenon of serious 
crimes committed by collective individuals, acting in concert, remains a significant 
societal scourge’.
116
 To the aforegoing, it added a secondary rationale, namely that ‘in 
consequence crimes such as murder, robbery, malicious damage to property and arson, 
it is often difficult to prove that the act of each person or of a particular person in the 
group contributed causally to the criminal result’.
117
 It held that the introduction of a 
causal requirement for liability, as contended for by the appellants, would render the 
object of the doctrine ‘nugatory and ineffectual’ and ‘make prosecution of collaborative 
criminal enterprise intractable and ineffectual’.
118
 It would be evident, therefore, that the 
Constitutional Court did not attempt to rely upon the mandate analogy, or, for that 
matter, on any other normative basis as a justification for the fiction. It based its 
justification fairly and squarely upon instrumental rationales; principally, the need for 





The chapter that follows will consist of a more detailed discussion of the development 
of the doctrine of common purpose pursuant to its adoption in South African law. 
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 Ibid. See also the court’s comment, later on in the judgment (para 40) that ‘group, organised or 
collaborative misdeeds strike more harshly at the fabric of society and the rights of victims than crimes 








THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON PURPOSE IN 





In the previous chapter, it was explained how the 19
th
 century English law doctrine of 
common purpose was adopted into South African law. This chapter will focus on the 
development of the doctrine by the South African courts pursuant to its adoption. In so 
doing, the subject will be addressed under four headings, namely: (1) the nature and 
effect of the doctrine; (2) methods of forming a common purpose; (3) the time of 
formation; and (4) determining the ‘scope’ of a common purpose. Withdrawal from a 
common purpose (sometimes referred to as ‘repentance’), although an important topic 




2. THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
The doctrine of common purpose in South African law may be expressed as follows: 
 
Where two or more people agree to commit a crime or actively associate in a joint unlawful 
enterprise, each will be responsible for specific criminal conduct committed by one of their 
number which falls within their common design. Liability arises from their “common 




The legal effect of the doctrine is that secondary participants who are party to such a 
common purpose are regarded as co-perpetrators (co-principals), not as accessories, and 
are therefore liable for the crime itself. Inasmuch as it is a fundamental principle of 
South African criminal law that liability must be based on unlawful conduct of some 
kind, the actus reus of such a secondary participant is regarded as his act of associating 
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with the actual perpetrator, with a common purpose to commit the crime.
2
 As a matter 
of law, the criminal conduct of each participant is then imputed to all the others.
3
 In 
short, therefore, the doctrine of common purpose dispenses with the need for the state to 
prove all the normal requirements of the actus reus in respect of each and every 




Thus, where the crime was committed in pursuance of a prior conspiracy, it is not 
necessary to show that each conspirator played an active role in the execution of the 
conspiracy, or that he was even present at the time of the crime (as was required in 
English law). Nor, in the absence of a conspiracy, is it necessary to prove that each 
participant contributed towards, or facilitated the commission of the crime, in a physical 
or even psychological sense (aiding and abetting). It follows that, where the crime is one 
that normally requires proof of causation, as with murder, it is not necessary to prove 
that each participant played a contributory role in causing the prohibited consequence, 
or even to establish the identity of the actual perpetrator(s). As long as the state can 
prove, by inferential reasoning, that the consequence must have been caused by one or 
other of the participants, and that the others shared a common purpose with him (or 
them) to cause it, all will be liable for the resulting crime.
5
 The law on this last point 
was not always clear. Writing in 1970, Burchell and Hunt cited numerous cases as 
authority for their assertion that:  
 
It is not necessary to show either that each party did a specific act towards the attainment of 
the joint objective or that there was a causal link between the conduct of each party and the 
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At the same time, there were some eminent authorities who took the opposing view, 
most notably Professor JC de Wet,
7
 who considered that there needed to be a causal 
relationship between the conduct of the participant in question and the commission of 
the crime, even if only in a psychological sense.
8
 There were also other commentators 
who thought that the law did not require proof of causation in any form, but regarded 
this as a highly objectionable departure from the normal principles of liability.
9
 Further 
uncertainty was added in 1969 by the AD’s decision in S v Thomo, where it held (per 
Wessels JA) that, according to ‘accepted principle and authority’: 
 
[O]n a charge of murder it must be established that, intending the death of his victim, the 
accused, irrespective of the fact whether he is charged as principal or socius, was guilty of 




Certain commentators understood this to mean that proof of a causal relationship was 
indeed required in order to establish the liability of a secondary participant for murder,
11
 
an interpretation which seemed to be confirmed by the AD’s subsequent decisions in S v 




It has been explained that, in Williams, the AD sought to re-introduce a distinction 
between principals (co-perpetrators) and secondary participants. The facts of the case 
were that Williams and his three co-accused had been travelling together on a train. 
There was no evidence that they had started out with a common purpose to commit any 
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crime, but during the course of their journey the first three accused attacked and killed 
another passenger. Williams stabbed the deceased with a knife, then the second accused 
grabbed him round the neck and pulled him along the coach. Whilst the deceased was 
being held by the second accused, the third accused approached and stabbed the 
deceased with a broken-off bottleneck. The fourth accused did not participate at all. The 
trial court convicted Williams and the third accused of murder as co-perpetrators and 
convicted the second and fourth accused of being accomplices to the murder. On appeal 
by the second and fourth accused, the AD (per Joubert JA) distinguished between co-
perpetrators and accomplices,
13




An accomplice’s liability is accessory in nature so that there can be no question of an 
accomplice without a perpetrator or co-perpetrator who commits the crime. A perpetrator 
complies with all the requirements of the definition of the relevant crime. Where co-
perpetrators commit the crime in concert, each co-perpetrator complies with the 
requirements of the definition of the relevant crime. On the other hand, an accomplice is not 
a perpetrator or co-perpetrator, since he lacks the actus reus of the perpetrator. An 
accomplice associates himself wittingly with the commission of the crime … in that he 
knowingly affords the perpetrator or co-perpetrator the opportunity, the means or the 
information which furthers the commission of the crime … [A]ccording to general 
principles there must be a causal connection between the accomplice’s assistance and the 




The AD then confirmed that the second accused had been correctly convicted of being 
an accomplice to murder, but acquitted the fourth accused, because he had merely been 
a passive bystander.  
 
It would be evident from the above extract that, apart from trying to revive the English 
law dualistic distinction between primary and secondary participants, Joubert JA was 
also seeking to introduce an additional requirement for liability as a secondary 
participant, namely that there needed to be a causal connection between the conduct of 
                                                 
13
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such a participant and the commission of the crime by the actual perpetrator. This was 
contrary to the preponderance of authority, which, as previously explained, regarded 
proof of such a causal connection as unnecessary in cases where the parties had acted in 
pursuit of a common purpose.
15
 Joubert JA offered no direct explanation for this sudden 
departure from precedent, other than to say that there was often confusion between 
‘medepligtigheid en mededaderskap’,
16
 but it is evident from the authorities cited in his 
judgment that the court’s thinking had been heavily influenced by commentators such as 
De Wet and Swanepoel, Strauss, Hugo and Rabie,
17
 who had advocated the need for 




S v Williams was not an isolated case. The following year, in S v Maxaba, the AD (per 
Viljoen JA) interpreted its earlier decision in Williams as meaning that the state must 
indeed prove a causal connection, both in order to establish liability for murder as a co-
perpetrator and in order to establish liability as an accomplice to murder.
19
  These two 
decisions were not permitted to stand as authority for very long. In S v Khoza, the AD, 
in a rather startling example of judicial obfuscation, held (per Botha AJA) that it did not 
‘accept’ that Joubert JA had meant to alter the law on common purpose: 
 
Generally, I should make it clear that I do not accept that it was intended in Williams' case to 
supplant, qualify, or detract from, the substance of the practice of the Courts in relation to 
common purpose in previous cases decided over a period of many years.
20
  
                                                 
15
 Burchell & Hunt (note 2 above) 362 and further authorities cited therein. It would also be evident from 
the discussion of the English law approach to complicity in the previous chapter that a causal relationship 
is not an invariable requirement of English law either. 
16
 Loosely translated as ‘liability as an accomplice and liability as a co-perpetrator’. 
17
 S v Williams (note 12 above) 63H. 
18
 De Wet & Swanepoel (note 7 above); Strauss (note 7 above); Hugo (note 11 above); Rabie (note 9 
above). 
19
 S v Maxaba (note 12 above) 1155F-G; 1156H-1157A. 
20
 S v Khoza 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A) 1054C-D. The difficulty with this dictum is that it simply does not 
accord with the record. It is impossible to place any construction on Joubert JA’s words in the extract 
from Williams cited above (note 14 and accompanying text), other than that he did indeed mean to alter 
the law by introducing a dualistic approach to liability, as does his treatment of the second accused in that 
case. It is evident from the facts that the second accused spontaneously associated himself with the first 
accused’s murderous attack on the deceased, which, according to established authority by that time (see 
s3.2 below), made him party to a common purpose with the first accused to murder the deceased and, 
hence, liable for murder himself, as a co-perpetrator (the requirements for spontaneous association will be 
discussed under the next heading). In order for him to be liable as an accomplice, rather than as a co-
perpetrator, the law on common purpose would first have needed to be altered. Whiting argues that the 
second accused was in fact a principal in the first degree, because he satisfied the requirements for 
causation, but this would only be correct if the second accused’s contribution had been a sine qua non of 





Botha AJA’s dictum in Khoza proved insufficient to dispel uncertainty on the question 
of causation, however. Six years later, he was required to address the issue yet again in 
his judgment in S v Safatsa – the notorious case of the so-called ‘Sharpville Six’.
21
 This 
time he left no scope for uncertainty. The case arose from the mob-killing of the Deputy 
Mayor of Lekhoa outside his house in Sharpville. Eight members of the mob were 
identified and tried for the murder. Two (the fifth and six accused) were acquitted by the 
trial court, because, although they were part of the mob when it stoned the deceased’s 
house, there was no evidence that they were still present when the mob set the 
deceased’s house on fire and that they had been party to a common purpose to murder 
the deceased. The trial court found, however, that each of the remaining six had 
intended the death of the deceased and that they had all actively associated themselves 
with the conduct of the mob, which was directed at causing his death. They were 
accordingly convicted of murder and sentenced to death. They appealed against their 
convictions and sentences on the grounds, inter alia, that the state had not proved a 
causal connection between their conduct and the death of the deceased. In support of 
this argument, they relied in particular on the authority of S v Thomo and S v Maxaba.  
 
On appeal, the AD (per Botha JA, as he had by then become) reviewed the evidence and 
confirmed that the trial court had been correct in finding that each of the accused had (1) 
shared a common purpose to kill the deceased with the mob as a whole; (2) by their 
conduct, actively associated themselves with the achievement of that common purpose; 
and (3) had the necessary intention to commit murder.
22
 On the question of causation, 
Botha JA put an end to further argument on the subject by making it abundantly clear 
that proof of a causal connection is not required in cases involving common purpose.
23
 
After reviewing the authorities on the subject, he held that Wessels JA’s dictum in 
Thomo had been obiter and was thus not a binding precedent.
24
 He repeated his earlier 
assertion that Joubert JA’s ruling in Williams had not been intended to alter the 
established law on the doctrine of common purpose and had, in any event, not had that 
                                                                                                                                               
the deceased’s death, which does not appear from the reported facts (R Whiting ‘Principals and 
accessories in crime’ (1980) 97 SALJ 191, 201-2); ‘Joining in’ (1986) 103 SALJ 38, 51). 
21
 S v Safatsa (note 2 above) . 
22
 S v Safatsa (note 2 above) 901H-J. 
23
 S v Safatsa (note 2 above) 898J - 900A. 
24
 S v Safatsa (note 2 above) 896E-F. 







 Lastly, after criticising Viljoen JA’s interpretation of Williams in Maxaba, 
Botha JA went on to hold that the former’s ruling on causation in that case could also be 
safely ignored in the treatment of cases involving common purpose.
26
  Although Botha 
JA’s ruling on causation has been extensively criticised over the ensuing years, amongst 
other aspects of the Safatsa judgment,
27
 it recently received the endorsement of the 
Constitutional Court in S v Thebus,
28
 and it must now be regarded as a correct reflection 
of South African law, even if the rule itself remains susceptible to criticism.  
 
Before moving on to the next heading, it needs to be mentioned that there are certain 
crimes to which the doctrine of common purpose does not apply. South African law has 
adopted the English law position that certain crimes are framed in terms that render 
them incapable of commission by anyone other than the actual perpetrator.
29
 Common 
law crimes falling into this category are rape,
30
 bigamy and perjury.
31
 By the same 
token, a statutory offence may be framed in such terms that it can only be committed by 
a certain class or category of persons, such as the holder of a personal permit or licence, 
or a person of a certain status, such as a prisoner, or an unrehabilitated insolvent.
32
 In 
such cases, the only person who can be convicted of the offence itself is the individual 
who personally satisfies all the requirements of the actus reus. A person who conspires 
                                                 
25
 S v Safatsa (note 2 above) 898D-I: ‘In my view the Court in Williams' case did not intend to supplant, 
qualify, or detract from the substance of the practice of the Courts in relation to common purpose. I 
expressed this view in Khoza's case supra at 1054C. It has turned out to be correct, having regard to the 
manner in which cases of common purpose have continued to be dealt with in the decisions of this Court 
subsequent to Williams' case, as mentioned above… For practical purposes, in applying the law relating 





 S v Safatsa (note 2 above) 900A. 
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 See, for example, D Unterhalter ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose: What Makes One Person Liable 
for the Acts of Another’ (1988) 105 SALJ 671; A Rabie ‘Kousaliteit en “common purpose” by moord’ 
(1988) 2 SACJ 229; VVW Duba ‘What was wrong with the Sharpeville Six decision?’ (1990) 2 SACJ 
180; P Parker ‘South Africa and the Common Purpose Rule in Crowd Murders (1996) 40(1) J of African 
Law 78; L Sisilana ‘What’s wrong with common purpose?’ (1999) 12 SACJ 278. 
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 S v Thebus (note 67 above) paras [33]-[40]. 
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 Snyman refers to these as ‘autographic’ crimes (CR Snyman Criminal Law 5ed (2008) 269). See also S 
v Kimberley 2002 (2) SACR 38 (E) 42H-43E; S v Saffier 2003 (2) SACR 141 (SE). On English law, see 
Williams (note 8 above) 386 and JC Smith & B Hogan Criminal Law (1965) 81.  
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 The common-law crime of rape has been repealed in South Africa by the provisions of the Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. It is not clear to what extent, if 
any, the rule mentioned applies to the statutory crime of rape, created by section 3 of the Act, which 
replaces the common law version of the crime. 
31
 Rape could only be committed by sexual intercourse per vaginam by a male over 14 years of age, who 
was not the complainant’s husband. Bigamy could only be committed by one who was married. Perjury 
could be committed only by one who had taken the oath (Williams, note 8 above, 386). 
32
 S v Kimberley (note 29 above) 42H-43E. 





with, or intentionally causes or assists the former to commit the crime cannot be 
convicted as a co-perpetrator, but is not altogether immune from liability. Pursuant to S 
v Williams,
33





3. METHODS OF FORMING A COMMON PURPOSE 
 
It has been explained that, in cases where liability is based on common purpose, the 
actus reus of a co-perpetrator is regarded as his act of associating with the actual 
perpetrator, with a common purpose to commit the crime in question. It follows that it is 
important to have clarity on what will be regarded as sufficient to constitute such an act 
of association. 
 
It would be evident from the authorities cited above that, according to English law, a 
common purpose could only arise from prior conspiracy – in this case, an agreement 
between the relevant parties to commit the crime in concert.
35
 Indeed, Glanville 
Williams seldom uses the term common purpose, but speaks merely of conspiracy, 
treating the two concepts as synonymous.
36
 As previously explained, too, in 19
th
 century 
English law, liability as a principal in the second degree (which we now call a co-
perpetrator) could arise in one of two ways, namely (1) by aiding and abetting the actual 
perpetrator(s); or (2) by conspiring beforehand to commit the crime in concert with the 
actual perpetrator(s). Simply put, therefore, such liability could arise either from prior 
conspiracy (common purpose), or from individual conduct (aiding and abetting). In 
either case, however, presence at the time of the crime was required, albeit in an 
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 S v Kimberley (note 29 above) 42H-43E. 
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 See the description given by Foster in section 4.1 of the previous chapter (M Foster & M Dodson 
Crown Law 3ed (1792) 351. See also Solomon JA’s description in McKenzie v Van der Merwe 1917 AD 
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criminal enterprise liability in modern English law (AP Simester & GR Sullivan Criminal Law Theory 
and Doctrine 2ed (revised 2004) 219-220). 
36
 Williams (note 8 above) 346-415. 
37
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Although South African law adopted the doctrine of common purpose from 19
th
 century 




Whereas English law required presence at the time of the crime, in pursuance of a prior 
conspiracy to commit the crime in concert, South African courts developed the view 
that, where the accused had entered into a prior conspiracy to commit the crime, 
presence at the time of the crime was not an invariable requirement, nor, consequently, 
was it always necessary for the accused to have played some role in the execution of the 
crime.
38
 In R v Njenje, the Southern Rhodesian Appellate Division (per Lewis AJA) 
drew a distinction between different types of conspirator.
39
 It held that a conspirator 
who incited, commanded, or procured his co-conspirators to commit the crime would be 
liable as a co-principal even if he was not present and played no part in its 
commission,
40
 whilst other types of conspirator would be liable as co-principals only if 
they had participated in (aided and abetted) the actual commission of the crime.
41
 The 
effect of this dictum was therefore to eliminate the distinction (if any remained) 
between accessories before the fact and principals in the second degree.
42
 In S v Yelani, 
the AD relied upon the first part of Lewis AJA’s dictum to hold the appellant liable for 
murder despite his absence from and lack of active participation in the commission of 
the crime.
43
 It can be seen, therefore, that South African law came to attach greater 
weight to the existence of a conspiracy than English law.  
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 Burchell & Hunt (note 2 above) 364, citing R v Bergstedt 1955 (4) SA 186 (A) and S v Nkombani 1963 
(4) SA 877 (A). See also R v Kgolane 1960 PH H110.  
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 R v Njenje 1966 (1) SA 368 (SRA) 376H, citing Fischer JP’s dictum in R v Dhlamini 1941 OPD 154, 
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above, 408).  
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 R v Njenje (note 39 above) 377B-C and further authorities referred to therein. 
42
 It did not, however, extend liability as a co-principal beyond those who, in English law, would have 
been regarded as accessories before the fact (that is, inciters, counsellors, or procurers). 
43
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distinction is S v Tungata 2004 (1) SACR 558 (TkD) 566C-E, however the first appellant in this case 
(who was ultimately acquitted) had clearly procured the commission of the crime, having paid the second 
appellant to murder her husband, so the court’s observations regarding other types of conspirator must 
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A year after Yelani, however, the AD went considerably further and extended the scope 
of liability arising from a conspiracy to extreme (and highly questionable) lengths, in S 
v Nzo.
44
 Nzo and his co-appellant had been members of a cell of ANC activists, based in 
Port Elizabeth, at the time when this organisation was banned. They were charged with 
treason, as well as the murder of a fellow cell-member’s wife, who had threatened to 
expose her husband’s illicit activities, which included operating a safe house for fellow 
activists. Nzo, who was the leader of the group, had overheard the threat and reported it 
to one ‘Joe’, another member of the cell, who warned the deceased, in Nzo’s hearing, 
that he would shoot her if she persisted in her disloyalty. About a month later, Joe 
murdered the deceased and fled the country, evading justice. Nzo played no part in the 
commission of the murder and was, in fact, in custody when it took place, having been 
arrested on unrelated charges and having disclosed his unlawful activities to the police.  
 
The second appellant had even less involvement with the murder. There was no direct 
evidence that he had been aware of the deceased’s threat to inform, or of Joe’s counter-
threat, but he had been a leading member of the cell, whose responsibilities had 
included finding safe accommodation for the activists after their arrival in the country. 
The trial court therefore found that, because of the position he occupied, he must have 
been privy to this information. The trial court found, further, that a common purpose 
had existed between the members of the cell to commit acts of sabotage in the Port 
Elizabeth area and that they must have foreseen the possibility that fatalities might be 
caused in the process. It also referred to certain ANC pamphlets urging the killing of 
informants, the contents of which must have been known to the appellants. It held 
further that both appellants must have been aware of the possibility that the deceased 
would be killed in retaliation for informing, or in order to prevent her from doing so. It 
held, therefore, that Nzo, the second appellant and Joe had all shared an unlawful 
common purpose and that the murder of persons in the position of the deceased fell 
within its scope. Both appellants were accordingly convicted of treason and murder, but 
appealed to the AD against their murder convictions (they did not appeal against their 
convictions for treason). 
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 S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA 1 (A). 





On appeal, counsel for the appellants argued that mere membership of an unlawful 
organisation and a broad, general agreement to commit unspecified acts of sabotage was 
not sufficient to render the appellants liable for every foreseen crime committed by 
every one of their fellow members; liability needed to be based on association with the 
particular crime in question. In support of their argument, they cited McKenzie v Van 
der Merwe,
45
 where the AD had declined to hold that each member of the rebel troops 




Although their argument won the support of the minority of the court (Steyn JA), it 
failed to persuade the majority. Hefer JA, who delivered the majority judgment, made 
no reference to the AD’s decision of the previous year in Yelani,
47
 or to the distinction 
between different types of conspirator, drawn earlier by Lewis AJA in Njenje.
48
 He 
simply relied on the portion of the AD’s dictum in S v Madlala, which dealt, in a very 
general manner, with liability for collateral crimes committed in the course of carrying 
out a common purpose.
49
 He held that all the available evidence pointed to the fact that 
Joe and the two appellants had functioned as a cohesive unit, in which each played an 
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 McKenzie v Van der Merwe 1917 AD 41. This case was discussed in ch2, s6. 
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 ‘I am not prepared to hold that every member of a commando is, by the mere fact of such membership, 
liable for the acts of every other member “within the scope of the objects of the rebellion”’ (per Innes CJ, 
in McKenzie v Van der Merwe (note 45 above) 47 (minority judgment); and see also Solomon J: ‘[T]here 
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rebellion is undoubted, and I fail to see how it can be inferred from the mere fact of his joining such a 
movement’ (majority judgment, 52). 
47
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48
 S v Njenje (note 39 above). 
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 S v Madlala (note 5 above) 640G-H: ‘It is sometimes difficult to decide, when two accused are tried 
jointly on a charge of murder, whether the crime was committed by one or the other or both of them, or 
by neither. Generally, ... an accused may be convicted of murder if the killing was unlawful and there is 
proof - (a) that he individually killed the deceased, with the required dolus ...; or (b) that he was a party to 
a common purpose to murder, and one or both of them did the deed; or (c) that he was a party to a 
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purpose could be constituted by a broad, general agreement to commit as-yet unspecified crimes. 







 their common design was to ‘wage a localised campaign of terror and 
destruction’ and the murder of the deceased (which must have been foreseen as possible 
by both appellants) was committed ‘in the furtherance of this design and for the 
preservation of the unit and the protection of each of its members’.
51
 He concluded that 
‘[t]his being the narrow ambit within which their liability falls to be decided, it is clear 
that they cannot derive material assistance from McKenzie v Van der Merwe’.
52
 Lastly, 
he held that there was no logical distinction between a common design relating to a 
particular offence and one relating to a series of offences.
53
 He found, however, that 
Nzo had dissociated from the common purpose at the time when he disclosed his 
unlawful activities to the police and that he was consequently not liable for the murder, 
which had been committed after this date. Nzo’s conviction for murder was therefore set 
aside, but that of the second appellant was upheld. 
 
Nzo’s case illustrates the inherent difficulties created by dispensing with the need to 
establish presence at the time of the crime (even in an extended or constructive sense), 
coupled with concerted conduct. These requirements had placed practical, finite limits 
on the scope of the doctrine, which in turn limited liability for collateral crimes 
committed in pursuance of a common purpose.
54
 These requirements had meant (as 
Steyn JA observed in his minority judgment) that the doctrine was based on the 
principle of a participant’s proximity to the commission of the crime, in both factual and 
legal terms.
55
 They also meant that a generalised campaign of criminal conduct, even if 
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misdaad.’ (S v Nzo, note 44 above, 16I, per Steyn JA). 





it amounted to treason, could not be regarded as sufficient to constitute a common 
purpose.
56
 Dispensing with these requirements removed the practical constraints on the 
scope of the doctrine and opened up almost infinite possibilities for liability, particularly 




Burchell criticised the AD’s judgment in Nzo for extending the scope of the doctrine at 
a time when the general trend, as evidenced by cases like S v Mgedezi, S v Goosen and S 
v Motaung,
58
 was to restrict its scope.
59
 In S v Mzwempi,
60
 and clearly mindful of 
Burchell’s criticisms of Nzo,
61
 Alkema J observed that the AD’s judgment in Nzo had 
only been followed on the question of dissociation and not on the question of the scope 
of common purpose liability.
62
 He held further that the AD’s ruling in this latter regard 
had been overruled by the Constitutional Court’s decision in S v Thebus,
63
 in light of the 
latter’s approval of the requirements for active association, as set out in S v Safatsa and 
S v Mgedezi, and which included the necessity for presence at the time of the crime.
64
 
Alkema J’s reasoning in Mzwempi is however based on a fundamental misconception, 
in that he incorrectly identified the form of common purpose relied on by the AD in Nzo 
as having arisen from active association (discussed below), whereas it is abundantly 
clear that the AD considered that it was dealing with a case of common purpose arising 
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 The AD’s decisions in Safatsa and Mgedezi had no bearing on 
cases of common purpose formed by prior conspiracy and the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment in Thebus did not touch upon such cases either.
66
 Thus, although it would 
have been a welcome development if Nzo had indeed been overruled, it must regrettably 
be concluded that Alkema J’s finding is incorrect and that Nzo still remains binding 
authority,
67
 even if liable to criticism. Unfortunately, however, there are bound to be 
instances where Alkema J’s ruling will be taken at face value and it can be anticipated, 
therefore, that this is likely to lead to confusion in the law, which will require 
clarification at some time in the future.  
 
3.2 Spontaneous association 
 
Although the South African courts attached greater weight to the existence of a prior 
conspiracy than had been the case in English law, they simultaneously developed the 
view that prior conspiracy, whilst important in itself, was not an essential prerequisite 
for the establishment of a common purpose. English law considered that it was not 
necessary to provide direct evidence of the existence of a prior conspiracy, or of its 
nature and scope. These were matters that could be inferred from the facts of the case.
68
 
South African law adopted the same approach in the early case of R v Itumeling.
69
 In his 
dissenting judgment in R v Duma, however, Tindall JA went even further, holding: ‘If it 
is proved that the intention of persons acting in concert is to do an illegal act, then there 




                                                 
65
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R v Duma was a case of mob violence. A crowd of about thirty people, armed with 
sticks, had chased the deceased and, when he was caught, he was not only beaten, but 
also stabbed. He died as a result of the stab wound. Duma and his co-accused were seen 
carrying sticks and moving away from the place where the deceased had died. Although 
the trial court convicted them of murder, the AD overturned their convictions on appeal, 
the majority of the court holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the 
appellants had actually participated in the attack on the deceased. Tindall JA dissented. 
He found that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the appellants had joined in 
the chase, knowing that the deceased was likely to be beaten to death if caught. He held 
that, if this had in fact happened, they would have been liable for murder. Because the 
deceased had died of a stab wound, however, he held that the appellants would be guilty 
of murder only if they had also foreseen this particular method of killing. Since there 
was no evidence to show that this had been the case, they were not guilty of murder, 
but, because they had associated themselves with the attack on the deceased with sticks, 




Parker points out that, apart from endorsing the evidential rule that permitted the 
existence of a common purpose to be inferred from the facts of a particular case, Tindall 
JA’s dissenting judgment in Duma introduced two novel propositions into the 
substantive law: Firstly, he introduced the idea that a common purpose could arise 
spontaneously, without any degree of prior consultation or planning (in other words, 
through tacit agreement); and, secondly and more importantly, he introduced the idea 
that a common purpose could also arise where one person joined in spontaneously with 
a crime that was already in the process of being committed by others, and thus without 




These ideas rapidly gained currency. A year later, in R v Mkhize, Greenberg JA repeated 
Tindall JA’s view that a common purpose could arise in the absence of prior conspiracy, 
‘on an impulse without any prior consultation or arrangement’
73
 and, in 1950, in his 
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dissenting judgment in R v Mthembu, Schreiner JA endorsed the view that a common 
purpose could arise by spontaneous association.
74
 In 1954, both of these propositions 
were accorded unanimous acceptance by the AD; firstly in the case of R v Du Randt,
75
 
where it was found that the common purpose to commit murder had arisen 
spontaneously whilst the accused were trying to avoid arrest and, secondly, in R v 
Mgxwiti,
76
 which was a case of spontaneous association (joining in), without any form 
of prior agreement.   
 
The idea that a common purpose could be formed by spontaneous association and, 
hence, by unilateral action was a radical development. English law had held that 
liability as a principal in the second degree could arise out of prior conspiracy (common 
purpose),
77
 or out of aiding and abetting (individual conduct). In the latter event, the 
accused was required to have done something of a practical nature to facilitate or 
encourage the commission of the crime, even if the crime could, and probably would, 
have been committed without his involvement.
78
 As explained under the previous 
heading, proof of a practical contribution to the commission of the crime is unnecessary 
in South African law, in cases where the state is able to rely on common purpose. Thus, 
by being able to extend the doctrine of common purpose to non-conspirators, the state 
was spared the need to prove conduct on the part of the individual accused that 
amounted to aiding and abetting. It was sufficient to show that there was conduct from 
which it could be inferred that the accused had ‘made common cause’ or ‘associated 
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himself’ with the conduct of those committing the crime.
79
 As will be shown further on, 
this lowered the threshold of proof for liability.  
 
This development was of particular significance to cases involving mob violence, as is 
illustrated by the case of R v Mgxwiti.
80
 In this case, a large crowd of people had 
stopped a car and had attacked and killed its occupant, a woman. The deceased was first 
assaulted, then the car was set alight and burned with the deceased inside. Although the 
cause of death was officially given as extensive burns, it could not be established what 
injuries the deceased had already received when the car was set alight and, in particular, 
whether she had died in the fire or from one of these prior injuries. Mgxwiti had been 
seen walking towards the car with a knife at the time when the initial assault was taking 
place and he was also seen, shortly afterwards, stabbing (or stabbing at) the deceased 
through the open window or door of the car. Greenberg JA, delivering the majority 
judgment on behalf of the AD, found that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 
Mgxwiti had ‘made common cause’ with the mob at very latest at the time when he 
walked towards the car with his knife,
81
 thus making him a party to the common 
purpose to murder the deceased before she received her fatal injuries. He was 




Mgxwiti’s case illustrates how the idea that common purpose may arise from 
spontaneous association was used to extend the scope of liability. Mgxwiti’s act of 
stabbing (or stabbing at) the deceased would no doubt have afforded adequate proof of 
aiding and abetting, but, in that case, it would not have been possible for the court to 
find beyond reasonable doubt that such aiding and abetting had taken place before the 
deceased received her fatal injuries. Merely walking towards the car with a knife would 
not in itself have constituted adequate proof of aiding and abetting, but, by being able to 
construe this conduct as evidence of accession to a common purpose to commit murder, 
the court was able to find that Mgxwiti had become a party to the crime at an earlier 
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stage in the sequence of events, at a time when the deceased had not yet received her 
fatal injuries. 
 
Mgxwiti’s case also highlights some of the difficulties presented by the idea that a 
common purpose may arise through spontaneous association; in particular, the difficulty 
of determining what will constitute sufficient proof of such association. In line with 
English law,
83
 the courts have repeatedly held that mere presence at the scene of a crime 
and failing to prevent it, or even performing an act that appears to coincide with the acts 
of the perpetrators is not sufficient to constitute proof of accession to a common 
purpose,
84
 but they did little in early years to lay down any practical guidelines as to 
what was sufficient. It was only in 1986 that Professor Whiting suggested that there 
were three basic requirements that ought to be satisfied: 
 
Firstly, the party to whom the act is to be attributed must be present on the scene at the time 
of its commission. Secondly, he must intend to associate himself with the commission of the 
act by the other party or to make common cause with the other party in its commission. And, 
thirdly, he must give expression to this intention by some overt conduct, such as joining a 
crowd obviously intent on the commission of the act in question and showing solidarity with 




Although the AD did not deal directly with the question in S v Safatsa,
86
 preferring to 
concentrate instead on the question of causation, it is evident from Botha JA’s treatment 
of the facts and his endorsement of the trial court’s findings that he implicitly 
recognised three requirements for spontaneous association; namely that (1) the accused 
in question must have ‘manifested an active association’ with the conduct of the 
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perpetrators; (2) he must have shared a common purpose with the latter; and (3) he must 




A year after Safatsa, however, Botha JA expressly endorsed Whiting’s suggested 
approach when he delivered the AD’s judgment in S v Mgedezi,
88
 although, perhaps 
mindful of his earlier judgment in Safatsa, he expanded the list of requirements to five, 
namely:   
 
1. The accused in question must have been present at the scene of the crime; 
2. He must have been aware that the crime was being, or was about to be committed; 
3. He must have intended to make common cause with those committing the crime; 
4. He must have manifested his sharing of such a common purpose by performing 
some act of association with the conduct of the others; 
5. He must have had the requisite mens rea for the crime.89 
 
Botha JA’s ruling in Mgedezi has since been accepted as the definitive authority on the 
requirements for spontaneous association and received the approval of the 




It should be noted that the fourth requirement laid down by Botha JA is crucial. Mere 
presence at the scene of a crime is not a sufficient basis for liability, so little can be 
made of the fact of such presence, even when the accused went to the scene in the 
knowledge that the crime would be committed.
91
 At the same time, it is impossible to 
divine a person’s unspoken intentions, other than by observing his conduct within the 
context of the surrounding facts, and drawing appropriate inferences. The accused’s 
conduct in such cases will therefore generally be the decisive factor in determining his 
intentions and, consequently, his liability.
92
 Whiting had spoken of ‘some overt 
conduct’ which showed ‘solidarity’ with the actual perpetrators of the crime. In 
Mgedezi, Botha JA also spoke of manifesting the sharing of the common purpose 
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through some ‘act of association’, however this term appears to have been discarded in 
recent years, in favour of the rather more vague and less satisfactory term ‘active 




Exactly what will constitute a sufficient ‘act of association’ or ‘active association’ has 
never been explicitly defined by the courts. In S v Thebus, the Constitutional Court held 
that this was a matter to be determined according to the facts of each case.
94
 It is 
however apparent from the leading cases on the subject that it ought to consist of 
positive conduct of some kind (an act, as opposed to an omission), from which the 
accused’s accession to the common purpose can be properly inferred.
95
 So saying, it is 
equally clear that the act in question need not actually assist, or facilitate, or encourage 
the commission of the crime in any way, as long as it shows ‘solidarity’ (as Whiting 
puts it) with the perpetrators of the crime.
96
 It could therefore be something relatively 
trivial, such as uttering verbal encouragement, even though the accused’s words may 
well have gone unheard or unheeded by the perpetrators,
97
 and it does not appear to be 
necessary to show that the perpetrators invited or welcomed the accused’s participation, 
or, for that matter, that they were even aware of it. An entirely unilateral act is 
sufficient. 
 
In summary, therefore, in modern South African law, a common purpose can arise in 
two possible ways, namely: 
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1. By prior conspiracy, in which case all that is necessary is that there be consensus 
between the parties that the crime should be committed, procured, or assisted by one 
or more of the conspirators. This form of association therefore implies bi- or 
multilateral conduct. In such cases, presence at the time of the crime is not a 
prerequisite for liability, nor is active involvement with the execution of the crime. 
There need not be prior consultation or planning; consensus can arise more-or-less 
spontaneously, through tacit agreement.
98
 The ‘act of association’ is the act of 
entering into the conspiracy. 
 
2. By spontaneous association, or ‘joining-in’ (in other words, unilateral conduct), in 
which case each of the five requirements set out in Mgedezi, including presence at 
the time of the crime, must be satisfied.
99
 The act of association must consist of 
some form of objectively ascertainable and hence positive conduct on the part of the 
individual accused, showing solidarity with the conduct of the perpetrators and 
evidencing his intention to make common cause with them.  
 
 
4. THE TIME OF FORMATION OF THE COMMON PURPOSE 
 
As previously explained, English law regarded common purpose as coterminous with 
conspiracy. Clearly, therefore, the common purpose needed to be entered into at some 
time before the commission of the crime and the parties would only be liable for each 
other’s acts committed whilst the common purpose still endured.
100
 Once it had been 
achieved,
101
 or if it was abandoned,
102
 no further liability arose. Thus, for example, a 
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person who merely assisted a felon to profit from his felony after the event would 




The idea that a common purpose could also arise through spontaneous association 
however presented the courts with a new challenge, as was illustrated in the case of S v 
Mgxwiti.
104
 It raised the question of whether a person would be liable for murder, if he 
joined in with a murderous attack after the fatal blow had already been delivered, but 
before the victim died. This question was especially problematic in cases of mob 
violence, where the deceased might have been subjected to numerous injuries, inflicted 
at different times by different assailants. It has been explained how, in Mgxwiti’s case, 
the majority of the court were able to avoid this difficulty by finding that Mgxwiti had 
acceded to the common purpose to kill before the deceased had received her fatal injury 
or injuries.
105
 Schreiner JA was however unable to agree with this finding. In his 
dissenting judgment, he held that there was a reasonable possibility that the deceased 
had already received the fatal injury before Mgxwiti joined in, but went on to hold that, 
in that case, Mgxwiti had ‘ratified’ the injuries that the deceased had already received 
and that he was consequently liable for her murder on that basis:  
 
[W]hoever joins in a murderous assault upon a person must be taken to have ratified the 
infliction of any injuries which have already been inflicted, whether or not in the result these 




The proposition that liability could arise retrospectively, through ratification, was 
subsequently endorsed by the majority of the Rhodesian Federal Court in R v 
Chenjere,
107
 and Schreiner JA’s dictum was adopted and applied by the Natal Provincial 
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Division of the Supreme Court in R v Mneke.
108
 It was only in 1969, however, that the 
validity of what, for sake of brevity, will be referred to as the ‘ratification rule’ was 
considered by the AD in S v Thomo.
109
 Wessels JA, who delivered the unanimous 
decision of the court in that case, rejected the ratification rule, with the following words: 
 
The only real practical advantage offered by this limited recognition of the principle of 
ratification would, in my opinion, appear to be the lessening of the burden of proof in a 
murder charge where circumstances render proof of causality a difficult matter. It must be 
borne in mind that an accused will not escape the consequences of his proved unlawful 
conduct in assaulting a mortally injured person, because he may, depending upon the nature 
of his own conduct and state of mind, still be guilty of attempted murder, assault with intent 
to murder or to do grievous bodily harm or common assault ... Even if it were open to this 
Court to give its approval to the rule of law referred to in Mgxwiti's case, I am satisfied that 




Despite the AD’s unanimous decision in Thomo, the question continued to exercise the 
minds of courts and commentators alike for some years.
111
 In 1982, the AD revisited the 
question in S v Khoza.
112
 In that case, the majority of the court (Holmes AJA, Joubert  
JA and Hoexter AJA) found that the accused had lacked intention to kill and altered his 
conviction to one of assault. Corbett JA and Botha AJA dissented. Corbett JA found 
that the accused had intention to kill in the form of dolus eventualis, but held that, 
because he had joined in the attack only after the fatal blow had been delivered and had 
done nothing himself to hasten death, he was merely guilty of attempted murder. In so 
doing, like Wessels JA before him, Corbett JA rejected the ratification rule, holding 
that: 
 
Whatever role common purpose may serve in the law relating to participation in crime ... it is 
clear that in order to impute the act of a perpetrator to another person on the ground of 
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common purpose it is, in general, necessary that the latter should have acceded to the 




Botha AJA also found that the accused had intention to kill and held that he had been 
correctly convicted of murder. In coming to this conclusion, he endorsed the ratification 
rule, describing it as ‘pragmatic’ and ‘soundly based on considerations of policy and 
practical exigency in the administration of criminal justice’.
114
 He approved of the 
reasoning of Tredgold CJ and Briggs FJ in Chenjere,
115
 and added his own reasons, 
namely that, since it was unnecessary to prove causation on the part of a secondary 
party, it could be of no logical significance whether that party acceded to the common 




Botha AJA’s approach was subsequently followed in S v Dlamini, by Thirion J, who 
endorsed the need for a pragmatic approach in such cases.
117
 It was only in 1990 that the 
AD finally resolved the uncertainty as to which approach was to be preferred. In S v 
Motaung,
118
 the nine accused had all been convicted of murder on the basis of the 
ratification rule, but on appeal, the AD, in a unanimous decision delivered by Hoexter 
JA, rejected the rule and overturned their convictions, holding that the choice of 
approach had to be determined with reference to legal principle, and that the principle of 
retrospective criminal liability was alien to South African criminal law.
119
 Thus, it held, 
where a person accedes to a common purpose to commit murder only after the deceased 
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has been fatally injured, and does nothing himself to expedite death, he cannot be guilty 




Pursuant to Motaung, it is now settled law that, in order for a person to be liable for 
another’s unlawful conduct on the basis of common purpose, and regardless of the 
method of association, the former must have been party to the common purpose at the 
time when that unlawful conduct was committed. In the case of a materially-defined 
crime like murder, this will be the time when the causal act or omission occurs, not the 
time when the consequence materialises, even though the crime is not complete until 
such consequence does materialise. 
 
 
5. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF A COMMON PURPOSE 
 
A fundamental principle of the doctrine of common purpose is that the criminal conduct 
of one party to a common purpose may be imputed to the other parties only if that 
conduct falls within the ‘scope of the common purpose’, or within the ‘scope of the 
mandate’,
121
 or within the ‘common design’,
122
 as it is also sometimes described (the 
terms are often used interchangeably). They will therefore not be liable for crimes 
committed by their fellow participants that fall outside the scope of the common 
purpose. Clearly, this means that the parties will be liable for whatever crime or crimes 
they actually meant to commit together, but questions often arise concerning their 
liability for collateral crimes committed by one or more of their number in the process 
of achieving their actual aim and object. 
 
According to Glanville Williams, English law regarded the question as one of degree.
123
 
He cites the following passage from Foster’s Crown Law: 
 
Much has been said by writers who have gone before me, upon cases where a person 
supposed to commit a felony at the instigation of another hath gone beyond the terms of such 
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instigation, or hath in the execution varied from them. If the principal totally and 
substantially varieth, if being solicited to commit a felony of one kind he wilfully and 
knowingly committeth a felony of another, he will stand single in that offence, and the 
person soliciting will not be involved in his guilt ... but if the principal in substance 
complieth with the temptation, varying only in circumstances of time and place, or in the 
manner of execution, in those cases the person soliciting to the offence will, if absent, be an 




In the case of liability for the use of violence as an adjunct to the principal crime, the 
answer depended primarily on what had been agreed beforehand by the participants. 
The nature of such agreement could however be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of the case.
125
 Thus, where one party knew that the other was carrying a 
weapon, this would be strong evidence (although not conclusive proof) of a common 
intent to use violence. Equally, an agreement to threaten violence would generally be 
construed as evidence of a common intent to use violence, ‘for the one so easily leads to 
the other’.
126
 It therefore appears that, in English law, the scope of a common purpose 
was regarded as a matter of objective fact, although it could be inferred from the facts 
and circumstances of the case. 
 
In addition, however, English law insisted that a secondary party had to have mens rea 
in order for liability to arise,
127
 although the form of mens rea was wider than that 
required for a principal in the first degree, in that it merely required that the secondary 
party should have involved himself knowingly in the commission of the crime; in other 
words, with full knowledge of, or wilful blindness towards all the material facts and 
circumstances constituting the crime.
128
 At the same time, English common law 
employed a number of rules that either dispensed with, or facilitated proof of mens rea. 
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One such rule was that a person was presumed to foresee and intend the natural 
consequences of his acts (sometimes the terms ‘probable’ and ‘reasonable’ 
consequences were preferred).
129
 A second rule, commonly known as the felony-murder 
rule, was that a person would be liable for murder if he caused the death of another in 
the course of committing a felony, even if he had no mens rea in respect of such death. 
It was only necessary to prove the mens rea for the felony.
130
 A third rule was the 
doctrine of transferred malice, which held that, where a person set out to commit a 
crime against a particular person or object, but accidentally or mistakenly targeted some 
unintended person or object, he would nevertheless be liable for the crime, if the harm 
that followed was of the same legal kind as he had intended. His malice (intention to 
commit the crime in question) was regarded as having been ‘transferred’ to the person 
or object that was the actual victim or target of the actus reus.
131
 These rules, which 
applied equally to secondary participants,
132
 extended the scope of liability for crimes 
committed in concert. 
 
The same rules were imported into South African law and applied for some years; the 
first,
133
 until it was overruled in a line of decisions beginning with R v Valachia in 
1945;
134
 the second, in its better-known guise of the ‘versari in re illicta’ doctrine, until 
the 1960s, when it was abolished by the AD’s rulings in S v Van der Mescht and S v 
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 and the third until its eradication in 1981, after a long line of conflicting 




The most important rule for present purposes was the first one, namely that a person 
was held to have foreseen and intended the natural and probable consequences of his 
conduct. This meant that both the perpetrator and a secondary party would be liable, not 
only for such criminal conduct as had been expressly or tacitly agreed upon, but also for 
any consequence that they knew or ought to have known would be a likely or probable 
result of their agreed conduct, including the commission of collateral crimes.
137
 This 
rule was incorporated into Sir James Stephen’s draft criminal code of 1879,
138
 upon 
which the Native Territories’ Penal Code was later modelled.
139
 Thus, in R v 
Garnsworthy, Dove-Wilson JP stated the relevant rule as follows: 
 
Where two or more persons combine in an undertaking for an illegal purpose, each of them 
is liable for anything done by the other or others of the combination, in the furtherance of 
their object, if what was done was what they knew or ought to have known, would be a 
probable result of their endeavouring to achieve their object. If on the other hand what is 
done is something which cannot be regarded as naturally and reasonably incidental to the 
attainment of the object of the illegal combination, then the law does not regard those who 
are not themselves personally responsible for the act as being liable; but if what is done is 
just what anybody engaging in this illegal combination would naturally, or ought naturally to 





With the South African trend towards the subjectivisation of mens rea during the 1950s 
and 1960s, however, the approach to determining the scope of a common purpose was 
also subjectivised,
141
 to the point where the enquiry for scope became conflated with the 
                                                 
135
 S v Van Der Mescht 1962 (1) SA 521 (A); S v Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287 (A). For a common purpose 
case in which this rule was applied, see R v Mkhize (note 73 above). 
136
 S v Mavhungu 1981 (1) SA 56 (A) 67G-H. 
137




 Native Territories Penal Code 24 of 1886 (Cape).. 
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enquiry for mens rea. Thus, writing in 1970, Burchell and Hunt explained the law as 
follows: 
 
[I]n the judgments where the liability of parties to a common purpose was based on mandate, 
language identical to that used to determine the existence of mens rea was employed to 
define the limits of the mandate. Indeed, mens rea and the scope of the mandate between the 
parties are synonymous in that if the associate in question had mens rea in respect of the 





Accordingly, in modern day South African law, the scope of a common purpose is 
ascertained ex post facto, by simply enquiring whether the party concerned had the 
necessary form of mens rea for the crime in question. If so, that crime is then considered 
to have fallen within the scope of the common purpose. Since each party’s liability is 
determined according to his own mens rea, this means that different parties to the same 
common purpose may be liable for different crimes, depending on what they knew and 
foresaw as possible in the circumstances, or, in the case of culpable homicide, what they 
ought reasonably to have foreseen.
143
 Thus, for example, where A, B and C share a 
common purpose to assault X and X dies as a result of the assault, A will be guilty of 
murder if he subjectively foresaw the possibility of causing X’s death; B will be guilty 
of culpable homicide if he did not subjectively foresee that possibility, but a reasonable 
person in the same circumstances would have done so; and C will be guilty of assault if 
he had neither subjective foresight nor negligence in respect of X’s death, but merely 
foresaw the possibility of injury. 
 
The question however arises as to the point in time when such mens rea is required: Is it 
at the time of association, or at the time of the commission of the actus reus, or, in the 
case of a prior conspiracy, is it at the time when the parties actually embarked on the 
commission of the agreed crime? Clearly, the actual perpetrator (if his identity can be 
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established) must have had the necessary mens rea at the time of the actus reus, in 
accordance with the established rule requiring contemporaneity of fault and conduct. It 
is also clear that a party who accedes to a common purpose by spontaneous association 
must have had the necessary mens rea at the time of his act of association.
144
 The 
position in respect of parties to a conspiracy is far from clear, however. The courts have 
not thus far addressed the issue directly. Burchell points out that, in S v Nkwenja,
145
 the 
majority of the court chose to assess the parties’ mens rea for culpable homicide at the 
time when they formed the common purpose to rob, whilst the minority chose to assess 
it at the time of the unlawful conduct (in this case, the fatal assault).
146
 In neither of the 
judgments was the issue specifically addressed, however, so the case is of doubtful 
value as authority on the point. 
 
Burchell’s own view is that the minority approach is preferable, because it allows for a 
subsequent change in the mental state of a participant, which would enable him, failing 
repentance and withdrawal, to be held liable for a collateral crime which was not 
contemplated at the time when he acceded to the common purpose, or embarked on the 
commission of the principal crime.
147
 As he explains: 
 
The intention of a participant in a common purpose to rob, for instance, may initially not 
include the intention to kill or even the subjective foresight that death may result from the 
robbery. However, at some stage before the victim of the robbery is killed, the participant 
may, in fact, realise or foresee that one of the group may use violence which might result in 
the death of the deceased. If the intention of the participant in question is to be is to be 
judged at some later stage before the victim of the robbery dies, then account can be taken of 
the change in the participant’s mental state. If the participant, despite his knowledge or 
foresight of the possibility that death might result, nevertheless associates himself with the 
common purpose, then his failure to withdraw from the criminal venture may be seen as 
unlawful and liability for murder could ensue (emphasis added).
148
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What Burchell is effectively saying, however, is that the scope of a common purpose 
may be extended as the commission of the crime progresses. There is nothing 
remarkable in this. Where parties to a common purpose to commit one crime later agree, 
either expressly or tacitly, to commit a collateral crime, all parties to such later 
agreement will be guilty of the collateral crime. Equally, if one party starts committing a 
collateral crime without such an agreement having been reached, and another party joins 
in with him in the commission of that crime, the latter will also be guilty of the 
collateral crime. All that has happened, in either case, is that a new and extended 
common purpose has been formed, either by fresh conspiracy (the first example), or by 
spontaneous association (the second example). There does however need to be a fresh 
act of association in some form,
149
 as Burchell appears to recognise (see the italicised 
words in the passage above) and it would appear that each participant’s mens rea is then 
judged at the time of that act.
150
 This, in any event, is in accordance with the normal rule 
requiring contemporaneity of fault and conduct.
151
 It seems, therefore, that despite 
Burchell’s preference for the minority approach in Nkwenja, it is probably the majority 




6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This concludes the discussion of the development of the doctrine of common purpose in 
South African law. It has been shown that, whereas English law required presence at the 
time of the crime in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit the crime in concert, South 
African law has dispensed with the need for all these requirements to be met in any 
given case. Thus, where there is a prior conspiracy, South African law has dispensed 
with the need for either presence at the scene of the crime, or an actual contribution 
                                                                                                                                               
unlawful conduct. If the relevant passage (23D-F) is read in its entirety (and not merely the extract 
supplied by Boister), it is evident that the court was merely assessing the second accused’s credibility 
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court subsequently (22J-23A) assessed his mens rea for culpable homicide at the time of the formation of 
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towards its execution. Where there is presence at the scene of the crime, South African 
law has dispensed with the need for either prior conspiracy, or an actual contribution 
towards the execution of the crime; all that is required is unilateral conduct showing 
solidarity with the conduct of the perpetrators. And lastly, South African law has 
dispensed with the need to establish the scope of a common purpose as a matter of 
objective fact. All that is required is association in a criminal enterprise of some kind, 
coupled with the necessary mens rea for the crime in question. It would be evident, 
therefore, that South African law has greatly extended the scope of the doctrine, to the 
point where it now covers a wide range of conduct that, in English law, would have 
been regarded as accessorial in nature, or may well have attracted no liability at all. This 
raises the question of what, if any, scope remains for accessorial liability. The following 









Although South African law adopted and has largely adhered to the Roman-Dutch monistic 
approach towards complicity, it has been explained how, in S v Williams,
1
 the AD (per 
Joubert JA) attempted to introduce a dualistic approach, by reviving the English law 
distinction between principals in the first degree and secondary participants.
2
 It has also been 
explained that it sought to introduce an additional requirement for liability as a secondary 
participant (termed an ‘accomplice’), namely that there needed to be a causal connection 
between the conduct of the accomplice and the commission of the crime by the actual 
perpetrator. This latter decision represented a significant departure from established 
precedent on common purpose liability and, although it was endorsed in S v Maxaba,
3
 both 
decisions were subsequently reversed in S v Khoza and S v Safatsa.
4
   
 
In reversing Joubert JA’s ruling on causation in cases of common purpose, however, the AD 
did not simultaneously reverse his decision on the need to distinguish between perpetrators 
and accomplices. That decision was allowed to stand, although it must now be read in 
conjunction with, and subject to, the AD’s rulings in Khoza and Safatsa. In order to 
determine exactly what is required for accomplice liability in South African law, therefore, it 
is necessary to piece the relevant requirements together from these conflicting judgments. 
 
 
2. THE NATURE OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY 
 
According to Joubert’s judgment in S v Williams, an accomplice is someone other than a 
perpetrator or co-perpetrator, who: 
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[A]ssociates himself wittingly with the commission of the crime … in that he knowingly affords 
the perpetrator or co-perpetrator the opportunity, the means or the information which furthers the 
commission of the crime... The assistance consciously rendered by the accomplice in the 
commission of the crime can consist of an act or an omission... [T]here must be a causal 





Further on, on the subject of accomplice liability for murder, Joubert JA held: 
 
The state of mind of an accomplice to murder consists in the intention to assist the perpetrator or 
co-perpetrators in killing the victim... His own act comprises his assistance in or furthering the 
commission of the murder. He is then liable as an accomplice to murder on the basis of his own 
act, whether it is a positive act or an omission, to further the commission of the murder, and his 
own fault, viz the intent that the victim must be killed, coupled with the act (actus reus) of the 
perpetrator or co-perpetrator to kill the victim unlawfully.  
 
This much of Joubert JA’s judgment remains unaffected by the decisions in Khoza and 
Safatsa. The only effect of these latter decisions, although an important and far-reaching one, 
is that the term ‘perpetrator’ is not limited to principals in the first degree, as Joubert JA 
evidently intended, but also includes principals in the second degree; that is, persons who are 
liable for the crime on the basis of common purpose. Such persons are still regarded as co-
perpetrators and thus, by definition, cannot also be accomplices. In order to determine 
whether a particular participant is an accomplice, therefore, it is necessary in the first instance 
to eliminate the possibility that he may be a co-perpetrator. Only if he is not, may one then 





It is evident from Williams that an accomplice’s liability is based, not on the principle of 
imputation, but on his own actus reus, coupled with the necessary mens rea.
7
 Each will 
therefore be discussed in turn: 
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3. THE ACTUS REUS OF AN ACCOMPLICE 
 
The actus reus of an accomplice consists in unlawfully furthering or assisting the commission 
of a crime by someone else; for example by affording the perpetrator ‘the opportunity, the 
means or the information which furthers the commission of the crime’.
8
 This assistance may 
consist of a positive act, or an unlawful omission – a failure to act positively to prevent the 
commission of the crime, in breach of a duty to do so.
9
 Since the accomplice’s liability is 
based on his own conduct, it does not appear to matter whether the perpetrator was aware of 
the assistance he received, or the identity of the person from whom he received it.
10
 There 
must however be ‘a causal connection between the accomplice’s assistance and the 




3.1. The need for a causal connection 
 
The need to prove a causal connection between the accomplice’s assistance and the 
commission of the crime by the perpetrator has given rise to considerable debate. Some 
commentators, like De Wet, Whiting and Snyman, have interpreted this requirement strictly, 
to mean that the accomplice’s assistance must have been a sine qua non of the commission of 
the crime and, in the case of murder, to mean that the accomplice’s conduct must have been a 
contributory cause of the death of the deceased.
12
 As they point out, however, this then leads 
to the anomalous situation where a person can never be an accomplice to murder, because the 
conduct required for such liability would then also be sufficient, in most cases, to render him 
liable as a perpetrator in his own right (a principal in the first degree).
13
 Other commentators, 
like Joubert,
14
 interpret the requirement more broadly, to mean that there must merely be a 
causal connection between the conduct of the accomplice and the ‘commission of the crime 
generally’ and, furthermore, that the envisaged causal connection does not require proof of 
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causation in the same exacting sense as is required to establish liability for a materially 
defined crime like murder (namely, the usual enquiries for factual and legal causation).
15
 
Botha AJA, in his dissenting judgment in Khoza, provided a third interpretation.
 
He stated 
that the required causal connection was not between the conduct of the accomplice and the 
crime itself, or its result, but between the conduct of the accomplice and the conduct of the 
perpetrator.
16
 He declined, however, to express an opinion as to how substantial that causal 
connection needed to be. Burchell expresses no opinion on the question of where the causal 
connection must lie, but does suggest that it is only necessary to prove factual causation; thus 
allowing for a person to be convicted as an accomplice to murder where his conduct was the 




Roman-Dutch law did not distinguish between principals and accessories and is thus of no 
assistances in resolving the issue. English law did draw such a distinction, but is of less 
assistance than might be hoped. Williams, after reviewing a number of the older cases, 
concludes that ‘it is enough that the accused has facilitated the crime, even though it would 
probably have been committed without his assistance’.
18
 As KJM Smith points out, however, 
the English case law on the subject is ‘patchy’ and contradictory and there has been little 
attempt by the courts to develop a coherent approach or set of principles.
19 
In 1975, the 
meaning of the term ‘procure’, as used in the phrase, ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’,
20
 was the 
subject of judicial review and the Court of Appeal held that the words were to be given their 
ordinary meanings.
21
 Pursuant to this decision, Smith and Hogan offered the opinion that 
‘procuring’ probably implies ‘causation but not consensus’; ‘abetting’ and ‘counselling’ 




 S v Khoza (note 4 above) 1054G-H: ‘Those authors who have read this statement to mean that a causal 
connection is required between the conduct of the accomplice and the death of the deceased have, I consider, 
misunderstood the judgment. If that were the requirement for liability as an accomplice, there would be no 
meaningful distinction between the actus reus of a perpetrator and the actus reus of an accomplice, and the very 
foundation of the distinction drawn between the two in the Williams judgment would disappear, with the result 
that the reasoning in the judgment would be self destructive. It is clear, therefore, that, in formulating the  
requirement of a causal connection in the way it did, as quoted above, the Court in Williams' case could not have 
been postulating a causal connection between the conduct of the accomplice and the death of the deceased. 
What was stated to be required was a causal connection between the conduct of the accomplice and the 
commission of the offence by the perpetrator(s) ... which connotes no more than a causal connection between the 
conduct of the accomplice and the conduct of the perpetrator or co-perpetrators.’ 
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probably imply ‘consensus but not causation’; and ‘aiding’ probably implies ‘actual 
assistance but neither consensus nor causation’.
22
 Smith and Hogan’s interpretation does 
appear to reflect the approach adopted in English law in more recent years. According to 
Simester and Sullivan, there needs to be a proven connection between the secondary party’s 
act and the commission of the offence by the principal, but this is not necessarily a causal 
connection.
23
 They explain the connection and the reasoning behind it in the following terms: 
 
Secondary liability is derived from S’s involvement in the principal offence, and not merely her 
attempt to become involved. It follows that S’s conduct must somehow be connected to the 
commission of the offence by P... [I]n the case of aiding this requirement is manifested by the 
need to demonstrate that assistance of some sort was in fact provided to P; similarly, in the case 
of procuring, it is reflected in the need to show a causal link between S’s conduct and 
perpetration of the offence. The same is true for abetting and counselling. Although causation 
need not be shown [for abetting and counselling], it must be established by the prosecution that 
the principal received encouragement, urging, or advice, before S’s conduct may count as 
participation falling within section 8 [of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861]. 
 
This point is fundamental to the nature of secondary participation. Derivative liability is not a 
form of inchoate liability. Liability is not based on S’s act of encouragement (for example) per 
se, as it is in inchoate offences such as incitement. Rather, it is derived from S’s participation in 
the offence perpetrated by P. If P is not aware of the encouragement, urging, or advice, S 
necessarily fails to participate in the commission of the offence. In such a case, S cannot be a 




Thus, despite Joubert JA’s confident pronouncement on the need for the existence of a causal 
relationship, it does not appear that such a relationship was an invariable requirement of 
English law. Although it is impossible to express a definite opinion on the question, 
therefore, it is submitted that the preferable approach is that provided by Botha AJA in his 
dissenting judgment in Khoza, namely that the causal relationship should lie between the 
conduct of the accomplice and the conduct of the perpetrator; and, furthermore, that such a 
relationship does not require proof of either factual or legal causation, in the strict sense, but 
merely proof that, as described by Williams, the accomplice’s conduct facilitated the 
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commission of the crime in some way,
25
 even if the perpetrator could and probably would 
have committed it anyway. In this way, it is submitted, effect can be given to the concept of 
accomplice liability without encountering the difficulties raised by De Wet, Whiting and 
Snyman. Furthermore, this approach would appear to coincide most closely with the position 
in English law, from which the concept of accessorial liability was derived. 
 
3.2. Becoming an accomplice without becoming a co-perpetrator 
 
It would be evident that, because the scope of common purpose liability has been so widely 
extended in South African law, it is virtually impossible for a person to further or assist 
knowingly in the commission of another’s crime without rendering himself a co-perpetrator. 
Where the assistance, whether in the form of an act or an omission, is rendered by agreement, 
however informal, this would be a case of common purpose arising from conspiracy. Where 
the assistance is rendered unilaterally, without prior agreement, positive conduct that amounts 
to such assistance will inevitably be regarded as a sufficient show of solidarity to constitute 
an act of spontaneous association in a common purpose. Essentially, then, there are only two 
clear possibilities that remain: 
 
1. Where the assistance is rendered unilaterally, without prior agreement, and takes the form 
of an unlawful omission (a failure to take steps that may have prevented the commission 
of the crime, or foiled its successful completion), the person who renders such assistance 
cannot become a co-perpetrator, since spontaneous association requires positive conduct. 




                                                 
25
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2. Where the crime in question is an autographic crime,27 a person who assists in its 




Apart from the above two possibilities, which have in fact been endorsed by the courts,
29
 one 
may speculate upon a further possibility, although the position is less clear; namely, where 
the assistance, whatever form it took, was not accompanied by sufficient mens rea to render 
the provider liable for the crime itself, but only sufficient to render him liable as an 
accomplice. In order to consider this last possibility further, the mens rea for accomplice 
liability needs to be addressed. This will be done further on. In order to complete the 
discussion of the actus reus for accomplice liability, there is one further point requiring brief 
discussion. 
 
3.3. The derivative liability of accomplices 
 
Because an accomplice’s liability is accessorial in nature, it derives from and is thus 
necessarily dependent on the liability of the actual perpetrator. This does not mean that the 
perpetrator must first be tried and convicted, as was once required in English law, but a crime 
must indeed have been committed, and committed by someone other than the alleged 
accomplice. Even so, the exact degree of dependence is unclear. Two possible approaches 
have been identified in this regard.
30
 One, the ‘strict accessoriness’ approach, requires that the 
perpetrator must have satisfied all the normal elements of liability for the crime in question. 
Thus, where the perpetrator is able to rely on a defence that excludes criminal capacity or 
mens rea, a person who assisted him to commit an unlawful act would not be liable to 
conviction as an accomplice.
31
 This approach has been criticised on the grounds that it is 
capable of producing inequitable results.
 
Whiting argues that it would mean that a person who 
                                                 
27
 Autographic crimes are discussed in ch3, s2. 
28
 R v Uys 1911 CPD 213; R v Jackelson 1920 AD 486; R v M (1950) 4 SA 101 (T); S v Kellner 1963 (2) SA 
435 (A); S v Kimberley 2002 (2) SACR 38 (E). 
29
 See the authorities cited in footnotes 26 and 28 above. 
30
 Burchell (note 1 above) 604. See also Whiting (note 12 above) 203 and MA Rabie ‘Die Aksessoriteits-
beginsel in die Deelnemingsleer’ (1970) 33 THRHR 244, 247. Rabie in fact argues that there are four possible 
approaches, but the two additional ones he mentions (‘minimal’ accessoriness and ‘hyper’ accessoriness) lie so 
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need not be addressed here. 
31
 See, for example, R v Rasool 1924 AD 44, in which the accused flouted the immigration laws by bringing his 
three-year-old son, a prohibited immigrant, into the country, but escaped liability because the child, lacking 
criminal capacity, was not himself capable of committing a contravention of the relevant Act 





orchestrated the rape of a woman by a mentally ill person would then attract no liability.
32
 To 
circumvent this problem, the alternative or ‘limited accessoriness’ approach requires only that 
the perpetrator must have committed the actus reus of the relevant crime. In that case, it 
would be open to the alleged accessory to rely on a defence like justification, which would 
exclude this element of liability on the part of the principal offender, but not on a defence 
aimed at excluding the subjective elements of liability (criminal capacity or mens rea).
33
 
Burchell appears to favour the limited accessoriness approach,
34
 although the preponderance 
of South African case authority tends to favour the strict approach,
35






4. THE MENS REA OF AN ACCOMPLICE 
 
Turning now to the mens rea element of accomplice liability, it is clear that the required form 
of mens rea is dolus, that is to say, the intention to assist the perpetrator to commit the crime 
in question.
37
 Dolus may take any of the accepted forms, including dolus eventualis, but mere 
negligence will not suffice, as this would cast the net of liability too widely.
38
 It is also clear, 
pursuant to the recent decision of the Western Cape High Court in S v Masilingi, that the 
accomplice must have known what type of crime it was that the perpetrator would commit (or 
                                                 
32
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38
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at least have foreseen that type of crime as one of a range of possibilities).
39
 Thus, in order to 
be an accomplice to robbery with aggravating circumstances, the accomplice must have been 
aware that the robbery would (or might possibly) be committed under those particular 
circumstances.  
 
What is not clear, however, is the degree of particularity with which the accused is required 
to have known or foreseen the identity of the victim or target of the crime to be committed by 
the perpetrator. Suppose, for example, that A lends B a firearm, believing that B intends to 
use it to rob a certain grocery store, but B uses it instead to rob a bank. Is A an accomplice to 
the resulting bank robbery? According to English law, where one person supplies another 
with the means to commit a crime like robbery, murder, or burglary, the former becomes an 
accessory to the latter’s crime, even though he may not know the identity, or even the class or 
category of persons whom the latter intends to rob or murder, or the address of the premises 
that the latter intends to burgle. It is enough if the former knew, or foresaw the possibility that 
he was assisting the latter to commit one or more of a range of possible crimes, which 
included the type of crime that was ultimately committed.
40
 To answer the question posed 
above, therefore, in English law A would indeed be an accomplice to the bank robbery, 
because it was a crime of the same type as he had foreseen (robbery). He would not, however, 
be an accomplice to the bank robbery, if he had lent the firearm to B in the genuine, but 
mistaken belief that B intended to use it for purposes of game poaching, being a crime of an 
entirely different type. Although this question has not yet been decided by the South African 
courts, it is possible that they would follow suit. If so, this would mean that there is a third 
way in which a person might meet the requirements for accomplice liability without 
becoming a co-perpetrator (and thus disqualifying himself); namely, if he supplied the means 
for the commission of a crime without sufficient knowledge of its intended victim or target to 
be said to have had ‘concrete’ intention in that regard. In that case, he would not satisfy the 
mens rea requirements for liability as a co-perpetrator,
41
 but he could conceivably satisfy the 
requirements for accomplice liability, as long as the type of crime committed fell within the 
range of crimes that he had contemplated. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It would be evident from the preceding discussion that the South African approach towards 
participation in crime has remained primarily monistic in nature, in accordance with the 
approach in Roman-Dutch law. Although certain dualistic elements were initially adopted 
from English law and were revived by the AD’s decision in S v Williams,
42
 they have thus far 
proved of relatively little significance. Thus, although it is correct that South African law now 
recognises accessorial liability, in the form of accomplices, it has been shown that this form 
of liability spans such a narrow range of conduct as to be almost negligible. It would also be 
evident that the law on the subject of accomplice liability is in a most unsatisfactory state. 
Despite the fact that more than thirty years have elapsed since the Williams judgment, there 
remain a number of crucial areas where the law is in need of clarification and development. 
                                                 
42









It has been explained that the doctrine of common purpose rests upon a fiction, derived 
from English law, whereby the conduct of the principal actor is imputed to secondary 
participants. The secondary participant’s own actus reus is merely his act of associating 
with the principal actor, with a common purpose to commit the crime in question.
1
 This 
fiction allows both parties to be regarded as co-perpetrators, with equal liability for the 
crime. It has also been explained that the original rationale for this fiction (which 
developed during the late Middle Ages and thus predated the doctrine of common 
purpose) was probably based on little more than expediency – the need for a mechanism 
to convert accessories at the fact into co-principals, in order to deprive them of the 
privileges then available to accessories; most notably that of being effectively immune 




 century, however, when it might have been considered necessary to find 
some normative basis for the fiction, in order to legitimise the emerging doctrine of 
common purpose, it was thought to rest on principles of agency, or authorisation.
2
 This 
appears to have been the view adopted by the American courts in early years,
3
 and the 
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 EM Burchell & PMA Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Volume 1, General Principles 
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South African courts took the same view, although, presumably in order to reconcile the 
English and Roman-Dutch law approaches,
4
 the latter generally preferred to speak of 
‘implied mandate’. Thus, for example, Innes CJ, in his minority judgment in McKenzie 
v Van der Merwe, explained the rationale for the fiction in the following terms: 
 
Now the rule has not been deduced from general principles, but rests upon certain old 
decisions. The terms in which it is expressed and the limitations to which it is subject would 
seem to indicate that the principle which underlies it is that of agency. However that may be, 
its place in our law must be that of an application of the doctrine of implied mandate. There 
is none other upon which it can be grounded; and its operation in our practice must be 




As previously explained, however, although the implied mandate analogy was 
maintained well into the 1960s, it attracted increasing criticism as time passed.
6
 It 
became evident that the analogy could not account satisfactorily for all applications of 
the doctrine and, in particular, that it could not explain or justify the extension of the 
scope of the doctrine to include the ‘active association’ form of common purpose, where 
liability is based on unilateral conduct, rather than consensus. Thus, although Botha JA 
observed in S v Safatsa that the ‘much maligned notion of implied mandate’ is ‘not 
without merit’,
7
 he (perhaps wisely) declined to express a definite view on the matter 
and, for many years, the courts remained silent on the question of what the underlying 
rationale for the doctrine was, until the Constitutional Court was obliged to address this 
question in S v Thebus.
8
 In doing so, however, the court did not attempt to advance any 
normative basis for the doctrine, but held that it was justifiable on purely instrumental 
(utilitarian) grounds; principally, the need for crime control, with the need to circumvent 
difficulties of proof as a secondary rationale: 
 
The principal object of the doctrine of common purpose is to criminalise collective criminal 
conduct and thus to satisfy the social 'need to control crime committed in the course of joint 
enterprises'. The phenomenon of serious crimes committed by collective individuals, acting 
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 See further ch 2, s5. 
5
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6
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in concert, remains a significant societal scourge. In consequence crimes such as 
murder, robbery, malicious damage to property and arson, it is often difficult to prove that 
the act of each person or of a particular person in the group contributed causally to the 
criminal result. Such a causal prerequisite for liability would render nugatory and ineffectual 
the object of the criminal norm of common purpose and make prosecution of collaborative 




The lack of any normative basis for the doctrine is highly problematic, however. It flies 
in the face of decades of legal development and refinement, in which our courts have 
generally striven to approach the criminal law on a rational, systematic and principled 
basis.
10
 It means that the doctrine of common purpose is an aberration, since it then 
represents the sole remaining instance of what might be termed ‘unprincipled’ criminal 
liability in our common law. There are also serious constitutional implications to 
divorcing criminal liability from personal responsibility and, hence, from the principle 
of culpability.
11
 The question therefore arises as to whether the doctrine of common 
purpose can be justified on normative grounds, or whether any such justification(s) 




2. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS  
 
2.1 Mandate revisited 
 
In considering whether a normative justification can be found for the doctrine of 
common purpose, it is necessary, in the first instance, to revisit the ‘much maligned’ 
concept of implied mandate.
12
 Although it must be accepted that criminal liability 
                                                 
9
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cannot be based on mandate per se,
13
 Dressler nevertheless observes that ‘the concept of 
agency explains a great deal about why we feel justified in punishing an accomplice as 
if she were the perpetrator’.
14
 The question that arises is why this should be so. After 
examining the commentary that exists on the subject, it becomes evident that there are 
three different ways of viewing the mandate analogy, each of which offers a distinctive 
normative basis on which the imputation of the principal actor’s conduct to a secondary 
party could conceivably be justified. These approaches may be briefly stated as 
authorisation, power of control and contributory causation. 
 
2.1.1 Mandate as authorisation 
 
The most common and literal approach to the mandate analogy is to regard the 
secondary party as having expressly or tacitly authorised the perpetrator’s criminal act. 
The notion of indirect perpetration, as expressed in the classic maxim ‘qui facit per 
alium facit per se’, is well entrenched in our law and is unassailable as a principle of 
normative justice. Thus, where the secondary party (S) was in fact the instigator of the 
crime committed by the perpetrator (P), a clear and defensible normative basis exists for 
imputing P’s conduct to S. In such cases, P is merely the instrument through which S 
exercises his autonomous will and there can be no objection in principle to holding S 
liable as a co-perpetrator on this basis.
15
 As Unterhalter puts it:  
 
This follows from the criminal law’s commitment to the idea that he who proposes should 





Difficulties with the ‘mandate as authorisation’ approach arise, however, when one 
attempts to extend the analogy beyond cases of actual (express or tacit) authorisation, to 
cases where the mandate is implied; for example, where P and S set out to commit the 
crime together, or where P merely enlists S’s help to commit a crime of his own, or 
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where P, in executing his mandate from S, commits a collateral crime that was expressly 
forbidden by S.
17
 To say that, in such cases, S has authorised P’s criminal conduct 
stretches the concept of authorisation into the realms of fictitious or constructive 
mandate, a concept which, it is submitted, has no place in criminal law.
18
 One is then 
also faced with the need to explain and justify not just one, but two legal fictions.
19
 As 
Ziff puts it, however, ‘one legal fiction + another legal fiction = science fiction’.
20
 In 
such cases, the analogy becomes so attenuated that it no longer offers a defensible 
normative foundation for the imputation.
21
 There are, however, two further ways of 
approaching the mandate analogy. 
 
2.1.2 Mandate as power of control 
 
A second way of approaching the mandate analogy is by viewing the secondary 
participant in terms of the power of control that he exercises over the principal actor’s 
conduct. In civil law, the doctrine of vicarious liability is explained and justified in part 
by the employer/principal’s right to direct and control his servant/agent’s actions.
22
 
Although this doctrine does not form part of our criminal law, the concept of control 
(hegemony) nevertheless enjoys significant support as a basis for criminal liability in 
Continental legal systems,
23
 notably that of Germany. In German law, a perpetrator is 
one who exercises ‘Tatherrschaft’ over the criminal act,
24
 even if he does not commit it 
himself. Thus S will be the perpetrator of a crime executed by P if the criminal act is the 
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result of S’s ‘event-directing will’ and if S ‘dominates the commission of the act in 
terms of the significance of his objective contribution’.
25
 This ‘objective contribution’ 
could take the form of planning and masterminding the crime, or playing a significant 
part in its execution. Once again, this is merely another example of indirect perpetration 
(qui facit per alium facit per se) and, as such, it offers a clear and defensible normative 
basis for imputing P’s criminal act to S. It would not, however, justify the imputation of 
principal liability to minor and insignificant participants, who exercised no control over 
the way in which the crime was executed and were in no position to have done so. It is 
doubtful, therefore, whether the ‘mandate as control’ analogy would extend the scope of 
liability any further than the ‘mandate as authorisation’ analogy. 
 
2.1.3 Mandate as contributory cause 
 
A third way of approaching the mandate analogy is in terms of causation; that is to say, 
by regarding S, through his mandate, as having (indirectly) caused the commission of 
the crime by P. This approach corresponds with the medieval approach to crimes 
committed by mandate in Western Europe,
26
 in that (according to De Wet) the mandator 
was not held liable ex mandato, but propter mandatum; that is to say, not because P’s 
act was imputed to S, as in civil law, but because, through his mandate, S had set into 
motion a causal sequence of events, for which he could ultimately be held responsible.
27
 
Causation, too, would offer a clear and defensible normative basis for the imputation of 
P’s conduct to S; possibly the most defensible basis of all, in view of the importance 
universally accorded to causation as a determinant of criminal liability: 
 
The common law is wedded to the concept of personal, rather than vicarious, responsibility 
for crimes. Professor Sayre has described the notion that criminal liability is ‘intensely 
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personal’  as ‘deep rooted’. Our demand that responsibility be personal is the result of the 
‘inarticulate, subconscious sense of justice of the man on the street’. Personal responsibility 
is the ‘only sure foundation of law’. Causation, then, is the instrument we employ to ensure 
that responsibility is personal. It links the actor to the harm. It helps us to understand who 
should be punished by answering how the harm occurred. Causation is, as Professor Jerome 
Hall writes, ‘an ultimate notion, deeply characteristic of human thought and expressed even 




It was no doubt for such reasons that De Wet and other adherents of the Purification 
movement argued so vigorously for causation to be made a prerequisite for secondary 
participant liability.
29
 The reason for their lack of success is not hard to find, however. 
There is a difference between saying that S contributed causally to the crime committed 
by P and saying that S contributed causally to P’s commission of the crime. The former 
statement denotes a direct causal nexus between S’s conduct and the crime itself, so that 
S becomes a co-perpetrator in his own right; whereas the second statement denotes 
indirect causation – S causes P to act and P in turn commits the crime. The latter is 
clearly what De Wet had in mind when he spoke of ‘psychological’ causation,
30
 a 
notion that was dismissed by Botha JA in S v Safatsa as ‘stretching the concept of 




The extremely narrow view of causation taken by the AD in Safatsa was almost 
certainly influenced, to some degree at least, by Hart and Honoré’s well known and 
highly influential treatise on the subject, in which they argued that, because human 
beings have independent volition, it can never be correct to speak of one person as 
having caused another’s voluntary act and that, consequently, it is not permissible to 
attribute responsibility for one person’s voluntary act to another on the principle of 
causation; an intervening human act, if voluntary, must invariably rank as a novus actus 
interveniens.
32
 According to this reasoning, if causation became a requirement for 
secondary participant liability, an important category of participants would then escape 
liability, namely those persons who instigated the crime, without playing a direct role its 
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execution. It is understandable that the AD would not have been prepared to 
countenance such an outcome.
33
 More contentiously, it must also be assumed that it was 





Kadish, however, whilst he agrees with Hart and Honoré’s view that it is not possible 
for one person to cause the voluntary act of another in the strict, scientific sense, 
observes that it is certainly possible for one person to influence another’s voluntary act 
and that, where such influence is exerted deliberately, responsibility for the ensuing act 
may be attributed to the former on the basis of that influence:  
 
Holding a secondary party liable for influencing the principal’s decision to act is plainly 
compatible with the premise that the latter’s acts are determined by his own choice. 
Recognizing that a person is influenced by what other people say and do... does not imply 
that volitional actions are caused, in the physical sense, the way natural events are 
determined by antecedent conditions... As Hart and Honoré have pointed out, the 
characteristic form of influencing another is the giving of reasons for an action. This differs 
from causal influence in that the influence operates not as a determining condition, but as a 
consideration that renders a particular course of action more desirable to the primary actor. If 
one persuades or encourages another to commit a criminal act by appealing to some 
consideration that moves him, by giving him emotional support and approval, by offering a 
rationalization for the action, or by similar means, one has not caused the principal to act in 
the physical sense of cause. These influences did not make the principal act, for he was free 
to act as he chose. Nonetheless, since the secondary party intentionally initiated the influence 
in order to induce the principal to act, he may be held liable. This is a commonplace ground 
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To influence however means to affect. Where S influences P to act in a particular 
manner, S’s conduct affects the course and eventual outcome of events; and, in that 
case, it is submitted that it is unduly pedantic to insist that S’s conduct was not a 
contributory cause of those events, merely because P had the freedom to act differently 
had he chosen to do so.
36
 This, in any event, is the current English law approach 
towards the concept of procuring,
37
 and it corresponds with the current approach in our 
law towards causation generally.
38
 It is submitted, therefore, that the ‘mandate as 
contributory cause’ analogy would also offer a clear and defensible normative basis for 
the imputation of the principal actor’s conduct to secondary participants. As with the 
other analogies, however, it would not justify the imputation of such conduct to minor 
and insignificant participants, whose conduct had no influence whatsoever on the 
commission of the crime by the principal actor. 
 
In summary, therefore, it can be seen that the mandate analogy offers three clear and 
readily-defensible normative bases on which the imputation of a principal actor’s 
conduct to a secondary party could conceivably be justified. It can also be seen, 
however, that there are limits to how far this analogy can be extended, without 
involving further fictions and entering into the realms of ‘science fiction’.
39
 Whichever 
analogy one adopts (and they are not mutually exclusive), the concept of mandate offers 
no normative basis for imputing a principal actor’s conduct to minor and insignificant 
secondary participants. It is self-evident that, to be regarded as a co-principal in terms of 
the analogy, the remote/secondary participant must play a role that corresponds closely 
with the common conception of what a principal is, according to civil law. Before 
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leaving the subject of mandate, however, it is necessary to address a further justification 
advanced by Snyman, namely the concept of mandate as forfeited identity. 
 
2.1.4 Mandate as forfeited identity 
 
Snyman argues that the true justification for the doctrine of common purpose lies in the 
concept of ‘forfeited identity’. He explains: 
 
It is not unjust to impute X’s act ... to Z. By engaging in conduct in which he co-operates 
with X’s criminal act, Z forfeits his right to claim that the law should not impute to him 





The theory of forfeited identity was developed and advanced by Dressler, as an 
alternative to the idea that the imputation of the principal actor’s conduct to secondary 
parties was based on authorisation or agency.
41
 For various reasons, Dressler considered 
the analogy with the civil law concept of agency unsatisfactory,
42
 and argued that a 
more realistic and honest explanation for the imputation was that, due to his 
participation in the crime, the secondary participant was simply regarded as having 
forfeited his personal identity; his right, in other words, to be treated as an individual: 
 
Despite these technical distinctions, the concept of agency explains a great deal about why 
we feel justified in punishing an accomplice as if she were the perpetrator. Perhaps, however, 
our feelings may be described better in terms of ‘forfeited personal identity’. Ordinarily a 
person is held criminally responsible for his own actions. However, when an accomplice 
chooses to become a part of the criminal activity of another, she says in essence, ‘your acts 
are my acts’, and forfeits her personal identity. We euphemistically may impute the actions 
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of the perpetrator to the accomplice by ‘agency’ doctrine; in reality, we demand that she who 
chooses to aid in a crime forfeits her right to be treated as an individual. Thus, moral 
distinctions between parties are rendered irrelevant. We pretend the accomplice is no more 
than an incorporeal shadow.
43 
  
It should be noted, however, that Dressler regarded forfeited identity as an explanatory 
theory and not as a defensible normative basis for imputing a principal actor’s conduct 
to secondary parties. On the contrary, he made it clear that he considered the notion of 
forfeited identity objectionable. His chief objection was that forfeiture of personal 
identity cannot be reconciled with the principle of culpability: 
 
Forfeiture permits society to ignore the potentially numerous levels of personal culpability 
and personal involvement of wrongdoers. Yet, it is precisely because the criminal justice 
system stigmatizes the guilty and metes out punishment for wrongdoing that the common 
law usually rejects forfeiture, and instead evaluates legal guilt and apportions punishment 
based on the degree of personal responsibility. Punishment is rendered proportionally to 




Snyman’s adoption and advancement of forfeited identity theory as a normative basis 
for the imputation of a principal actor’s conduct to secondary participants is therefore 
problematic. The principal difficulty lies in explaining precisely why mere co-operation 
in another’s crime should, in and of itself, be regarded as sufficient to justify a forfeiture 
of such magnitude. Three feasible normative justifications for imputation have been 
offered above, however it has also been shown that these justifications are of limited 
application. None of them is capable of justifying imputation based on co-operation 
alone. Furthermore, applying civil law concepts like forfeiture and waiver in the context 
of criminal law is treading on very dangerous ground, especially when dealing with 
questions of personal identity, which must inevitably impact upon constitutionally 
protected rights.
45
 It may be concluded, therefore, that the ‘mandate as forfeited 
identity’ approach does not offer a defensible normative basis for imputing a principal 
actor’s conduct to secondary participants. On the contrary, it offers a very good reason 
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for regarding any such imputation as objectionable in the absence of some other 
convincing and defensible justification.  
 
2.2 Change of normative position 
 
An alternative normative basis for the imputation of the principal actor’s conduct to 
secondary participants is advanced by Simester and Sullivan, in the form of ‘change of 
normative position’.
46
 This theory, originally devised by Gardner,
47
 and elaborated by 
Ashworth and others,
48
 has been advanced to justify what Ashworth describes as 
‘moderate’ constructivism in the criminal law, in relation to liability for unforeseen and 
unintended consequences. It may be distinguished from ‘unlawful act’ theory,
49
 which 
allows for more extreme forms of constructive liability. According to ‘unlawful act’ 
theory, an offender crosses a significant moral and criminal threshold at the moment 
when he knowingly commits an unlawful act of any kind. Because he has chosen to 
place himself on the ‘wrong side’ of the law, liability may be imputed to him for any 
consequence that results from that act, however unintended and unforeseen. This theory 
is recognisable as the basis of the now-defunct versari in re illicita doctrine of South 
African law and the English law doctrines of constructive malice (the felony-murder 
rule) and transferred malice.
50
  Unlawful act theory has been discredited as a sufficient 
basis for the attribution of liability in modern times,
51
 not merely because of its 
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draconian implications, but also because it is inimical to the principle of culpability, 
which is based on respect for individual autonomy and is, in turn, integrally associated 




‘Change of normative position’ theory represents an attempt to reintroduce unlawful act 
theory in a more refined and considerably more restricted form. In terms of change of 
normative position theory, the significant moral and criminal threshold is crossed when 
the individual intentionally wrongs another person by directing conduct against a 
particular type of interest; for example, by assaulting that person.
53
 The commission of 
such an act, together with the required subjective mens rea, then ‘constitutes a change of 
position of such normative significance’ that it can justify the imposition of liability for 
more serious consequences than those subjectively foreseen, as long as the resulting 
liability falls within the same general group or ‘family’ of offences.
54
 According to 
Ashworth, there appear to be three main elements to the proposition: Firstly, the 
‘trigger’ for liability must be intentional conduct amounting to a change of normative 
position in relation to the consequences of that conduct; secondly, the intentional 
conduct must lie in the commission of a crime belonging to the same ‘family’ as that for 
which liability is sought to be imposed; and, thirdly, there must be a measure of 
proportionality (or ‘no great distance’) between the intended crime and that for which 




Whilst it would be evident that ‘change of normative position’ theory was developed as 
a justification for departure from the normal principles of mens rea and 
correspondence,
56
 its relevance for present purposes arises from its adoption by 
Simester and Sullivan as a justification for the modern English law doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise: 
 
By entering into an agreement or joint enterprise, S changes her normative position. She 
becomes, through her own deliberate choice, a participant in a group action to commit a 
crime. Moreover, her new status has moral significance: she associates herself with the 
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conduct of the group in a way that the mere aider and abettor, who remains an independent 




Whilst Simester and Sullivan’s explanation might appear plausible, however, it cannot 
withstand close scrutiny. In the first instance, the application of ‘change of normative 
position’ theory to the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise bears no relation to the 
purpose for which the theory was originally devised, namely to provide a justification 
for moderate (and thus limited) constructivism in relation to unforeseen and unintended 
consequences. This is borne out by the fact that the imputation of one party’s criminal 
conduct to another cannot fulfil the three essential requirements outlined by Ashworth,
58
 
the second and third of which are necessary in order to limit the attribution of liability 
and support the theory’s claim to be a justification for moderate constructivism. In fact, 
in the terms in which the theory is described and applied by Simester and Sullivan, there 
is nothing to distinguish it from the old ‘unlawful act’ theory (versari in re illicita 
doctrine), which is no longer regarded as a legitimate basis for the attribution of 
liability, and would certainly not be considered acceptable in modern South African 
law. Furthermore, other than alluding to the law’s hostility towards criminal groups,
59
 
Simester and Sullivan fail to offer any reason as to why entering into a criminal 
conspiracy should be considered an act of such great moral and criminal significance as 
to justify the treatment of conspirators in a manner that differs so radically from other 
criminal offenders, who are judged on the basis of their own conduct. Consequently, it 
is submitted, ‘change of normative position’ theory is too vague and broad to provide a 
clear and defensible normative basis for imputing a principal actor’s conduct to 
secondary parties. If this theory is to shed any light on the subject, it needs to be 
developed so as to explain more precisely what it is about conspiracy that changes a 
conspirator’s normative position. 
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2.3 Substantial participation 
 
The final normative basis that requires discussion is Dressler’s ‘substantial 
participation’ standard for the imputation of conduct.
60
 In 1985, Dressler proposed that 
the conduct of a principal actor should be imputed to a secondary participant only if it 
could be shown that S’s conduct was a factual cause (sine qua non) of the ensuing 
criminal harm. Other, ‘non-causal’ accomplices should not be regarded as co-principals, 
but should instead be guilty of a lesser offence. Factual causation would, of course, 
offer an unassailable normative basis for holding a secondary party liable as a co-
principal, however, as previously discussed, South African courts have consistently 
refused to adopt factual causation as a prerequisite for such liability.
61
 In 2008, 
however, Dressler modified his original proposals, to suggest what he regarded as a 
pragmatic alternative solution, namely that P’s conduct could be imputed to S if the 
latter was a ‘substantial participant’ in the crime: 
 
‘Substantial participant’ concededly is an imprecise term, but certainly no more so that the 
doctrine of proximate causation, which invites the fact-finder to draw justice-based lines of 
responsibility. Ultimately, the issue here is whether the accomplice’s role in the planning or 
commission of the offense is sufficiently great that it is just to hold her accountable for – to 
derive liability for – the offense committed by the principal.
62 
 
Whilst ‘substantial participation’ does not offer as clear and defensible a normative 
basis for imputing conduct as authorisation, power of control, or contributory causation, 
it could well be regarded as a convenient proxy for causation, which would obviate the 
need for a causation enquiry, with all the difficulties that such an enquiry would 
encounter in a case of joint wrongdoing.
63
 It is self-evident, though, that ‘insubstantial’ 
participants could not be held liable as co-principals on this basis. They would still need 
to be found guilty of a lesser offence, as Dressler originally proposed. 
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It has been shown that there are indeed defensible normative justifications for imputing 
a principal actor’s conduct to secondary participants in terms of the doctrine of common 
purpose. Apart from direct causation, which has been rejected as a prerequisite for such 
liability, authorisation, power of control and indirect causation would each offer a 
defensible normative justification for imputation, as would substantial participation. It 
has also been shown, however, that these normative justifications do not cover the entire 
scope of common purpose liability as it exists in our present law. In particular, there is 
no normative justification of any sort for treating minor and insignificant secondary 
participants as co-principals. It must therefore be concluded that the only possible 
reasons for doing so are instrumental in nature. Instrumental justifications for the 
doctrine of common purpose will therefore be discussed below. 
 
 
3. INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
It has been explained that, in S v Thebus, the Constitutional Court did not attempt to 
advance any normative basis for the doctrine of common purpose, but held that it was 
justifiable on instrumental (utilitarian) grounds alone; principally, the need for crime 
control, with the need to circumvent difficulties of proof as a secondary rationale.
64
 It 
has also been explained that instrumental rationales are inherently problematic when 
they are used as the sole basis for criminal liability. They are inimical to a rational, 
systematic and principled approach to criminal law and there are also adverse 
constitutional implications to basing criminal liability on social exigency (public 
policy), rather than on personal culpability.
65
 Public policy has been famously compared 
to an ‘unruly horse’ that may take its rider where he has no wish to go.
66
 This is not to 
say that public policy considerations can never afford a valid basis for imposing 
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criminal liability, but justifications based on public policy need to be approached with 
circumspection and not simply accepted at face value.  
 
Thus, for example, examining the influence of instrumental arguments on human rights 
adjudication in the context of criminal law, Schwikkard offers the following 
observations in an article published shortly after the Constitutional Court’s judgment in 
Thebus: 
 
The criminal law is where the interface between state power and the individual is at its most 
direct. It is where the values of a democratic society based on dignity, equality and freedom 
are most frequently tested. If we accept that upholding constitutional rights might have a 
minimal impact on the conviction rate, then we must have clear and compelling reasons in 
specific instances for undermining the normative value of rights. The more easily we find the 
infringement of a right acceptable, the weaker becomes the normative value of that right. In 
the area of criminal justice, the justification for limiting rights is inevitably instrumental: the 
infringement is necessary to meet the pressing social need of combating crime. In order for 
these instrumental arguments to be clear and compelling they need to be supported by 
evidence so that their rationality can be tested. The weighting and evaluation of these 




From the aforegoing, it can be concluded that one of the serious difficulties with the 
Constitutional Court’s justification of the doctrine of common purpose in Thebus is that 
no evidence of any kind was placed before the court to demonstrate that the doctrine 
does have any particular utility.
68
 The court’s conclusions regarding the necessity for 
retaining the doctrine were essentially based on assumption and, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, its underlying assumptions were in fact flawed. Here 
it is perhaps necessary to emphasise that the issue is not whether there is utility in 
criminalising and punishing those who participate in the crimes of other persons. On the 
contrary, it is to be accepted that there are both valid normative and instrumental 
reasons for doing so. The issue is whether holding secondary participants, especially 
minor and insignificant secondary participants, liable as co-principals achieves the 
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objective of crime control in any way that could not be achieved equally well (or 
perhaps even better) by holding them liable as accomplices, or finding them guilty of 
some other lesser offence.
69
 No facts or reasons were advanced in Thebus to support any 





One of the main difficulties with evaluating instrumental justifications for the doctrine 
of common purpose is that there does not appear to have been any empirical research 
conducted into the question of whether it makes any difference, from the perspective of 
deterrence, incapacitation and/or crime prevention, whether secondary participants are 
regarded as principals or as accessories.
71
 What little research is relevant to the subject 
suggests that there may well be utility in a more nuanced approach to the imposition of 
liability and punishment; that is to say, in distinguishing between participants on the 
basis of their actual role in and contribution to the crime. Thus, for example, Robinson 
and Darley observe that recent research in the social sciences has demonstrated that 
people hold widely-shared intuitive beliefs about the relative gravity of different 
offences and offence scenarios, and that these intuitions are both ‘nuanced and 




The studies confirm that subjects consistently differentiate between situations and that they 
share intuitions about how these variations affect the blameworthiness of the offender. This 
was seen in a number of ways. First, punishment was uniformly imposed by subjects for 
serious wrongdoing. Second, incremental changes in facts produce predictably significant 
changes in punishment. Finally, subjects demonstrate a high degree of accord about the 
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Such research suggests, therefore, that there is a natural tendency to draw finely 
nuanced distinctions between offences and offenders, based on differences in 
culpability. 
 
Robinson and Darley point out further that such research has also shown that people 
will generally obey the law, even in the absence of a strong likelihood of arrest, 
conviction and punishment, under two sets of conditions: Firstly, when ‘they regard the 
law as representing the principles that moral people adhere to’, because ‘they are 
socialized in such a fashion as to want to live up to those moral rules’;
74
 and, secondly, 
when ‘the law specifies morally proper conduct’, because they then ‘naturally believe 
that the community believes in the “righteousness of the law” and so people fear the 
disapproval of their social groups if they violate the law.’
75
 This in turn, indicates that 
the fear of social sanctions is a far more efficient and effective deterrent than the fear of 
legal sanctions.
76
 Robinson and Darley conclude that, taken together, these two sets of 
findings make out a strong case for the utility of a criminal justice system that harnesses 
normative social influences, by providing for ‘a distribution of liability and punishment 




The ability of the criminal justice system to harness the power of stigmatization, to avoid 
subversion and vigilantism, to gain compliance in borderline cases, and to have a role in 
shaping societal norms is directly related to its ability to gain moral credibility from those to 
whom it applies. The moral credibility of the law is enhanced when the distribution of 
punishment it prescribes accords with the community's own shared intuitions of justice. 
When the law is perceived as “doing justice”, assigning liability in proportion to the moral 
blameworthiness of the punished offender, it becomes more effective at controlling crime. In 
contrast, when criminal liability deviates from intuitions of justice, particularly when such 
deviations are dramatic, the loss of moral credibility undermines the ability of the criminal 
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Robinson and Darley’s research therefore indicates that there is considerable social 
utility in what has become known as the ‘principle of fair labelling’; the principle that 
requires that the stigma (the ‘label’) attaching to an offender in consequence of his 
crime should be a fair and accurate reflection of his culpability and that ‘widely felt 
distinctions between different kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are 
respected and signalled by the law’.
79
 Vogel has observed that a dualistic/pluralistic 
model of complicity is ‘closer to social reality where primary and secondary 
responsibility are distinguished’.
80
 This in turn suggests that there could very well be 
greater utility in drawing a distinction between major and minor criminal participants 
for purposes of conviction and sentence, than in treating all participants on the same 
footing, regardless of personal contribution. Although it is impossible to draw any firm 
conclusions on the subject without further and more specific research, it would therefore 
appear that, contrary to the Constitutional Court’s assumptions in Thebus, instrumental 
arguments in favour of the doctrine of common purpose are inconclusive at best and, at 





Although the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the necessity for the doctrine of common 
purpose as an instrument of crime control can be criticised for lack of supporting 
evidence, it needs to be acknowledged that the court was not alone in its reasoning. 
Crime control rationales, in particular the need to deal effectively with the challenges 
presented by new forms and/or increasing levels of collective criminal activity, 
associated with gangsterism, organised crime, mob violence and terrorism, have also 
been advanced in other jurisdictions that employ a version of the common purpose 
doctrine.
81
 Thus, for example, Simester and Sullivan explain the rationale for joint 
enterprise liability as follows: 
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The law has a particular hostility to criminal groups ... [T]he rationale is partly one of 
dangerousness: “experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only too readily 
escalate into the commission of greater offences.” Criminal associations are dangerous. They 
present a threat to public safety that ordinary criminal prohibitions, addressed to individual 
actors, do not entirely address. Moreover, the danger is not just of an immediate physical 
nature. A group is a form of society, and a group constituted by a joint unlawful enterprise is 
a form of society that has set itself against the law and order of society at large.
82
 Individuals 
offending alone do not do this. Thus concerted wrongdoing imports additional and special 




Sieber argues persuasively that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is one of a 
number of wider crime-control measures, both within and outside the substantive 
criminal law, to which modern states appear to be resorting with increasing frequency, 
and which may be grouped together under the descriptive heading of ‘feindstrafrecht’ or 
‘enemy criminal law’.
84
 The controversial theory of feindstrafrecht was developed by 
the German legal scholar, Günter Jakobs, to explain (and later justify) a range of 
German legislative measures, in which considerations of culpability were subordinated 
to instrumental considerations. Jakobs argued that such measures were not aimed at the 
ordinary ‘occasional’ offender, who, despite his offence, still subscribes to society’s 
norms and values, but at the type of offender (such as those involved in organised 
crime, sexual predators, drug dealers and terrorists) whose persistent anti-social conduct 
demonstrates an outright rejection of society and its norms and values. His theory is that 
such individuals are, to all intents and purposes, enemies in society’s midst and, because 
of this, the state is not obliged to treat them according to the normal principles of 
(domestic) criminal justice (‘bürgerstrafrecht’), but, for the sake of security, is justified 
in adopting the type of draconian measures that would normally be reserved for enemy 
aliens in times of war (‘feindstrafrecht’). Typical measures for such purposes would 
include (1) pre-emptive criminalisation; (2) disproportionately severe punishment; and 
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(3) the suppression of rights of due process.
85
 What was particularly controversial about 
Jakob’s theory is that he not only regarded such measures as a legitimate response to 
such forms of law-breaking, but he also argued for the recognition of feindstrafrecht as 





Despite the controversy with which the theory of feindstrafrecht was received,
87
 Sieber 
observes that, in recent years, many states are in fact adopting increasingly draconian 
measures, of the sort that have been identified as typifying feindstrafrecht, in order to 
add impetus to their various ‘wars’ on terror, drug-trafficking, organised crime, 
economic crime and so forth.
88
 He goes on to point out that, within the scope of 
substantive criminal law, legal systems all over the world have responded, either 
legislatively or judicially, to the special risks posed by ‘complex offender 
constellations’, such as organised criminal networks and terrorist groups and cells, by 
creating ‘special legal instruments that facilitate the attribution of criminal liability’.89 
He identifies the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as one such instrument, along with 
other forms of constructive liability, such as vicarious and strict liability.
90
 The 
justifications offered by Simester and Sullivan for the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise, as reflected in the passage cited above,
91
 suggest that Sieber was not 
overstating the position. Simester and Sullivan speak of the ‘threat to public safety that 
ordinary criminal prohibitions, addressed to individual actors, do not entirely address’ 
and of a group constituted by a joint criminal enterprise as being a ‘form of society that 
has set itself against the law and order of society at large’, which ‘individuals offending 
alone do not do’.
92
 This is recognisably the language of feindstrafrecht theory. 
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 L Zedner ‘Security, the State and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime Control’ (2010) 13 
New Criminal LR 379, 392. 
86
 For further elucidation of this theory, see Zedner (note 85 above) 391-394; C Gómez-Jara Diez ‘Enemy 
Combatants Versus Enemy Criminal Law’ (2008) 11 New Criminal LR 529, 531; 391-393; D Ohana 
‘Trust, Distrust and Reassurance: Diversion and Preventative Orders in the Shadow of the German 
Feindstrafrecht Controversy’ (2010) 73 Modern LR 721, 723-727. 
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 See, for example, Ohana (note 86 above) 727-730; Gómez-Jara Diez (note 86 above) 533, note 6 and 
further authorities cited therein. 
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 Sieber, note 81 above, 39-40. For examples of measures adopted in the United Kingdom in recent 
years, see Ohana (note 86 above) 741 and Zedner (note 85 above) 394-. 
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 Note 83 above and accompanying text. 
92
 Ibid. 





The notion of the doctrine of common purpose as a draconian measure, designed to deal 
with a perceived national ‘crisis’ of criminal activity, places it in an entirely different 
light from that in which it is traditionally viewed. Viewed in this new light, the doctrine 
is not to be evaluated according to accepted normative theory, but according to a 
different set of norms altogether; namely, those of feindstrafrecht. This idea is both 
revelatory and, at the same time, deeply disturbing. As Zedner observes, ‘[t]he 
recognition that many areas of criminal law share the traits of enemy criminal law and 
treat their objects not as citizens but as presumptive enemies is a striking insight’.
93
 
Certainly, viewing the doctrine of common purpose through the lens of feindstrafrecht 
theory offers a plausible explanation (perhaps the most plausible thus far) as to why a 
doctrine of this nature appears – and is tolerated – in the legal systems of so many 
societies otherwise wedded to liberal precepts, but to explain is not necessarily to 
justify. In the South African context, an attempt to justify an aberrant and draconian 
doctrine on the basis of security requirements should surely trigger alarm. South 
Africa’s own experience with special internal security measures is too recent and 
painful to allow any but those with the shortest of memories to look upon such an 
attempt with equanimity.
94
 Thus, although feindstrafrecht theory offers an interesting 
perspective on the doctrine of common purpose, it is unlikely to be taken seriously as a 
defensible justification for the doctrine, although it might perhaps explain some of the 
subconscious thinking behind the desire for its retention. 
 
 
                                                 
93
 Zedner (note 85 above) 391. 
94
 See, for example, the following succinct account by Chaskalson CJ: ‘In 1960, the Unlawful 
Organizations Act was passed to empower the government to declare organizations other than the so-
called "communist organizations" to be unlawful, and to extend the criminal sanctions of the Suppression 
of Communism Act to such groups. The African National Congress and other anti-apartheid 
organizations, which until then had been at the forefront of nonviolent opposition to apartheid, were 
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incommunicado, and to deny them access to their lawyers or own medical advisors. Initially detention 
was for 90 days, then for 180 days, and then indefinitely. Courts were stripped of their jurisdiction to 
make habeas corpus orders in respect of detainees. The isolation of the detainees and the ousting of the 
jurisdiction of the courts led to torture and other abuses. Censorship was introduced, newspapers aimed at 
the black community were banned, and in the 1980s a state of emergency was declared which allowed the 
security forces vast discretionary powers’ (A Chaskalson CJ ‘Dignity as a Constitutional Value: A South 
African Perspective’ (2010-2011) 26 American Univ Int LR 1377, 1379). 





5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In previous chapters it was shown how the doctrine of common purpose has been 
developed by the South African courts. It has been shown that, whereas English law 
required presence at the time of the crime in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit the 
crime in concert, South African law dispenses with the need for all these requirements 
to be met in any given case. Thus, where there is a prior conspiracy, it is unnecessary to 
prove presence at the scene of the crime, or an actual contribution towards the execution 
of the crime. Where there is presence at the scene of the crime, it is unnecessary to 
prove prior conspiracy, or an actual contribution towards the execution of the crime. It 
is only necessary to prove unilateral conduct showing solidarity with the conduct of the 
perpetrators. And lastly, South African law dispenses with the need to establish the 
scope of a common purpose as a matter of objective fact. All that is required is 
association in a criminal enterprise of some kind, coupled with the necessary mens rea 
for the crime in question. It has been shown, therefore, that South African law has 
greatly extended the scope of the doctrine, to the point where it now covers a wide 
range of minor and insignificant conduct, which would originally have been regarded as 
accessorial in nature, or may well have attracted no liability at all. 
 
In this chapter, it has been shown that there are normative justifications for a limited 
application of the doctrine of common purpose. Such justifications may arise from the 
normative implications of authorisation, power of control and contributory causation, all 
three of which represent different ways of viewing the mandate analogy. It has also 
been shown that substantial participation would offer a convenient and defensible proxy 
for contributory causation. These grounds cannot, however, justify the entire scope of 
the doctrine as it is currently applied in our law. In particular, they are not capable of 
justifying the imputation of a principal actor’s conduct to minor and insignificant 
secondary participants. There is no normative justification for extending the doctrine of 
common purpose to such participants. Whether it is possible to justify such an extension 
on instrumental grounds is also open to doubt. Thus far, no empirical evidence has been 
advanced to indicate that holding minor and insignificant participants liable as co-
principals has any crime-control benefits that could not be achieved equally well by 
holding them liable as lesser participants. On the contrary, what little empirical evidence 





there is suggests that the interests of crime-control are best served by ‘fair labelling’. 
This in turn implies that it would be more beneficial to reflect public perceptions of 
differences in culpability by distinguishing between minor and major participants. 
 
Because of the far-reaching implications of the Constitutional Court’s decision in S v 
Thebus, the case requires discussion in more depth. The following chapter will therefore 
consist of a detailed analysis and critique of the portions of the judgment that deal with 
the doctrine of common purpose. The portions dealing with the right to silence, 











In previous chapters, it has been explained how the South African courts developed the 
doctrine of common purpose and, in so doing, expanded its scope to the point where the 
doctrine now covers a wide variety of minor and insignificant participatory conduct, 
which, in English law, from which the doctrine was derived, would have been regarded 
as accessorial in nature, or might well have attracted no liability at all. In particular, the 
South African law no longer requires a common purpose to have been constituted by 
prior conspiracy, but bases liability on active association; that is to say, mere unilateral 




This form of participation came under the spotlight in the late 1980s, in the highly 
politicised case of S v Safatsa, in which the AD confirmed that, in such cases, it is not 
necessary for the state to prove a causal connection between such a participant’s 
conduct and the commission of the crime, or, for that matter, to prove that such a 
participant’s conduct had any effect, whether practical or psychological, on the 
commission of the crime at all.
2
 It was this ruling that permitted the fourth accused, a 
young woman of eighteen, to be convicted of murder and condemned to death, when her 
only contribution had been to shout ‘laat ons hom doodmaak’ (‘let us kill him’) and to 
slap another woman who remonstrated with the crowd.
3
 Whilst the case itself provoked 
a public outcry, it is well documented that, of all the Sharpeville Six, it was the AD’s 
treatment of this young woman which most clearly highlighted the draconian 




                                                 
1
 This form of liability is unknown in English law, or in the legal systems of other common law countries 
like Canada and Australia. The only common law country that appears to recognise this form of liability 
is Scotland (see ch2, s5). 
2
 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868. The case is more fully discussed above, in ch3, s2. 
3
 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868, 892C-F.  
4
 See, for example, P Parker ‘South Africa and the Common Purpose Rule in Crowd Murders’ (1996) 40 
J of African Law 78, 98-99: ‘For the judgment against the Six had shocked the world. Lord Scarman 
examined the evidence against one of the accused for Granada television and said that had he been trying 





Given the level of attention and criticism generated by the Safatsa judgment, as well as 
the political milieu in which the case was decided, it was almost inevitable that the 
AD’s ruling would be challenged in the new constitutional dispensation which emerged 
during the 1990s. In 2003, therefore, the constitutionality of the active association form 
of common purpose was challenged in S v Thebus,
5
 but, perhaps surprisingly (and even 
disappointingly) for those who had followed the criticisms of the Safatsa judgment, the 
doctrine was found to pass constitutional muster. 
 
 
2. THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
S v Thebus was a case of common purpose by active association.
6
 On 14 November 
1998, a group of Ocean View residents planned and staged a vigilante offensive against 
certain reputed drug dealers operating in the area. In the course of this offensive, an 
exchange of gunfire took place between one of the reputed dealers and a group of 
vigilantes, which led to the death of a child and the injury of two other children. The 
two appellants, who were part of the vigilante group, were charged with one count of 
murder and two counts of attempted murder, by virtue of their participation in the 
shooting incident. Although they raised alibi defences at their ensuing trial in the Cape 
High Court, the court rejected their alibis as recent fabrications. It found that that they 
had been present at the scene of the shooting, were aware of the shooting when it 
occurred, had made common cause with the group involved in the shooting, including 
the gunman, and had acted in association with the latter, the first appellant by standing 
                                                                                                                                               
the case, he would have withdrawn it from the jury and directed an acquittal, and would have quashed the 
conviction had it come to the appeal court. Calls for clemency were made by the Pope, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Cardinal Hume, Lord Elwyn-Jones, the UN Security Council, the Organisation of African 
Unity, the Commonwealth, the European Community, the governments of the United States, Britain, 
France, West Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, the Soviet Union, New Zealand, Israel, Iran, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Botswana. Mrs Thatcher invited the sister of one 
of the Six to Downing Street. The case did severe damage to the reputation of South Africa's judiciary. 
An editorial in The [London] Times described the Six as “victims of a disgraceful piece of legal 
chicanery”, and concluded that “such a judicial system hardly deserves the name. It is little more than a 
charade designed to deter and intimidate – terror tailored to the purposes of the State”.’ See also E 
Cameron ‘When judges fail justice’ Advocate December 2004 issue 37, 38; J Mihálik ‘Expedient legal 
fiction and death sentences in Bophuthatswana’ (1991) 24 Comparative & Int LJ of SA 105, 111-112. 
5
 S v Thebus (2003) 6 SA 505 (CC). 
6
 This, at any rate, was the way in which the trial court chose to approach the case. The facts indicate, 
however, that the appellants’ liability could equally well have been based on the prior conspiracy form of 
common purpose. 





guard and the second appellant by collecting the spent cartridge cases.
7
 In accordance 
with the requirements for common purpose by active association, as set out in S v 
Mgedezi,
8
 the court found them guilty as charged and their convictions were upheld by 




The appellants then appealed to the Constitutional Court, challenging the 
constitutionality of the doctrine of common purpose.
10
 They did not attempt to argue 
that the doctrine of common purpose was unconstitutional in its entirety, but claimed 
that, in cases of common purpose by active association, it violated their constitutionally-
protected rights of dignity, freedom and security of the person, as well as their right to a 
fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent.
11
 They contended that, in light of 
these violations, and as enjoined by section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution,
12
 the SCA 
ought to have developed the common law beyond existing precedent, so as to give 
effect to their constitutionally protected rights; in particular, by developing, applying 
and elucidating the requirements that:  
 
1. There must have been a causal connection between their actions and the crime(s) for 
which they were convicted;  
 
2. They must have actively associated themselves with the unlawful conduct of those 
who actually committed the crime(s); and  
 





                                                 
7
 S v Thebus (note 5 above) para 10. 
8
 S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 678 (A) 702. 
9
 The SCA’s judgment deals entirely with the trial court’s evaluation of the factual evidence and the 
appropriateness of the sentences that it imposed. It did not deal with the law relating to common purpose 
at all and, for that reason, it is unnecessary to discuss the judgement in detail. 
10
 They also claimed that the adverse inferences drawn by the trial court from their failure to disclose their 
alibis when first questioned by the police violated their right to silence, however this aspect of the case is 
not relevant for present purposes and need not be discussed. 
11
 These rights are protected by sections 10, 12(1)(a) and 35(3)(h), respectively, of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (the 1996 Constitution). 
12
 Section 39(2) provides that, ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights’. 
13
 S v Thebus (note 5 above) para 23. 





3. THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE 
 
The essence of the appellants’ complaints regarding the constitutionality of the doctrine 
of common purpose, as derived from the Constitutional Court’s judgment,
14
 was as 
follows: 
 
1. The doctrine of common purpose undermines the fundamental dignity of each 
person convicted of the same crime with others, because it de-individualises them 
and de-humanises them by treating them ‘in a general manner as nameless, faceless 
parts of a group’.
15
 In support of this argument, it was contended that a crime like 
murder carries a greater stigma than lesser offences such as public violence, 
conspiracy, incitement, attempt, or liability as an accomplice, which are competent 




2. The doctrine of common purpose violates the right not to be deprived of freedom 
arbitrarily,
17
 because, by dispensing with the requirement of a causal connection 
between the accused’s actions and the crime of which he may be convicted, it 
‘countenances the most tenuous link’ between the individual’s conduct and his 
resulting liability.
18
 In the course of this argument, the appellants criticised the 
concept of liability based on active association, arguing that the requirements for 
active association had been cast too widely and/or misapplied, whilst, at the same 
time, there were less invasive forms of liability available, which did not require 
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 It must be mentioned, at the outset, that it is no easy task to reconstruct the appellant’s arguments from 
the judgment. The court’s account of these arguments is so brief and fragmented that it is impossible to 
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or what authority was offered in support of each argument. The account that follows in the text therefore 
represents the author’s own attempt to introduce some degree of structure and coherence, although some 
of the arguments (especially the first) sound far-fetched and even nonsensical in the retelling. 
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 S v Thebus (note 1 above) paras 33, 35. 
19
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 44. 





3. The doctrine of common purpose violates the presumption of innocence, because it 
lowers the threshold of proof for a crime and absolves the state from having to prove 




The appellants argued, finally, that the primary rationale for the doctrine of common 
purpose, which they cited as ‘convenience of proof in favour of the prosecution’, was 





4. THE JUDGMENT 
 
The Constitutional Court (per Moseneke J) commenced its judgment by outlining the 
essential import of the doctrine of common purpose, namely that it bases liability upon 
imputed conduct.
22
 It went on to distinguish between the two methods by which a 
common purpose may be formed, namely prior agreement (conspiracy) and active 
association.
23
 The court further observed that other common law jurisdictions, like 
England, Canada, Australia, Scotland and the USA, also apply principles similar to the 
doctrine of common purpose, without a causal nexus being a prerequisite for liability,
24
 
although it acknowledged that there is no equivalent of the doctrine in German or 
French law.
25
 After explaining the approach that a court must follow when dealing with 
a constitutional challenge to a rule of the common law,
26
 the court responded to the 
appellants’ arguments by identifying two rationales for the doctrine of common 
purpose, namely the need for crime control and the need to circumvent evidentiary 
difficulties (the instrumental rationales described in the previous chapter). 
                                                 
20




 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 18. 
23
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) paras 19 – 21. 
24
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 22. Although (as previously discussed in ch2, ss4.5 and 4.6) it is correct 
that a causal nexus is not an invariable requirement for liability in these jurisdictions, what the court 
omitted to mention is that none of these jurisdictions, save for Scotland, regard ‘active association’ as 
sufficient for liability either. In all the others, joint enterprise liability is based on prior conspiracy 
(consensus). See also J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) 582-583. 
25
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 22, note 30. The significance of the absence of an equivalent doctrine in 
German law will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
26
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 32. The procedure is, briefly, that the court must first decide whether the 
rule does limit a constitutionally protected right. If not, that is the end of the matter. If there is such a 
limitation, the court must then decide whether it is reasonable and justifiable, having regard for the 
various considerations enumerated in section 36(1) of the Constitution. If so, the rule stands. If not, the 
court must adapt or develop it in order to harmonise it with the norms of the Constitution.  





In response to the argument that the doctrine of common purpose violates the right to 
dignity, the court held that it was fallacious to argue that the prosecution and conviction 
of a person dehumanises him.
27
 In further response to this argument, as well as to the 
argument that the doctrine of common purpose amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of 
freedom, the court held that ‘the entire scheme of [sections] 35 and 12(1) of the Bill of 
Rights authorises and anticipates prosecution, conviction and punishment of individuals, 
provided it occurs within the context of a procedurally and substantively fair trial and a 
permissible level of criminal culpability’ (emphasis supplied).
28
 The court thus 
confirmed its earlier ruling in De Lange v Smuts NO that section 12(1)(a) of the 
Constitution opens the substantive criminal law to constitutional review,
29
 in that:  
 
The standard [of criminal culpability] must be constitutionally permissible. It may not 
unjustifiably invade rights or principles of the Constitution. Put differently, the norm may 
only ‘impose a form of culpability sufficient to justify the deprivation of freedom without 
giving rise to a constitutional complaint’. However, once the culpability norm passes 




Further on, the court amplified this dictum as follows: 
 
[T]he criminal norm may not deprive a person of his or her freedom arbitrarily or without 
just cause. The ‘just cause’ points to substantive protection against being deprived of 
freedom arbitrarily or without an adequate or acceptable reason ... The meaning of ‘just 
cause must be grounded upon and (be) consonant with the values expressed in [section] 1 of 




The court went on to hold, however, that the definitional elements for a common law 
crime are ‘unique to that crime’ and that, whilst common minimum requirements are 
unlawful conduct, criminal capacity and fault, a causal nexus is not a requirement of 
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 De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) paras 22 - 23. 
30
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 36, citing O’Regan J’s dictum in S v Coetzee 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) 
para 178. 
31
 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 39, citing Langa DP’s dictum in S v Boesak 2001 (1) SACR 1 (CC) para 
37. 







 The court reasoned that, because of this, the mere exclusion of causation 
as a prerequisite for liability is not ‘fatal to the criminal norm’.
33
 Despite its earlier dicta 
to the effect that the standard of criminal culpability must be sufficient to justify the 
deprivation of freedom, in accordance with the core values and provisions of the 1996 
Constitution, it held further that: 
 
There are no pre-ordained characteristics of criminal conduct, outcome or condition. 
Conduct constitutes a crime because the law declares it so... Ordinarily, making conduct 
criminal is intended to protect a societal or public interest by criminal sanction. It follows 
that criminal norms vary from society to society and within a society from time to time, 
relative to community convictions of what is harmful and worthy of punishment in the 




The court then ruled that the doctrine of common purpose does not amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of freedom, because it is ‘rationally connected to the legitimate 
objective of limiting and controlling joint criminal enterprise’.
35
 It held that it serves a 
‘vital purpose’, since, without it, persons other than the actual perpetrators of a crime 
and their accomplices would escape all liability, despite their unlawful and intentional 
participation in the crime, which would not accord with ‘the considerable societal 
distaste for crimes by common design’.
36
 It went on to hold that: 
 
Group, organised or collaborative misdeeds strike more harshly at the fabric of society and 
the rights of victims than crimes perpetrated by individuals. Effective prosecution of crime is 
a legitimate, ‘pressing social need’. The need for ‘a strong deterrent to violent crime’ is well 
acknowledged because ‘widespread violent crime is deeply destructive of the fabric of our 
society’. There is a real and pressing social concern about the high levels of crime. In 
practice, joint criminal conduct often poses peculiar difficulties of proof of the result of the 
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 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 38. 
35










The court concluded that ‘[t]here is no objection to this norm of culpability even though 
it bypasses the requirements of causation’.
38
 The appellants’ argument in this regard 
was thus found to be without merit. 
 
The court then turned to the argument that, by dispensing with proof of a causal nexus 
between an accused’s conduct and the criminal result, the doctrine of common purpose 
lowers the threshold of proof, thereby violating the presumption of innocence.
39
 It 
pointed out that the doctrine of common purpose does not amount to a reversal of the 
normal onus of proof, or to a presumption of guilt, in that the state is still required to 
prove all the elements necessary to establish liability in terms of the criminal norm 
established by the doctrine, which (it reiterated) had been found to pass constitutional 
scrutiny.
40
 It concluded that a proper application of the doctrine could not result in the 
conviction of an accused despite reasonable doubt as to his guilt and that, consequently, 




Lastly, the court dismissed the objections, raised by certain commentators,
42
 that the 
requirements for active association, as set out in S v Mgedezi and subsequent cases,
43
 
had been cast too widely and/or misapplied, whilst there were less invasive forms of 
liability available, which did not require the accused’s conviction as a co-principal.
44
 As 
regards the first of these objections, it held that criticisms of the doctrine on the grounds 
that it had been misapplied did not render liability based on active association 




 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 42. At this point, the CC reiterated O’Regan J’s dictum in S v 
Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 15: '[T]he presumption of innocence is an established 
principle of South African law which places the burden of proof squarely on the prosecution... It requires 
that the prosecution bear the burden of proving all the elements of a criminal charge. A presumption 
which relieves the prosecution of part of that burden could result in the conviction of an accused person 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. Such a presumption is in breach of the 






 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 44. Here the court cited the criticisms offered by the authors Burchell & 
Milton (J Burchell & J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 2ed (1997) 393). 
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 With respect, the availability of less invasive forms of liability should not have been dealt with at this 
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the first instance. 





unconstitutional, but merely highlighted the need for trial courts to ensure that the 
established requirements were properly applied.
45
 It did not elucidate the requirements 
for active association, commenting merely that the ‘factual context of each case’ would 
determine whether these requirements had been met.
46
 As regards the objection that 
there were less invasive forms of liability available, which did not require the conviction 
of a participant as a co-principal, the court held that this was a proportionality argument, 
which it would only have been required to consider if the appellant’s complaints had 
passed the threshold enquiry. Since they had not done so, however, the court was not 
obliged to consider the point.
47
 After (quite correctly) declining to sit in judgment on the 
SCA’s findings of fact in the matter, the court concluded that the doctrine of common 
purpose, in cases of murder by active association, was not unconstitutional in its 
existing form and consequently did not require development or reformulation in terms 






5. COMMENTARY ON THE JUDGMENT 
 
Considering its significance (and in dramatic contrast with the AD’s judgment in 
Safatsa), the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the constitutionality of the doctrine of 
common purpose provoked surprisingly little comment and even less criticism. For the 
most part, this aspect of the judgment was simply noted.
49
 Snyman welcomed the 
judgment, even though he criticised certain aspects of the court’s reasoning.
50
 Even 
Cameron JA (as he then was), who had earlier objected so vociferously to the AD’s 
ruling on causation in Safatsa,
51
 thought that the Constitutional Court had applied a 
‘carefully balanced standard of constitutional fairness’ in upholding the doctrine.
52
 One 
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 S v Thebus (note 1 above) para 48. 
48
 The entire court concurred with Moseneke J’s judgment on this ground of appeal. 
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 See, for example, M Reddi ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose Receives the Stamp of Approval’ 
(2005) 122 SALJ 59. 
50
 CR Snyman Criminal Law 5ed (2008) 270. 
51
 E Cameron ‘Inferential reasoning and extenuation in the case of the Sharpeville Six’ (1988) 2 SACJ 
243. See also his own and Mihálik’s account of his involvement in the media furore (Cameron, note 4 
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of the judgment’s few critics was Schwikkard, who expressed concern at the 
Constitutional Court’s willingness to allow the content of the right to freedom to be 
eroded by instrumental arguments, without engaging in more rigorous analysis of the 
content of that right and without addressing the question of what the minimum standard 
of criminal culpability ought to be, in order to avoid depriving a person of his freedom 
arbitrarily or without just cause.
53
 The only commentator to engage in extensive 
criticism of the judgment was Burchell, who incorporates a critique of its salient 
features into his overall critique of the doctrine of common purpose in his current 
textbook.
54
 Although Burchell has identified most of the major flaws in the judgment, it 
is necessary, for the sake of completeness, to consider the Constitutional Court’s 
response to the issues raised by the appellants in some depth. 
 
5.1 Ruling on the ‘violation of dignity’ issue 
 
The argument that the doctrine of common purpose undermines the fundamental dignity 
of each participant, because it ‘de-individualises and de-humanises them’, by treating 
them ‘in a general manner as nameless, faceless parts of a group’,
55
 is so far-fetched that 
it is difficult to believe that it was actually advanced in these terms. Since S v Mgedezi,
56
 
there has been no doubt that, in order to prove the active association form of common 
purpose, the state must prove individual conduct on the part of each accused, amounting 
to such association. Furthermore, in cases involving multiple offenders, the court must 
satisfy itself of the guilt of each individual accused and each accused is entitled to a 
separate verdict on each count with which he is charged. There is nothing in South 
African law that permits multiple accused charged with the same crime to be treated ‘in 
a general manner as nameless, faceless parts of a group’. If this was indeed what the 
appellants argued, then the Constitutional Court can hardly be faulted for dismissing it 
out of hand, but the fact that the appellants apparently contended, in support of this 
argument, that a crime like murder carries a greater stigma than a lesser offence like 
public violence, conspiracy, incitement, attempt, or accomplice liability,
57
 seems to 
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suggest that they may in fact have been attempting to invoke the principles of 
culpability and/or fair labelling, both of which are integrally connected with the right to 
dignity.
58
 If so, their argument was evidently misunderstood by the court. This, 
however, is mere conjecture and no purpose will be served by pursuing the point here. 
Objections to the doctrine of common purpose based on the principles of culpability and 
fair labelling will however be examined in the next chapter. 
 
5.2 Ruling on the ‘arbitrary deprivation of freedom’ issue 
 
Of far greater concern is the court’s treatment of the issue of whether the doctrine of 
common purpose violates of the right to freedom and security of the person. This issue 
must be viewed in light of section 12(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution, which provides 
that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person which includes the 
right ... not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause’.
59
 The threshold 
analysis for an alleged violation of this right involves two separate determinations, 
namely (1) whether the deprivation in question was/is ‘arbitrary’; and, if not, (2) 
whether it was/is for ‘just cause’.
60
 As regards the first stage of the enquiry, a 
deprivation of freedom will not be arbitrary if there is ‘a rational connection between 
the deprivation and some objectively determinable purpose’.
61
 Provided that there is 
such a purpose, and the deprivation is causally linked to that purpose, the deprivation 
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will not be arbitrary.
62
 This part of the enquiry therefore sets a very low standard for 
constitutional compliance,
63
 however it must then be followed by the second (and 
clearly more important) stage of the enquiry, which requires the court to determine 




Despite the Constitutional Court’s acknowledgement that ‘just cause must be grounded 
upon and (be) consonant with the values expressed in [section] 1 of the Constitution and 
gathered from the provisions of the Constitution’,
65
 it is evident from the judgment that 
it paid scant attention to this part of the enquiry. In order to justify this criticism, it is 
necessary, in the first instance, to compare the court’s approach in Thebus with its 
earlier approach in De Lange v Smuts NO.
66
 This latter case, which concerned the 
constitutional validity of committal and detention in terms of section 66(3) of the 
Insolvency Act,
67
 was the first in which the provisions of section 12(1)(a) came before 
the Constitutional Court for consideration.
68
 Dealing with the question of what would 
constitute ‘just cause’ for a deprivation of freedom, Ackermann J (who delivered the 
majority judgment) held that: 
 
It is not possible to attempt, in advance, a comprehensive definition of what would constitute 
a ‘just cause’ for the deprivation of freedom in all imaginable circumstances.  The law in this 
regard must be developed incrementally and on a case by case basis.  Suffice it to say that 
the concept of ‘just cause’ must be grounded upon and consonant with the values expressed 
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Despite Ackermann J’s unwillingness to define or elaborate on the meaning of ‘just 
cause’,  is evident from what follows in his judgment that, in reaching the conclusion 
that the requirement of ‘just cause’ was satisfied in the case of the committal and 
detention of section 66(3) examinees, he considered a number of factors, namely: 
 
1. The purpose of and necessity for committal and detention in terms of section 
66(3),
70




2. The fact that similar provision for detention exists in other comparable jurisdictions 




3. The fact that no effective but less severe measure exists by which an examinee may 




4. The fact that the means of release are within a detained examinee’s own hands and 





5. The fact that the committal mechanism is ‘very closely tailored to its intended 




It is noteworthy that, amongst the factors deemed worthy of consideration, were the 
nature and extent of the limitation, the importance of its purpose, the relationship 
between the limitation and its purpose, and whether that purpose could be achieved by 
less restrictive means.
76
 These are factors that a court is required to consider in 
performing a limitations enquiry in terms of section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution (the 
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 In essence, therefore, in determining whether the 
requirement of ‘just cause’ was satisfied in De Lange, Ackermann J chose to perform a 
proportionality enquiry, very similar to (although less stringent than) that which a court 




If Ackermann J’s majority judgment in De Lange is to be regarded as having set the 
standard for a ‘just cause’ enquiry, however, it is evident that Moseneke J’s approach in 
Thebus failed to measure up to that standard. The latter’s entire treatment of the 
threshold enquiry for a violation of section 12(1)(a) appears in a single paragraph, the 
first part of which (the court’s treatment of the ‘arbitrariness’ part of the enquiry) reads 
as follows:  
 
Common purpose does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of freedom. The doctrine is 





The reminder of the paragraph then reads: 
 
[The doctrine] serves vital purposes in our criminal justice system. Absent the rule of 
common purpose, all but actual perpetrators of a crime and their accomplices will be beyond 
the reach of our criminal justice system, despite their unlawful and intentional participation 
in the commission of the crime. Such an outcome would not accord with the considerable 
societal distaste for crimes by common design. Group, organised or collaborative 
misdeeds strike more harshly at the fabric of society and the rights of victims than crimes 
perpetrated by individuals. Effective prosecution of crime is a legitimate, 'pressing social 
need'. The need for 'a strong deterrent to violent crime' is well acknowledged because 
'widespread violent crime is deeply destructive of the fabric of our society'. There is a real 
and pressing social concern about the high levels of crime. In practice, joint criminal 
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conduct often poses peculiar difficulties of proof of the result of the conduct of each accused, 
a problem which hardly arises in the case of an individual accused person. Thus there is no 




On first reading, this second passage seems a mere continuation of the first passage 
cited above (that is, a further elucidation of the court’s ruling on the ‘arbitrariness’ 
enquiry). Presumably, however, it must be understood as dealing with the second part of 
the threshold enquiry, namely the requirement of ‘just cause’. This assumption is based 
on the fact that the ‘just cause’ requirement is not dealt with anywhere else in the 
judgment, however it is addressed in such cursory terms that it is difficult to say that the 
court really applied its mind to this part of the enquiry at all. Even accepting that the 
court’s remarks in the passage cited above must be read in conjunction with its earlier 
remarks concerning the rationales for the doctrine and the existence of similar doctrines 
in other comparable jurisdictions,
81
 it would be evident that its analysis was inadequate 
in comparison with the considerably more detailed and multi-faceted analysis performed 
in De Lange.
82
 It will be observed that, in Thebus, the court focussed exclusively upon 
the purpose of the limitation and the importance of that purpose from a public interest 
perspective. It did not, however, consider whether that purpose was a ‘just’ one. It did 
not consider the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; that is to say, 
whether the doctrine of common purpose is an appropriate and fitting means for 
achieving that purpose, or whether it goes further than strictly necessary. Nor did it 
consider whether the same objective could be achieved equally well by less invasive 
measures (a point evidently argued by the appellants at some stage during the 
proceedings).
83
 Despite the precedent set by the majority judgment in De Lange, the 
court took the view that such ‘proportionality arguments’ were relevant only to a section 
36(1) enquiry and, since it was not performing such an enquiry, it was not obliged to 
consider them.
84
 No criticism of the majority approach in De Lange was offered, 
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however, nor any other explanation for the departure from precedent.
85
 All of this 




Most importantly of all, however, as Schwikkard has pointed out, the Constitutional 
Court did not consider what the minimum standard of criminal culpability ought to be, 
in order to constitute just cause for depriving a person of his freedom.
87
 On the contrary, 
despite its reference to a ‘constitutionally permissible standard’ of criminal 
culpability,
88
 the court was able to avoid the (admittedly unenviable) task of deciding 
what this standard was, by adopting a simple, positivist approach to criminalisation: 
‘There are no pre-ordained characteristics of criminal conduct, outcome or condition. 
Conduct constitutes a crime because the law declares it so’.
89
 This statement however 
confuses legality with justness. Whilst the principle of legality is undoubtedly an 
indispensable principle for upholding the Rule of Law, legality alone cannot be a 
sufficient precondition for criminal liability;
90
 at least not in a constitutional 
dispensation intended to uphold and protect individual human rights against the so-
called ‘tyranny of the majority’.
91
 If that were so, Parliament could criminalise any 
conduct it chose and, as long as the resulting provision had some ‘objectively 
ascertainable purpose’ and was not in direct conflict with some constitutionally 
protected right other than the right to freedom, the Constitutional Court would be 
powerless to intervene, regardless of how unjust that provision might be. It is 
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What is of particular concern in this regard is that, although the Constitutional Court 
must have been well aware of the criticisms levelled over the years at the doctrine of 
common purpose (especially in its active association form), it did not take any account 
of the historical reasons for much of that criticism; in particular, the harshness and 
injustice wrought by the AD’s judgment in the notorious Safatsa case. It has been 
accepted that, in interpreting the Constitution and determining constitutional issues, it is 
not only permissible, but indeed necessary for the Constitutional Court to take 
cognisance of historical events that have a bearing on the issues under consideration.
93
 
Given the notoriety of the common purpose doctrine, one would have expected the court 
in Thebus to have taken account of these historical events, at least to the extent of 
providing some reassurance that the type of treatment meted out by the Safatsa bench to 
the fourth accused would no longer be possible under the present constitutional 
dispensation.
94
 Despite the court’s passing reference to the ‘evocative history’ of the 
doctrine,
95
 however, it did not do this.
96
 It did not refer directly to the Safatsa judgment 
at all,
97
 and offered no criticism of the AD’s treatment of the case, whether on the facts, 
or on the law, or on the question of sentence.
98
 If its reminder to the courts to ‘exercise 
the utmost circumspection in evaluating the evidence against each accused person’,
99
 
was intended as an oblique criticism of the AD’s findings of fact in Safatsa, then, with 
the utmost respect, it fails to reassure. Whatever criticisms might be levelled at the AD’s 
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interpretation of the evidence in relation to the other five accused,
100
 there can be no 
doubt that, according to the proven facts, the fourth accused in Safatsa satisfied the 
requirements for active association, not only as the law then stood, but also as it was 
later formulated in S v Mgedezi,
101
 as it has since been confirmed and reiterated in cases 
like S v Jama,
102
 and as it still stands today. Thus, if the fourth accused were tried today, 
she would still stand to be convicted of murder and would still qualify for the maximum 
punishment permissible by law. In the circumstances, one can only conclude, along with 





Even if it is incorrect to fault the Constitutional Court’s treatment of the ‘just cause’ 
enquiry on account of the factors that it omitted to consider, however, it can certainly be 
faulted on account of the factors that it did consider. As Burchell has noted,
104
 its 
reasoning concerning the importance of the doctrine and the necessity for its retention 
was based on a serious factual inaccuracy. The inaccuracy lies in the statement that, 
without the doctrine of common purpose, ‘all but actual perpetrators of a crime and their 
accomplices will be beyond the reach of our criminal justice system, despite their 
unlawful and intentional participation in the commission of the crime’.
105
 Whilst 
technically correct, this statement can only be described as disingenuous. It creates the 
impression that large numbers of criminal participants would then go ‘scot-free’, which 
is simply incorrect.  
 
As explained in the fourth chapter, the extremely narrow scope of accomplice liability 
in current South African law is directly attributable to the extremely broad scope of 
common purpose liability. The doctrine of common purpose converts the vast majority 
of persons who intentionally further or assist in the commission of a crime into co-
perpetrators.
106
 This means that they cannot also be accomplices.
107
 If they were no 
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longer regarded as co-perpetrators, however, they would then qualify to be regarded as 
accomplices and could be held liable accordingly; not for the crime itself, but for the 
separate and distinct offence of being an accomplice to that crime,
108
 a verdict that 
would then allow for a wide range of sentencing options, whilst ensuring that the 
sentencing court could not lose sight of the accused’s status as a secondary 
participant.
109
 Only if such a person’s conduct did not amount to ‘furthering or assisting 
the commission of the crime’, or if he lacked the necessary intention to do so, would he 
then escape liability as an accomplice. Even so, this does not mean that he would 
automatically be beyond the reach of the law. Depending on what form his participation 
took, he could still be held liable for conspiracy or incitement to commit the crime in 
question, or for attempted incitement, or even perhaps for an attempt to commit the 
crime itself. In cases of mob violence, he could be held liable for the separate offence of 
public violence.
110
 As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no empirical evidence 
to indicate that the interests of deterrence, incapacitation and/or crime prevention are 
served any better by treating secondary participants as co-perpetrators, than by holding 
them liable as accomplices, or convicting them of some other, lesser offence. Nor, for 
that matter, is there any evidence to suggest that it would be any more difficult or taxing 
for the state to prove a participant guilty of one of the lesser offences named above. As 
for the small number of individuals that might conceivably remain after these 
possibilities had been exhausted, it can hardly be regarded as a significant threat to law 
and order for a person who has neither committed, or attempted to commit a crime 
himself, nor furthered, assisted, incited, or conspired towards its commission by 
someone else, to escape conviction and punishment.  
 
It would be evident, therefore, that the Constitutional Court greatly exaggerated the 
crime-control benefits of the doctrine of common purpose; a fact that it was able to 
avoid confronting through its refusal to consider the appellants’ counter-argument that 
there are other, less invasive means available for punishing individuals who unlawfully 
and intentionally participate in the commission of crimes by common design. It seems, 
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therefore, that the real consideration behind the Constitutional Court’s support for the 
doctrine was simply that, as claimed by the appellants, the doctrine favours the 
convenience of the prosecution. It is highly unlikely, however, that prosecutorial 
convenience alone could ever constitute a just cause for deprivation of freedom. 
 
5.3 Ruling on the ‘violation of presumption of innocence’ issue  
 
Of equal concern is the Constitutional Court’s ruling that the doctrine of common 
purpose does not pass the threshold test for a violation of the presumption of innocence, 
because it does not involve a reversal of the onus of proof, or a presumption of guilt, 
which relieves the prosecution of any part of the burden of proof. With respect, this is 
pure sophistry. Whilst it is correct that the doctrine of common purpose does not 
amount to a reversal of the onus of proof, or to a presumption of guilt per se, it is 
patently incorrect to say that it does not relieve the prosecution of part of the burden of 
proof. It does exactly this, by relieving it of the need to prove that an accused personally 
committed the actus reus of the crime with which he is charged.
111
 This is the very 
essence of the doctrine. In many cases, it also relieves the prosecution from proving 
what part a particular accused did play in the commission of the crime, or indeed that he 
played any active part at all. The court’s ruling on this issue is all the more startling, 
because it expressly acknowledged the role of the doctrine in easing the prosecution’s 
burden of proof earlier in its judgment, when it offered, as one of the rationales for the 
doctrine, the difficulty of proving the causal contribution of each individual participant 
in the case of consequence crimes.
112
 Simple logic should have dictated that the court 
could not have it both ways. 
 
Schwikkard appears to defend the Constitutional Court’s ruling, by observing that its 
response ‘accords with the clear distinction, drawn by O'Regan J in S v Coetzee and 
Bernstein v Bester NNO, between issues directed at establishing the legitimacy of a 
form of criminal liability and issues of due process’.
113
 Even if it is to be accepted, 
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however, that in South African constitutional jurisprudence the presumption of 
innocence is concerned solely with issues of due process and not with the legitimacy of 
the substantive criminal law,
114
 it is incorrect and misleading to portray the doctrine of 
common purpose as simply another form of criminal liability.
115
 A person is not found 
guilty of a ‘common purpose’ to commit a particular crime, in the same way as he might 
be found guilty of incitement, conspiracy, or an attempt to commit that crime. He is 
found guilty of the crime itself, without the prosecution having to prove that he 
committed it. The doctrine is therefore a mechanism for circumventing the normal 
requirements of proof and, as such, its role in the criminal law cannot be separated 
logically from issues of due process. 
 
It is submitted that the correct approach to the issue is to be found in the judgment of 
Cameron J (as he then was) in S v Meaker.
116
 In this case, the Witwatersrand Local 
Division of the High Court was required to determine whether the presumption of 
innocence was violated by section 130(1) of the former Road Traffic Act,
117
 which 
created a (rebuttable) presumption, for purposes of any prosecution under the Act, that 
at any material time a vehicle is driven by its registered owner. The state argued that 
there was no such violation, since section 130(1) did not create a presumption of guilt in 
the same way as the types of provision that had previously been struck down by the 
Constitutional Court,
118
 since the state was required to prove the commission of an 
offence, independently of the presumption, before the presumption took effect.
119
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Cameron J rejected this argument, holding that the state had drawn ‘a distinction 
without a difference’:120 
 
The effect of the presumption is to lock the accused into the crime by associating him or her, 
through a fact presumed from ownership, with the commission of the offence. It does so by 




It would be evident that, with one or two minor amendments, Cameron J could equally 
well have been describing the doctrine of common purpose. The only real difference is 
that, with the doctrine of common purpose, there is no evidence or argument that a 
secondary party can advance in order to avoid having the principal actor’s conduct 
imputed to him. The imputation is irrebuttable.
122
 In conclusion, therefore, it is 
submitted that the doctrine of common purpose does indeed represent a violation of the 
presumption of innocence, sufficient at least to pass the threshold enquiry stage, and 
that the Constitutional Court should have held accordingly. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It may be concluded from the above discussion that the Constitutional Court’s decision 
in S v Thebus is unsatisfactory in a number of material respects. Although the court 
cannot be faulted for its response to the appellant’s first argument, concerning the 
violation of the right to dignity, its responses to the second and third arguments contain 
serious flaws. Its treatment of the threshold enquiry for a violation of the right to 
freedom was faulty, both in terms of the court’s wholly inadequate approach to the ‘just 
cause’ stage of the enquiry and in terms of the factual inaccuracies evident in its 
reasoning on the necessity for the retention of the doctrine. Its treatment of the threshold 
enquiry for a violation of the presumption of innocence was equally based on fallacious 
reasoning. The result was that neither of these challenges to the constitutionality of the 
doctrine passed the threshold enquiry stage, when, by rights, they should have done so. 
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The result of this, in turn, was that pertinent issues relating to the constitutionality of the 
doctrine of common purpose were never properly ventilated, or subjected to the critical 
scrutiny that a section 36(1) enquiry would have necessitated.   
 
Accordingly, whilst it must be accepted that, for all practical purposes, the judgment 
makes it very difficult to launch any further constitutional challenge against the doctrine 
of common purpose, it can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory answer to concerns 
regarding the doctrine’s constitutionality. There can be little doubt, however, that the 
court’s response might well have been different had the appellants succeeded in making 
out a better case for their first argument. Had they been able to show that the doctrine of 
common purpose does indeed violate the right to dignity (or, for that matter, some other 
constitutionally protected right), then the court would have been constrained to pay 
closer attention to the question of whether the doctrine represents a constitutionally 
permissible norm of liability, by performing a proper enquiry in terms of section 36(1) 
of the 1996 Constitution. The court would then have been obliged to take account of the 
alternative forms of liability available for use in cases of joint wrongdoing. 
 
This in turn raises the question of whether there are grounds, other than those raised in 
Thebus, upon which the constitutionality of the doctrine may be challenged. In the 
following chapter, it will be argued that the doctrine of common purpose does indeed 
violate the right to dignity; not for the reasons advanced by the appellants, but because it 
represents an infringement of the principles of culpability, proportionality in 
punishment and fair labelling; all three of which, it will be shown, are inextricably 
connected with the right to dignity. It will also be argued that, by infringing the 
principle of proportionality in punishment, the doctrine violates the right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, protected by section 12(1)(e) of 











In S v Thebus, the appellants argued that the doctrine of common purpose violates the 
fundamental dignity of each person convicted of the same crime with others, because it 
de-individualises and de-humanises them by treating them ‘in a general manner as 
nameless, faceless parts of a group’.
1
 This argument held no sway with the 
Constitutional Court; perhaps unsurprisingly, since the argument sounds nonsensical, at 
least when couched in the terms in which it is reported in the judgment. As explained in 
the previous chapter, there is nothing in South African law that permits multiple accused 
charged with the same crime to be treated ‘in a general manner as nameless, faceless 
parts of a group’.
2
 Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument that the doctrine of 
common purpose, as it is currently applied in South African law, violates the dignity of 
the individual accused; not for the reasons argued in Thebus, but because it violates the 
principle of culpability, together with a number of related principles, all of which are 
integrally associated with the right to dignity in the sphere of criminal justice. This 
proposition will be discussed and amplified in this chapter. 
 
 
2. THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY 
 
Dignity (‘dignitas’) denotes a person’s sense of personal pride and self-worth.
3
 Along 
with reputation (‘fama’), body (‘corpus’) and physical freedom (‘libertas’), it makes up 
the bundle of physical and psychological interests that are recognised by law as the 
constituents of human personality. Whilst all four constituents confer justiciable rights 
upon the individual, dignity is accorded special importance in South African law, by 
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virtue of the provisions of the 1996 Constitution.
4
 In South Africa, human dignity is not 
only a constitutionally protected right,
5
 but one of the founding values upon which the 




Whilst the prominence accorded to dignity in the 1996 Constitution may be attributed 
primarily to reaction against the inhumanity and indignity to which so many were 
subjected during the years of apartheid,
7
 dignity is nevertheless a value implicit in, and 
fundamental to, any conception of society based on liberal precepts and respect for 
human rights.
8
 Thus, for example, its importance is acknowledged in the very first 
article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
9
 as well as in various other 
instruments of international human rights.
10
 Since the Second World War and, more 
recently, the fall of the Iron Curtain, there has been an increasing tendency to refer to 
human dignity in national constitutions, either as a founding principle or value, or as a 
justiciable right, or frequently both.
11
 An early example may be found in the German 
Constitution,
12
 which, like our own, was formulated in the wake of a political regime 
that involved gross violations of human rights, without regard for human dignity. 
Article 1(1) of the German Constitution now stipulates, as a precursor to the schedule of 
rights, that ‘the dignity of man shall be inviolable’ and the German courts, in the sixty-
odd years since its adoption, have developed a substantial body of jurisprudence on the 
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 which has included the review of criminal legislation by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court.
14
   
 
Respect for human dignity demands the recognition of the intrinsic (and thus 
inalienable) value and moral worth of each individual person. As such, the concept of 
human dignity is inextricably associated with the blend of individualist, libertarian and 
egalitarian values that have come to typify modern liberal democratic ideology. The 
liberal concept of dignity is essentially Kantian and individualistic in nature: It demands 
that each individual be regarded as an end in himself, rather than merely a means for 
achieving the ends of others,
15
 a view evidently shared by the South African 
Constitutional Court, as is evident from the dictum of Ackermann J in S v Dodo: 
 
Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be attached; they are creatures with 
inherent and infinite worth; they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as a 




It also demands respect for each individual as ‘fully human’; that is to say, as capable of 
rational thought and choice, of making moral judgments and, hence, as capable of 
evaluating, choosing and directing his own behaviour.
17
 Because of this, the individual 
has the innate right to choose his own ends and pursue them in his own ways, as free as 
possible from external constraint and interference.
18
 The liberal concept of dignity is 
therefore also fundamentally libertarian, in that it requires respect for the autonomy of 
the individual and the protection of his personal liberty.
19
 And it is egalitarian, in that it 
assumes that, since all individuals have dignity in the same measure, they are of equal 
worth and are thus entitled to equal concern and respect from society and its 
institutions.
20
 In as much as the ideals of libertarianism and egalitarianism are generally 
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regarded as inherently contradictory,
21
 dignity may be regarded as the crucial mediating 
factor.
22
 No society can be expected to guarantee its members absolute liberty, or 
equality in all things. However, a society founded on liberal values, with human dignity 
as its central value, is nevertheless required to guarantee its members liberty and 
equality in such matters and in such degree as may be necessary for and commensurate 





3. THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY AND THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The notion of liberty mediated by dignity has important implications for criminal 
justice. In the sphere of criminal law, the liberal conception of the individual as an 
autonomous moral agent finds expression in the notion that, with free will, comes 
personal responsibility.
24
 It is this principle which, according to Kantian thinking, 
entitles the state to condemn and punish the individual for choosing to break society’s 
laws. Holding an offender responsible for how he has chosen to act, and punishing him 
accordingly, is not cruel, inhuman, or degrading. On the contrary, it is an affirmation of 
the individual’s autonomy and, hence, his inherent dignity,
25
 whereas (for example) 
regarding criminal behaviour as an illness, something for which the offender is not 
responsible and for which he requires therapy rather than punishment,
26
 reduces him to 
something less than fully human and, as such, constitutes an affront to his dignity.
27
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It follows, however, that an individual may only be subjected to punishment for 
criminal conduct that was in fact a product of his own free will; conduct, in other words, 
for which he is personally responsible and thus blameworthy.
28
 This precept is 
commonly referred to as the principle of culpability,
29
 a principle that is recognised to a 
greater or lesser degree in all modern liberal systems of criminal justice. Thus, for 
example, individuals are not normally punished for their involuntary acts and omissions, 
nor if they genuinely lack the capacity for rational choice and self-control, as in the case 
of young children and the mentally ill. By the same token, individuals are not normally 
punished for the wrongdoing of other individuals, because such conduct falls outside the 
domain over which the individual is able to exercise his autonomy.
30
 The principle of 





The principle of culpability however has further implications for criminal justice. The 
concept of culpability is closely allied with the concept of fault (mens rea), as expressed 
in the classic maxim ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’; the notion that, in order for 
a person to be considered guilty, his unlawful conduct must have been accompanied by 
a culpable mental attitude towards that conduct. A person who engages in criminal 
conduct without the necessary mens rea can hardly be regarded as blameworthy and 
deserving of punishment.
32
 The importance of fault as a fundamental prerequisite of 
liability in Western criminal jurisprudence has been highlighted by the Constitutional 
Court (per O’Regan J) in the following terms:  
 
[T]he requirement of fault or culpability is an important part of criminal liability in our law. 
This requirement is not an incidental aspect of our law relating to crime and punishment; it 
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lies at its heart. The State's right to punish criminal conduct rests on the notion that culpable 




The striking degree of correspondence between different legal systems in relation to an 
element of fault in order to establish criminal liability reflects a fundamental principle of 
democratic societies: as a general rule people who are not at fault should not be deprived of 
their freedom by the State. This rule is the corollary of another rule which the same 
comparative exercise illustrates: when a person has committed an unlawful act intentionally 
or negligently, the State may punish them. Deprivation of liberty, without established 




It would be evident, therefore, that the generally accepted paradigm of criminal liability, 
comprising a voluntary actus reus, accompanied by criminal capacity and mens rea, did 
not emerge by mere chance and it is not coincidental that these three elements are 
common requirements amongst modern Western systems of criminal law, as Moseneke 
J seems to suggest in S v Thebus.
35
 On the contrary, they are reflective of a particular 
ideology concerning the nature of human existence and the proper relationship between 
the individual and the society in which he lives; an ideology to which South Africa has 
subscribed by virtue of its constitutional dispensation. It is submitted, therefore, that 
instead of the positivist approach that it chose to adopt in S v Thebus,
36
 this paradigm of 
criminal liability ought to have received the recognition of the Constitutional Court as 
establishing the ‘constitutionally permissible norm’,
37
 such that any extension of 
liability beyond this paradigm, whether in relation to fault, conduct, or any other 
element of liability, would be regarded as prima facie violations of the rights to dignity 
and freedom and would require justification in terms of the general limitations clause 
(section 36(1)). 
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The principle of culpability is not relevant only to the substantive elements of criminal 
liability, however. It is also closely allied to the principle of proportionality in 
punishment; the notion that each individual offender should be punished according to 
his own deserts; that is, according to the gravity of his offence and his own moral 
blameworthiness.
38
 Punishing a person solely (or primarily) to act as a deterrent to 
others, or for preventative purposes, or in order to achieve some other socially desirable 
goal, treats him as a mere means to an end, rather than an end in himself, and is an 
affront to his dignity.
39
 The Constitutional Court (per Ackermann J) has explicitly 
recognised the relationship between dignity, culpability and proportionality in 
punishment: 
 
The concept of proportionality goes to the heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment is 
cruel, inhuman or degrading, particularly where, as here, it is almost exclusively the length 
of time for which an offender is sentenced that is in issue... To attempt to justify any period 
of penal incarceration ... without inquiring into the proportionality between the offence and 
the period of imprisonment, is to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of 
human dignity. Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be attached; they are 
creatures with inherent and infinite worth; they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, 
never merely as means to an end. Where the length of a sentence, which has been imposed 
because of its general deterrent effect on others, bears no relation to the gravity of the 





To summarise, therefore, a ‘dignified’ approach to criminal justice requires that 
individuals be punished for their crimes, each according to his own culpability. 
Punishment cannot be divorced from culpability. If an individual is not culpable, no 
guilt attaches to him and punishment becomes merely a violation of the individual’s 
liberty and his dignity. This implies that punishment must be essentially desert-based 
and desert-based punishment is necessarily proportional. Whilst deterrence, prevention 
and incapacitation may (at least arguably) be permissible ancillary goals of 
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 the punishment of the individual purely (or primarily) for instrumental 
purposes is objectionable, because, by treating him as no more than a means to the ends 
of society, it constitutes an affront to his inherent dignity and a prima facie violation of 
his right to liberty. 
 
Although the above precepts are generally recognised in the criminal justice systems of 
all modern liberal societies, however, the extent to which they confer justiciable rights 
on the individual varies considerably, according to the degree of prominence accorded 
to the right to dignity in the particular constitutional dispensation concerned. For 
example, the Constitution of the United States of America (USA) and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
42
 contain no explicit references to human dignity. Thus, 
in the USA, the dignity of criminal suspects and defendants is not protected directly, but 
is afforded protection under the rights of due process and fair trial,
43
 whilst 
disproportionate punishment is reviewable under the right not to be subjected to ‘cruel 
and unusual’ punishment.
44
 The scope for constitutional review of the substantive 
criminal law is however generally limited to questions of compliance with the criteria of 
legality,
45
 although exceptions have been made in the case of laws involving the death 
penalty,
46
 and those that can be brought under the ambit of violations of the right to 
privacy.
47
 Although the Canadian Supreme Court takes a wider view of its powers of 
constitutional review of the substantive criminal law than courts in the USA, Canada 
approaches such challenges primarily from the perspective of the right to liberty.
48
 
Although the Canadian Supreme Court has implicitly recognised the principle of 
culpability in a number of decisions dealing with the requirement of mens rea,
49
 no 
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special importance is attached to the right to dignity per se and, indeed, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has held that respect for human dignity is not a ‘principle of 




By contrast, because of the primacy afforded to the right to dignity in the German 
Constitution,
51
 German criminal law adheres strictly to the principle of culpability. For 
this reason, criminal sanctions are divided into two forms, namely punishments and 
preventative measures. Punishments must conform strictly to the principles of 
culpability and proportionality, whilst preventative measures are unrelated to culpability 
and are based instead on dangerousness.
52
 Any criminal law infringing human dignity is 




In South Africa, the right to dignity, along with the right to life, is regarded as a value 
‘of the highest order’ under the Constitution.
54
 Although dignity does not carry quite the 
same primacy as in it does in German constitutional jurisprudence (where the right to 
dignity is considered inviolable), the prominence accorded to the right to dignity is 
reflected in various examples of constitutional litigation, including the review of the 
substantive criminal law. Thus, for example, in its decision to decriminalise same-sex 
sodomy, the Constitutional Court attached greater weight to the violation of the right to 
dignity arising from the stigmatisation of the conduct concerned than it did to the 
violation of other constitutionally protected rights such as equality and privacy, which 
were also implicated in the matter.
55
 Similarly, its recent striking-down of certain 
sections of the current Sexual Offences Act,
56
 which criminalised consensual sexual acts 
between adolescents, was based in the first instance on the violation by these provisions 
of the right to dignity, although the Constitutional Court also recognised that the 
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relevant provisions violated such children’s right to privacy and was not conducive to 
their best interests. It is therefore important to be mindful of these differences in 
emphasis when seeking to compare South African rulings on the constitutionality of the 
substantive criminal law with those of other jurisdictions. 
 
 
4. DIGNITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON PURPOSE 
 
Given the interconnection between the right to dignity and the principles of culpability 
and proportionality in punishment, as discussed above, the doctrine of common purpose 
gives rise to a number of concerns: 
 
4.1 Common purpose offends against the principle of culpability 
 
Because the principal actor’s conduct is imputed to the secondary party, the doctrine of 
common purpose holds the latter liable for criminal conduct which he did not personally 
commit; conduct which, as Unterhalter puts it, ‘falls outside the domain over which the 
individual is able to exercise his autonomy’.
57
 This is a deviation from the principle of 
personal responsibility, which is a corollary of the principle of culpability. At its most 
basic level, therefore, the doctrine represents a prima facie violation of the principle of 
culpability. Such a deviation could be justified, however, if it could be shown that the 
doctrine of common purpose nevertheless respects the principle of culpability by some 
other means. This could be achieved if some defensible normative basis existed for the 
imputation of the principal actor’s conduct to the secondary party, sufficient to warrant 
the conclusion that the latter’s wrongdoing is commensurate in culpability with that of 
the former. As previously discussed, authorisation, power of control and/or contributory 
causation would all offer such a normative basis,
58
 whilst substantial participation 
would offer a defensible proxy.
59
 None of these are necessary requirements for common 
purpose liability in South African law, however. On the contrary, it has been shown that 
there is no normative justification for the manner in which our courts have extended the 
scope of the doctrine to include minor and insignificant secondary participants. It is self-
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evident, therefore, that in such cases the doctrine of common purpose violates the 
principle of culpability and, thereby, the offender’s right to dignity.  
 
Whilst this might not be considered a serious obstacle to the constitutionality of the 
doctrine in jurisdictions where less prominence is accorded to the right to dignity, it is 
submitted that it cannot be so easily disregarded in South Africa, given the prominence 
assigned to the value of human dignity in the Constitution. It is not insignificant, 
therefore, that German law, which regards the right to dignity as inviolable and which 
consequently places great importance on the principle of culpability,
60
 contains no rules 
of imputation equivalent to the South African doctrine of common purpose. Instead, a 
distinction is drawn between perpetrators (direct and indirect, lone and multiple) and 
secondary parties, with liability attaching to each type of participant according to his 
own role in the crime.
61
 Although the Constitutional Court was evidently aware of the 
difference between German and South African law on this point when it delivered its 
judgment in Thebus,
62
 it may not have fully appreciated the implications of this 
difference. 
 
4.2 Common purpose offends against the principle of proportionality in punishment 
 
By holding a secondary party liable for the principal actor’s crime, irrespective of the 
secondary party’s own culpability, the necessary connection between culpability and 
punishment is disregarded. The secondary party is not only convicted of a crime that he 
did not personally commit; he is then sentenced as though he had committed that crime, 
regardless of his actual role in its conception and commission. Where his role in the 
planning and execution of the crime was minor and peripheral in nature, or where he is 
held liable for a corollary crime in which he did not participate at all and which he may 
have foreseen as no more than a possibility, this may translate into disproportionately 
harsh punishment. Although it is generally accepted that it is incumbent on a court, 
when passing sentence, to take account of any factors that bear upon the accused’s 
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moral blameworthiness, including his actual role in the commission of the crime,
63
 as 
well as the nature of his mens rea,
64
 the unfortunate reality is that courts seldom draw a 
sufficient distinction between participants on this basis. There is all too often a tendency 
to punish a secondary participant, whose contribution to the crime was minimal and 
who may not have foreseen its commission as anything more than a possibility,
65
 as 
severely as though he were the actual perpetrator,
66




Although the worst effects of this tendency have been ameliorated in more recent years, 
with the abolition of the death penalty,
68
 the minimum sentencing legislation currently 
in force hampers the sentencing discretion of a court which might otherwise be inclined 
to impose a less severe sentence on account of the minor role played by a secondary 
participant. Thus, for example, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997 requires the 
imposition of a minimum sentence of life imprisonment for murder and rape, when 
committed in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy, unless 
there are ‘substantial and compelling’ reasons why such sentence should not be 
imposed.
69
 Although such statutorily prescribed minimum sentences are now described 
as ‘discretionary’ rather than ‘mandatory’,
70
 they nevertheless represent a significant 
incursion upon judicial sentencing discretion. The fact that the legislature has made 
specific provision for the sentencing of offenders whose liability arises out of common 
purpose makes it difficult for a court to find that minimal participation alone constitutes 
a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the statutorily prescribed 
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 The usual reasoning in such cases is that the legislature must have been 
mindful of the variety of forms that secondary participation might take and would have 




It is this unduly punitive feature of the doctrine that has probably attracted more 
criticism than any other. Dressler, for example, describes the corresponding principle in 
American law as ‘a disgrace’.
73
 The reason is that, in such cases, it cannot be said that 
the individual is being punished according to his own deserts; instead, he is being 
punished primarily in order to serve the goals of society (deterrence, incapacitation 
and/or crime-prevention). This, for reasons that have been discussed, is an affront to his 
dignity. Disproportionately harsh punishment is also a violation of the constitutionally 




4.3 Common purpose offends against the principle of fair labelling 
 
Even in cases where the sentence itself is not disproportionately harsh, however, it is 
submitted that the doctrine of common purpose nevertheless violates the offender’s 
right to dignity, because it offends against the principle of fair labelling,
75
 the principle 
which requires that the stigma attaching to an offender in consequence of his conviction 
should be a fair and accurate reflection of his guilt. Although the principles of 
culpability and proportionality in punishment are well known and widely recognised 
principles of criminal justice, the principle of fair labelling is rather less widely 
recognised and some further elucidation is therefore necessary. 
 
The concept of ‘fair labelling’ was initially derived from ‘labelling theory’, a theory 
developed in the early 1960s by Becker and other criminologists to explain how the 
stigmatisation of offenders as deviant individuals (‘outsiders’) marginalises them and 
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predisposes them to re-offend.
76
 In 1981, in an essay on the subject of transferred 
intention, Professor Andrew Ashworth,
77
 who was both a criminologist and a scholar of 
criminal law, adopted the term ‘labelling’ (stigmatisation) from labelling theory and, 
bridging the traditional divide between criminology and normative legal theory,
78
 
coined the term ‘representative labelling’,
79
 which he described as ‘the belief that the 
label applied to an offence ought fairly to represent the offender’s wrongdoing’.
80
 
Further on in the same essay, he explains: 
 
[O]nce the label is entered on the person’s criminal record the passage of time will dim 
recollections of the precise nature of the offence and may result in the label being taken at 
face value. Both out of fairness to the individual and in order to ensure accuracy in our legal 





Professor Glanville Williams, responding to Ashworth’s essay, amplified the latter’s 
brief exposition of the principle with the words:  
 
I understand this to mean not merely that the name of the abstract offence but the particulars 
stated in the conviction should convey the degree of the offender’s moral guilt, or at least 
should not be positively misleading as to that guilt’.
82
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Professor Williams in turn proposed the term ‘fair’ labelling, which he thought was a 
more accurate description than Ashworth’s original term,
83
 and it is Williams’s term 
that has since been generally adopted. Although Chalmers and Leverick claim that the 
principle of fair labelling has since become ‘common currency in criminal law 
scholarship’,
84
 this may be a mild exaggeration. Literature on the subject is hardly 
abundant or extensive, but it is fair to say that the principle has been accorded 
increasing recognition, although largely within the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
(UK).
85







 and, of course, Ashworth himself,
89
 now 
include at least a brief discussion of the subject in the introductory chapters of their 
standard works. One area of legal scholarship in which the principle of fair labelling has 
indeed become common currency is the relatively young, but rapidly-developing field 
of international criminal law. Robinson goes so far as to identify the principle of fair 
labelling as one of three fundamental principles of criminal law, recognised by 
international criminal law, which distinguish a liberal system of criminal justice from an 
authoritarian system.
90
 The principle of fair labelling has also received some degree of 
formal recognition in Canadian law, by virtue of a series of judgments, beginning with 
R v Vaillancourt, in which the Supreme Court has held that, in view of the ‘special 
stigma’ attaching to certain crimes, such as murder, attempted murder, war crimes and 
                                                 
83
 Williams (note 82 above) 85. Williams was concerned that the term ‘representative’ might be 
misleading, since it is also used in other legally relevant senses, as for example in the term ‘representative 
government’. 
84
 J Chalmers & F Leverick ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 217, 217. 
85
 It would not be correct, however, to think that recognition of the principle of fair labelling has been 
entirely confined to the UK. It has also received some degree of recognition in Canadian and Australian 
legal circles; see, for example, B Ziff ‘The Rule Against Multiple Fictions’ (1986) 25(2) Alberta LR 160 
and D Stuart ‘The Dangers of Quick Fix Legislation in the Criminal Law’ in RJ Daniels, P Macklem and 
K Roach (eds) The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001). See also A 
Hemming ‘Reasserting the Objective Tests in Criminal Responsibility: Ending the Supremacy of 
Subjective Tests’ 2011 (13) Univ of Notre Dame Australia LR 69.  
86
 AP Simester & CR Sullivan Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine 2ed (revised) (2004) 44-45. 
87
 J Herring Criminal Law: Texts, Cases and Materials 5ed (2012) 1-15. 
88
 CMV Clarkson Understanding Criminal Law 4ed (2005) 9-12. 
89
 Ashworth (note 81 above) 78-80. 
90
 D Robinson ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of 
International Law  925, 926; and see also D Robinson ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal 
Law’ in C Stahn & L van den Herik (eds) Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (2010) 
115, 119-120. The other two principles that he identifies are the principle of personal culpability and the 
principle of legality (ibid). 





crimes against humanity, as well as the severity of punishment in such cases, subjective 




Simester and Sullivan explain that the principle of fair labelling is a necessary adjunct to 
the need for justice not only to be done, but to be seen to be done.
92
 They go on to 
explain:  
 
The criminal law speaks to society as well as wrongdoers when it convicts them, and it 





Like Ashworth, Simester and Sullivan take the view that the designations attached to 
offences (their ‘labels’)  should reflect public perceptions of differences in wrongdoing 
and that, where these distinctions are blurred, the law’s communicative function is 
impaired. Further in this regard, they explain that the distinction between crimes is not 
merely a matter of distinguishing between different outcomes of criminal conduct (the 
nature and/or amount of harm done), but also reflects socially significant differences in 
the conduct leading to those outcomes (the mode of offending).
94
 The law must make it 
clear, they argue, ‘exactly what sort of criminal each offender is’ (emphasis added) and 
communicate this to the offender, so that he knows exactly how he has transgressed and 
the reason for his punishment.
95
 In this way, the punishment will be meaningful to him 
and not just arbitrary harsh treatment. This information must also be communicated to 
the public, so that it knows the nature of the offender’s transgression.
96
 In essence, 
therefore, the principle of fair labelling requires the definition of an offender’s guilt in 
                                                 
91
 R v Vaillancourt and other cases referred to in note 49 above; and see also R v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701 
(subjective mens rea required for war crimes and crimes against humanity). It should be noted that 
Canadian law does not always require subjective mens rea for crimes that would normally require this 
form of fault in South African law. 
92




 Thus, for example, they argue that it would be wrong to conflate the crimes of vandalism and negligent 
damage to property, because although their outcome (loss of property) may be the same, vandalism 
involves a degree of contempt for society that is not present in negligent damage to property (ibid). 
Herring makes the same point in slightly different terms: ‘In defining the offence, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the losses suffered by the victim and the wrongs done to the victim’. He argues that it 
is therefore appropriate for the law to distinguish between crimes such as criminal damage to property 
and theft, and between negligent injury and assault (Herring, note 87 above, 14-15). 
95
 Simester & Sullivan (note 86 above) 45. 
96
 Ibid. 





such a way that his particular type of wrongdoing, its relative gravity and the extent of 
his legal and moral blameworthiness are accurately expressed and conveyed, thereby 
enabling his personal culpability to be accurately assessed and readily distinguished 
from that of other offenders. 
 
It would be evident, therefore, that the principle of fair labelling derives from the 
recognition of the importance of the criminal law’s condemnatory or denunciatory 
function, which in turn has important implications for an offender’s rights of 
personality. A criminal conviction has two immediate implications for an offender: 
Firstly, the court’s verdict is a formal, public statement of condemnation 
(denunciation)
97
 and, as such, it constitutes a direct affront to the offender’s dignity (an 
injuria).
98
 Secondly, it determines the stigma that will attach to the offender in the eyes 
of the public; that is to say, the extent to which his reputation (fama) stands to suffer in 
consequence of his conviction,
99
 which in turn constitutes a further infringement of his 
legally protected rights of personality. Whatever justifications may exist for permitting 
these infringements (and it is commonly accepted that they are indeed justified),
100
 it is 
clear that such justifications can hold good only insofar as the court’s verdict is a true 
and fair reflection of the offender’s culpability. A misrepresentation of an offender’s 
guilt cannot constitute a justifiable infringement of his rights of personality.  
 
Furthermore, whilst some might regard the stigmatisation of criminal offenders as no 
more than an unfortunate, but unavoidable ‘by-product’ of conviction and punishment, 
the more common view is that such stigmatisation is an essential function of the 
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criminal justice system and a central element of punishment.
101
 If this is accepted as 
correct, it follows logically that the principle of proportionality should apply, not only to 
the sentence formally imposed by the court, but also to the stigma that the offender must 
bear in consequence of his conviction and sentence.
102
 Since unfair labelling implies 
unfair stigmatisation,
103
 it can be argued that it also amounts to disproportionately harsh 
punishment. Unfair labelling also has serious implications for future punishment. An 
offender’s criminal record will have a direct impact on his sentence in the event that he 
re-offends. In such cases, the offender’s criminal record is likely to be ‘taken at face 
value’, as Ashworth puts it.104 The offender therefore has a direct and concrete interest 
in having the nature and gravity of his offences fairly and accurately reflected in his 
criminal record. If his culpability is overstated, it is likely to result in undeservedly 




The doctrine of common purpose stigmatises a secondary party as having committed a 
crime that he did not in fact commit and in which his role may have been merely minor 
and peripheral. A secondary party may thus be branded a ‘murderer’, a ‘robber’, an 
‘arsonist’, etc, when he has neither committed such a crime, nor been instrumental in its 
commission in any meaningful sense. This overstatement of the offender’s guilt 
amounts to unfair stigmatisation.
106
 Although this is true of any crime, it is of particular 
concern in the case of murder, being arguably the most serious crime in our law, in view 
of the fact that South African law, unlike some other legal systems, does not distinguish 
between different degrees of murder. For the reasons explained above, it is submitted 
that this unfair stigmatisation amounts to an unjustifiable infringement of the offender’s 
right to dignity and reputation and, furthermore, because of the aforegoing, amounts to 
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disproportionately harsh punishment. It is possible that these were the points that the 
appellants were attempting to make in their first argument in S v Thebus.
107
 If so, it is 




5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the arguments advanced by the appellants in 
Thebus, to the effect  that the doctrine of common purpose, in its present form, infringes 
the right to freedom and security of the person and the right to be presumed innocent, 
should have received more serious consideration by the Constitutional Court than they 
were accorded, at least to the point of subjecting such infringements to scrutiny in terms 
of the general limitations clause (section 36(1)).  In this chapter it has been shown that 
the doctrine of common purpose also infringes the principles of culpability, 
proportionality in punishment and fair labelling, thereby violating the right to dignity, 
with which these principles are intimately associated. In so doing, it also violates the 
right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading  punishment. Although this is 
not necessarily so in all cases where the doctrine applies, it is indeed the case when the 
doctrine is applied to minor and insignificant secondary participants, where there is 
neither any normative justification for the application of the doctrine, nor any 
demonstrable instrumental justification.  
 
It is therefore submitted that, despite the Constitutional Court’s ruling to the contrary in 
Thebus, the doctrine of common purpose does not in fact pass constitutional muster in 
such cases, and that our law of complicity is consequently in need of reform, to bring it 
into line with Constitutional norms and values. Conclusions and recommendations in 
this regard will be discussed in the final chapter. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
1.1 The scope and ambit of the doctrine of common purpose 
 
It has been shown that, whereas the Roman-Dutch law approach towards complicity 
was monistic in nature, the English law approach was largely dualistic, with a 
distinction being drawn between primary and secondary participants (principals and 
accessories) in the case of felonies. During the early part of the 19
th
 century, English 
law developed the doctrine of common purpose in order to extend the scope of liability 
of principals in the second degree (abettors), which was in turn based on the older 
principle of imputed conduct. Whilst liability as a principal in the second degree 
originally required proof of aiding and abetting, the doctrine of common purpose held 
that a secondary participant would be liable as a principal in the second degree if he was 
present at the time of the crime, in pursuance of a prior conspiracy to commit the crime 
in concert with the actual perpetrator or perpetrators. It was then unnecessary to prove 
conduct on the part of the secondary participant amounting to actual aiding and abetting.  
 
It has also been shown that, whilst the South African approach towards complicity was 
originally based on Roman-Dutch law, the English law approach was adopted and 
superimposed onto the Roman-Dutch law approach during the early years of the 20
th
 
century. It may be speculated that this was done primarily because the doctrine of 
common purpose (and the principle of imputed conduct on which it was based) 
provided a legal basis for holding secondary participants liable as co-principals, in 
accordance with the monistic approach preferred in Roman-Dutch law. In so doing, 
however, the South African courts extended the scope of the doctrine considerably, so 
as to bring accessories before the fact and, eventually, all co-conspirators within its 
ambit. Thus, whereas English law required presence at the time of the crime, in 
pursuance of a conspiracy to commit the crime in concert, South African law dispensed 
with the need for all these requirements to be met in any given case. Accordingly, where 





there is a prior conspiracy, South African law does not require presence at the time of 
the crime, or an actual contribution towards its execution. Because of this, it appears 
that, in South African law, a common purpose need not take the form of a conspiracy to 
commit a particular crime or crimes; it may also take the form of an ‘ongoing’ 
conspiracy to commit a series of crimes, the particulars of which need not have been 




In addition to these developments, however, and even more controversially, the South 
African courts also extended the scope of the doctrine so as to dispense with the need 
for prior conspiracy in all instances. Thus, where there is presence at the time of the 
crime, it is unnecessary to prove the existence of a prior conspiracy, or an actual 
contribution towards the execution of the crime (aiding and/or abetting); all that is 
required is unilateral conduct showing solidarity with the conduct of the actual 
perpetrator, coupled with the necessary intention to commit the crime in concert with 
the latter.
2
 And, lastly, South African law dispensed with the need to establish the scope 
of a common purpose as a matter of objective fact. It is only necessary to prove 
association in a criminal enterprise of some kind, coupled with the necessary mens rea 
for the crime in question, which is generally established by ex post facto enquiry. Thus 
one party to a common purpose will be liable for a collateral crime committed by 
another if the commission of that crime was foreseen as a possibility by the former, 
regardless of what the parties may have agreed upon in advance and regardless of  
whether the collateral crime was necessary for, or incidental to the achievement of the 
common purpose. 
 
It can be concluded, therefore, that since its adoption into South African law, the scope 
of the doctrine of common purpose has been extended well beyond its original scope in 
English law, or indeed its scope in other common-law jurisdictions which also apply a 
version of the doctrine, with the sole exception of Scottish law. Consequently, whilst 
South African law does allow for accessorial liability, in the form of accomplices, the 
scope of the doctrine of common purpose is now so wide that it leaves very little scope 
for accessorial liability. In the vast majority of cases, a person who furthers or assists in 
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the commission of another’s crime will be a co-perpetrator, rather than an accomplice, 
by virtue of the doctrine of common purpose. As a result, the South African approach 
towards complicity has remained largely monistic in nature, with very little scope for 
the drawing of distinctions between participants on the basis of their actual role in the 
conception and commission of the crime and, hence, on the basis of their own 
culpability.  
 
1.2 Justifications for the doctrine of common purpose 
 
It has been shown that, although the medieval English principle of imputed conduct 
originally rested on little more than practical exigency (the need to convert accessories 
at the fact into co-principals, so as to render them amenable to justice without the need 
for the principal offender first to be tried and convicted) the doctrine of common 
purpose has generally been rationalised on the basis of the principles of agency. In 
South African law, it was originally considered to rest on the principle of implied 
mandate; or, more properly, quasi-mandate.  
 
Despite criticisms of the mandate analogy, it has been shown that the concept of 
mandate nevertheless offers three clear and defensible normative grounds upon which 
the imputation of a principal actor’s conduct to a secondary participant may be justified; 
namely, authorisation, power of control and indirect causation: Where a remote party 
instructs or authorises another person to perform a criminal act, or has the power to 
direct and control the latter’s conduct, or influences the latter into committing a crime, 
then the latter is merely the instrument through which the remote party exercises his 
autonomous will. In such circumstances, it is entirely in accordance with the principles 
of normative justice to regard the remote party as a co-perpetrator of the crime and to 
impute the actual perpetrator’s criminal conduct to him for such purpose.
3
 It has also 
been argued that, in cases where one party is a substantial participant in the planning or 
commission of another’s crime, this too would offer a defensible proxy for causation, as 
a basis for holding the secondary participant liable as a co-perpetrator.  
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Authorisation, power of control, indirect causation and substantial participation are not, 
however, sufficient to justify the extremely broad scope of common purpose liability in 
modern South African law. In particular, they cannot justify the imputation of the 
principal actor’s criminal conduct to a minor secondary participant, who exercised no 
authority, control, or influence over the commission of the crime and whose 
contribution thereto was of no significance or consequence. This is so, regardless of 
whether the secondary participant’s act of association took the form of prior conspiracy, 
or spontaneous association. On the contrary, it has been shown that there is no 
normative justification of any kind for the extension of the doctrine of common purpose 
to cover such cases.  
 
The lack of any normative basis for the doctrine in such cases is highly problematic, 
since it flies in the face of decades of legal development and refinement, in which our 
courts have generally striven to approach the criminal law on a rational, systematic and 
principled basis. It is also problematic, since it means that liability for a serious crime 
like murder can arise from a relatively trivial act of association, which in no way 
contributed to the death of the deceased, or encouraged or facilitated the commission of 
the crime. This is an unacceptable departure from the principles of normative criminal 
justice, which require liability and punishment to be commensurate with personal 
culpability. Disregard for the principle of culpability is inherently problematic in a 
constitutional dispensation that seeks to protect fundamental human rights and, in 
particular, to foster respect for the inherent dignity of each individual, including those 
who offend against the law. 
 
Although the Constitutional Court attempted to justify the doctrine primarily on the 
basis of the pressing need for crime control,
4
 it was shown that crime control arguments 
in favour of the doctrine are far from convincing. There is no empirical evidence to 
show that the interests of crime control are better served by a monistic approach to 
complicity than by a dualistic approach. On the contrary, what evidence there is on the 
subject suggests that there may well be greater utility in a dualistic approach, because an 
approach based on differences in personal contribution to the commission of the crime 
coincides more closely with public perceptions of differences in moral blame-
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 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC). 





worthiness, and because assigning liability in proportion to perceived moral 
blameworthiness (‘fair labelling’) helps to harness the normative social influences of the 
community, which have proven to be a more effective crime deterrent than the fear of 
detection and punishment per se. In short, therefore, it can be concluded that there is no 
real justification for the doctrine in its present extensive form, other than that it favours 
the convenience of the prosecution. Prosecutorial convenience alone cannot however be 
regarded as a sufficient justification for the draconian treatment of offenders in a 
constitutional dispensation that is concerned with the protection of fundamental human 
rights.  
 
1.3 The constitutionality of the doctrine 
 
Although the Constitutional Court found the doctrine of common purpose to be 
constitutionally compliant in S v Thebus,
5
 it has been shown that the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling is open to criticism in a number of respects and it has been argued that 
the doctrine of common purpose, in its present extended form, does in fact violate an 
offender’s constitutionally protected rights. Firstly and most importantly, the doctrine 




1.3.1 It allows for the imposition of liability without regard for the principle of 
personal culpability; the essential principle whereby the dignity of offenders is 
protected and the moral and social legitimacy of the criminal justice system is 
maintained. Although this is not the case in those instances where there is a clear 
and defensible normative basis for the imputation of the primary actor’s conduct 
to the secondary party (as discussed above), it is the case where such conduct is 
imputed to minor and insignificant secondary parties, whose culpability cannot 
be regarded as commensurate in any sense with that of the principal actor and 
other major participants. 
 
1.3.2 By allowing for the imposition of liability without regard for personal 
culpability, it also allows for the imposition of punishment without regard for 
                                                 
5
 S v Thebus (note 4 above). 
6
 The right to dignity is protected by s10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the 
1996 Constitution). 





personal desert. It has been explained that, in a constitutional dispensation that 
seeks to protect human dignity and personal freedom, punishment should 
essentially be desert-based. Where an offender’s sentence is not based on 
personal desert, but is imposed primarily for reasons of social utility (such as 
crime control), it infringes the offender’s right to dignity; and, where such 
sentence is substantially more severe than the offender deserves, it also amounts 
to disproportionately harsh punishment. It has furthermore been shown that, in 
our constitutional jurisprudence, disproportionately harsh punishment is 
necessarily cruel, inhuman and degrading, and thus a violation of the right to 




1.3.3 Even in those cases where the offender’s sentence is not substantially more 
severe than he deserves, however, it has been shown that the doctrine of 
common purpose nevertheless infringes the principle of fair labelling,
8
 because 
it stigmatises the offender as having committed a crime that he did not in fact 
commit and in which his role may have been minor and negligible. Over-
representing an offender’s culpability amounts to unfair stigmatisation, which in 
turn constitutes an unjustifiable insult to his dignity, as well as an unjustifiable 
injury to his reputation. It has been argued that these unjustifiable injuries 
represent disproportionately harsh punishment in themselves and, hence, a 
violation of the offender’s right to freedom and security of the person. 
Furthermore, insofar as the public record overstates the offender’s culpability, it 
compromises his right to a fair and proportionate punishment in the event that he 
re-offends, which is a further, prospective violation of his right to freedom and 
security of the person. 
 
Secondly, because the doctrine of common purpose infringes the offender’s right to 
dignity and may furthermore subject him to disproportionately harsh punishment, as 
described above, it is submitted that it also infringes his constitutionally protected right 
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 The right ‘not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way’ is protected by s12(1)(e) 
of the 1996 Constitution, which is concerned with the protection of the right to freedom and security of 
the person. 
8
 The principle of fair labelling requires that the stigma attaching to an offender in consequence of his 
conviction should be a fair and accurate reflection of his guilt. 





not to be deprived of his freedom without just cause.
9
 Although it is conceded that the 
doctrine does not represent an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of freedom, since it is causally 
linked to the objectively-determinable government purposes of crime control and 
prosecutorial convenience, it has been shown that these purposes alone are not sufficient 
to constitute ‘just cause’ for such a deprivation. It has been held that the concept of ‘just 
cause must be grounded upon and consonant with the values expressed in [section] 1 of 
the Constitution and gathered from the provisions of the Constitution’;
10
 yet it has been 
shown that, in the case of minor and insignificant secondary participants, where there is 
no normative basis for the application of the doctrine, the doctrine is not consonant with 
the values expressed in section 1 of the Constitution, nor is it consistent with those 
provisions of the Constitution that are concerned with the protection of the right to 
dignity and the right to not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
11
 
At the same time, no evidence has been advanced to support the Constitutional Court’s 
suggestion that, without the doctrine, significant numbers of criminal participants would 
be beyond the reach of the law;
12
 nor (as previously mentioned) has any evidence been 
advanced to show that the interests of crime control are better advanced by holding 
secondary participants liable as co-principals than by treating them as accomplices. It 
can therefore be concluded that, in those cases where there is no normative foundation 
for the application of the doctrine, it cannot represent a constitutionally permissible 
norm of liability, sufficient to constitute just cause for depriving an individual of his 
freedom. 
 
Lastly, it is submitted that the doctrine of common purpose infringes the presumption of 
innocence,
13
 because, to paraphrase the words of Cameron J in S v Meaker,
14
 the effect 
of the doctrine is to ‘lock the accused into the crime’ by associating him, through a fact 
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 The right ‘not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause’ is protected by s12(1)(a) of the 
1996 Constitution. 
10
 S v Boesak 2001 (1) SACR 1 (CC) para 37 (per Lange DP, cited with approval in S v Thebus, note 4 
above, para 39). 
11
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12
 They could instead be held liable as accomplices to the crime, or convicted of incitement or conspiracy 
to commit the crime, or, in appropriate cases, of an attempt to commit that crime, or of attempted 
incitement, or public violence. 
13
 The right to be presumed innocent is protected by s35(3)(h) of the 1996 Constitution. Section 35 deals 
with the incidents of the right to a fair trial. 
14
 S v Meaker 1998 (2) SACR 73 (W). 










Although none of the rights protected by the 1996 Constitution may be regarded as 
absolute and inviolable, it is submitted that the abovementioned infringements are 
neither reasonable nor justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, when all relevant factors are taken into account, 
including (1) the nature of the rights infringed (the right to dignity and freedom and the 
right to be presumed innocent, bearing in mind, in particular, the high value accorded to 
the right to dignity); (2) the relatively low value to be accorded to the true purpose of 
the doctrine (prosecutorial convenience); (3) the draconian nature and extent of the 
limitation posed by the doctrine, which holds minor and insignificant secondary 
participants liable as though they had committed the crime themselves; (4) the fact that 
the doctrine goes further than is reasonably necessary to ensure that those who 
intentionally participate in the commission of crimes by other persons are criminalised 
and punished; and (5) the fact that there are equally practical, normatively defensible 




It can be concluded, therefore, that the doctrine of common purpose, in its present form, 
represents an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the rights referred to above; 
namely, the right to dignity, the right to freedom and security of the person, and the 
right to be presumed innocent, and that the South African law of complicity is 
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 Cf the dictum of Cameron J in S v Meaker (note 14 above) 84A-B. 
16
 Section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides: ‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
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factors, including – (a)   the nature of the right; (b)   the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c)   the nature and extent of the limitation; (d)   the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e)   less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’ 





2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
 
There are various ways in which the reform of the South African law of complicity 
could be approached. The radical approach would be to eradicate the doctrine of 
common purpose entirely and to judge all secondary participants on the basis of their 
liability as accomplices.
17
 This would doubtless be regarded as the only satisfactory 
solution by those critics who, like Rabie,
18
 object to the principle of imputation per se, 
and would prefer to see liability based on a causal nexus between the conduct of the 
secondary party and the commission of the crime. At the same time, there are other 
critics, like the appellants in S v Thebus, who do not object to the doctrine of common 
purpose in general, but only to the active association form of common purpose.
19
 It has 
been shown, however, that the broadening of the scope of common purpose liability 
arising from prior conspiracy, so as to include the type of ‘ongoing’ common purpose 
envisaged S v Nzo,
20
 is equally capable, in its own way, of producing unjust and 
constitutionally questionable results as the active association form of common purpose. 
It is therefore submitted that the preferable approach to reform would be one that is 
guided, as far as possible, by existing normative principles; in particular, the principles 
of culpability and fair labelling. Proposals for the reform of the South African law of 
complicity are accordingly submitted with these considerations in mind. 
 
2.1 Categories of participant 
 
It is submitted that there is no need for the creation of additional or alternative forms of 
participation. The existing three categories of participant (perpetrators/co-perpetrators, 
accomplices and accessories after the fact) are sufficient and should be retained. The 
scope of liability as a co-perpetrator, arising from association in a common purpose, 
should however be considerably narrowed, thus allowing considerably wider scope for 
accomplice liability, as more fully described below. 
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 This appears to be what Burchell is advocating in his critique of the doctrine of common purpose (J 
Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) 583. 
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 M Rabie ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose in Criminal Law’ (1971) 88 SALJ 227, 237. 
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 S v Thebus (note 4 above). 
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 S v Nzo (note 1 above) introduced the concept of an ‘ongoing’ common purpose. 





2.2 Co-perpetrator liability 
 
It is submitted that liability as a co-perpetrator (co-principal) on the basis of the doctrine 
of common purpose should be reserved for those cases where the secondary 
participant’s role in the commission of the crime is sufficient to render him an ‘indirect’ 
perpetrator, in accordance with the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se. In order to 
achieve this, liability should be based on more than mere association with the actual 
perpetrator, regardless of whether such association arose spontaneously, or from prior 
conspiracy. Association should remain a minimum requirement for liability as a co-
perpetrator and the existing criteria for association should be retained for this purpose,
21
 
but it should no longer be a sufficient requirement. Liability should instead be based on 
association plus a substantial contribution to the conception, planning or execution of 
the crime.
22
 It is accordingly recommended that the following secondary/remote 
participants (only) should be regarded as co-perpetrators in terms of the doctrine of 
common purpose: 
 
1. A conspirator who also instigates (procures or otherwise authorises) the commission 









3. A party to a common purpose, whether formed by conspiracy or active association, 
who also plays a substantial role in the execution of the crime. 
                                                 
21
 That is to say, the requirements for conspiracy and the requirements for spontaneous association, as set 
out in S v Mgedezi (note 2 above), depending on the facts of the case. 
22
 The proposals that follow in this regard are substantially in accordance with Dressler’s proposals, 
discussed in ch5, s2.3 (see further J Dressler ‘Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser 
Offence’ (2008) 5 Ohio State J of Crim L 427, 448). 
23
 In this case, ‘authorised’ should mean actual authorisation, whether express or tacit (by conduct). There 
should be no scope for fictional or constructive (implied) authorisation.  
24
 The term ‘substantial role’ is intended to denote the equivalent of Dressler’s concept of ‘substantial 
participation’, as discussed in ch5 s2.3 (Dressler, note 22 above, 448). Whilst it may be thought that 
substantial participation is too flexible a criterion for criminal liability and that it would not be able to 
satisfy the need for reasonable certainty of outcome (the ius certum), it is submitted that it is no more 
flexible than the present test for legal causation, or the distinction between an attempt and an act of mere 
preparation, both of which require a court to make a value judgment, which in turn is ultimately guided 
by considerations of public policy, fairness and reasonableness. 





Conspirators, as envisaged in the first and second scenarios, would not need to be 
present at the time of the crime in order for liability to arise.
25
 In the third scenario, 
presence at the time of the crime would of course be necessary, in order for there to be 
substantial participation in the execution of the crime.
26
 In all three scenarios, it is 
submitted, there are clear and defensible normative grounds for regarding the secondary 
participant as a perpetrator, albeit of an indirect kind, rather than as an accessory. It is 
further submitted that, in these circumstances (and despite the arguments of those critics 
who object to the principle of imputation per se), there can be no legitimate objection to 
imputing the principal actor’s conduct to the remote or secondary party, or to invoking 
the doctrine of common purpose in order to do so.  
 
2.3 Accomplice liability 
 
It follows that a secondary participant who does not meet the requirements for common 
purpose liability, as described in one or other of the three scenarios outlined above, 
would at most be regarded as an accomplice. Whilst there is no need to reform the 
present law of accomplice liability, there is certainly a need (as mentioned at the 
conclusion of the fourth chapter) for this area of law to be developed and refined. In 
particular, in order for accomplice liability to fulfil the expanded role envisaged for it, it 
will be vitally important to clarify the nature of the causal relationship that is required to 
exist between the conduct of an accomplice and the commission of the crime by the 
actual perpetrator, and to do so in such a way that the scope of accomplice liability is 
not unduly narrowed. It is therefore proposed that it should be regarded as sufficient if 
the accomplice’s conduct merely facilitates the commission of the crime in some way 
(that is to say, makes it easier, more expeditious, or more convenient for the actual 
perpetrator to commit the crime), even if the crime could and probably would have been 
committed without the accomplice’s contribution. This would mean that a conspirator 
who neither instigates the crime, nor plays a substantial role in its planning and/or 
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 That is to say, the distinction drawn by Lewis AJA in S v Njenje 1966 (1) SA 368 (SRA) ) 377B-C 
should be revived. 
26
 Where the crime was executed by prior conspiracy, then such presence could take the form of 
constructive presence, so that it would include an active participant who is physically stationed at a 
remote location, but who is nevertheless in contact with the perpetrators and/or is playing a pre-assigned 
role in the execution of the crime. The concept of constructive presence is sufficiently well documented in 
English law that there should be no difficulties of interpretation. 





execution, would be regarded as an accomplice only if his conduct amounted in some 
way to furthering or assisting in the commission of the crime. Merely showing 
‘solidarity’ with the perpetrator, by expressing agreement with, or approval of the 
commission of the crime, would not suffice for accomplice liability. 
 
2.4 Other forms of liability 
 
There will therefore be a relatively small number of individuals who are currently being 
held liable as co-perpetrators, by virtue of the doctrine of common purpose, who will 
meet neither the reformulated requirements for common purpose liability, nor qualify to 
be regarded as accomplices. This, it is submitted, is entirely in accordance with the 
principles of culpability and fair labelling. Thus, a person who conspires to commit a 
crime, but who is not an instigator and plays no part at all in its planning or execution 
(for example, the individual described above, who merely expresses agreement with, or 
approval of the commission of the crime) would no longer be regarded as a party to the 
crime. Such a person would however be liable instead for the inchoate crime of 
conspiracy to commit the crime in question. By the same token, a person who is present 
at the scene of a crime and who joins in with its commission, but whose role in the 
commission of the crime is insignificant and inconsequential (like that of the fourth 
accused in S v Safatsa),
27
 would no longer be regarded as a participant either. 
Depending on what form his conduct took, however, such an individual might be liable 
for an attempt to commit the crime, or for incitement to commit it, or for attempted 




2.5 Liability for collateral crimes 
 
As far as possible, liability for collateral crimes should be attributed in accordance with 
the general principles and distinctions outlined above. For this purpose, it is proposed 
that a distinction be drawn between the different types of co-perpetrator, according to 
their method of association:  
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 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868 (A). 
28
 These recommendations are largely in accordance with Burchell’s views on the subject (Burchell, note 
17 above, 585).  





2.5.1 A co-perpetrator (as defined above) who acceded to a common purpose by prior 
conspiracy would also be a co-perpetrator in respect of any collateral crimes 
committed in pursuance of the common purpose, provided that he had the 
necessary mens rea for their commission. This is much as the law stands at 
present, however it is recommended that the enquiry for this purpose should be 
developed, so that, as in the modern English law of joint criminal enterprise,
29
 it 
would fall into two parts: Firstly, the court should determine whether, as a 
matter of objective fact, the collateral crime was one committed in pursuance of 
the common purpose, rather than an independent crime. The proposed test for 
this purpose would be whether the collateral crime was reasonably necessary for, 
or incidental to the successful achievement of the common purpose (including 
escape and the avoidance of detection). If not, it would not constitute conduct 
falling within the scope of the common purpose and only the actual perpetrator 
would be liable. Once the court had determined that the collateral crime fell 
within the scope of the common purpose, the second part of the enquiry would 
be whether the participant in question had the necessary mens rea for its 





2.5.2 A co-perpetrator who acceded to the common purpose by substantial 
participation (ie, a non-conspirator) should not be liable as a co-perpetrator for a 
collateral crime committed by his fellow participants, unless it can be shown that 
he also entered into a common purpose to commit the collateral crime, by one or 
other of the methods envisaged in section 2.2 above. A participant who 
intentionally furthered or assisted in the commission of a collateral crime, 
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 See ch2 s4.4 above. 
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 In light of the SCA’s recent ruling in S v Makgatho 2013 (2) SACR 13 para 9, it seems that foresight of 
a remote possibility will no longer suffice to meet the requirements for dolus eventualis. This 
development will resolve many of the concerns regarding the attribution of liability for collateral crimes, 
so further reform in this particular regard is unnecessary. 





2.6 Practical and evidential considerations 
 
Suggestions for the reform of the doctrine of common purpose commonly generate two 
types of practical concern. The first relates to the difficulties of proving an individual 
participant’s causal contribution to the commission of the crime, in cases where there 
are multiple wrongdoers, all acting more or less simultaneously.
31
 This concern, it is 
submitted, has been adequately addressed in the proposals outlined above, by allowing 
for liability to be based on considerations other than causation, such as substantial 
participation in the conception, planning or execution of the crime. 
 
A second concern relates to the difficulty of proving the respective contributions of 
individual participants, when this information may be known only to the participants 
themselves, who cannot be compelled to divulge it, or trusted to do so truthfully. In 
order to address this problem, there is no reason why, without going so far as to create 
constitutionally offensive presumptions of liability, or reversals of the onus of proof, 
rules of evidence could not be developed to assist the court and the prosecution. Thus, 
for example, where there is proof that a conspirator was present at the time of the crime, 
the ‘natural inference’ would be that he was a substantial participant in either the 
conception and planning of the crime, or its execution, or both.
32
 Such an inference 
would then place an evidential burden on the party in question (not an onus), which 
would require him to disturb the inference by adducing credible evidence as to his 
actual role in and contribution to the crime, sufficient at least to create a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not he was a substantial participant. This type of evidential rule 




3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is submitted that, whilst it has been shown that there are a number of serious concerns 
regarding the constitutionality of the doctrine of common purpose in the extended form 
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 This concern was, for example, expressed in S v Thebus (note 4 above) para 34. 
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 This, in essence, was the original English law concept of common purpose, as described in ch2, s3.4 
above. 





in which it is currently applied in South African law, it would be a relatively simple 
matter to reform the existing law of complicity so that these concerns could be 
eliminated, without creating intractable problems of proof, overly burdening the 
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